GHSA-X26H-XMV8-GXF7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 21:42 – Updated: 2026-06-19 21:42
VLAI
Summary
stigmem-node: RTBF tombstones are mis-attributed and suppress reads tenant-blind (cross-tenant BOLA)
Details

Summary

On a multi-tenant stigmem node, RTBF (right-to-be-forgotten) tombstones were mis-scoped two ways. (1) issue_tombstone defaulted the tenant to "default" instead of the caller's tenant, so tombstones could be written to the wrong tenant. (2) The read-suppression path — _get_tombstone_filter (routes/facts/common.py) and the _tombstone_scope_cache (lifecycle/tombstones.py) — had no tenant_id predicate, so tombstone suppression was applied tenant-blind across fact queries and provenance. Reached via /v1/tombstones and the fact query/provenance read paths.

Impact

Cross-tenant integrity of the RTBF mechanism: a tenant's deletion request could be recorded against the wrong tenant, and tombstone suppression could hide — or fail to hide — facts across tenant boundaries, undermining both data-view correctness and RTBF guarantees.

Affected configurations

This is a cross-tenant break. It is exploitable only on deployments running the opt-in stigmem-plugin-multi-tenant (multiple tenants on one node). A default single-tenant node has only tenant="default" — there is no second tenant to cross — so it is not exploitable on default deployments. The rating is HIGH for the multi-tenant deployments the plugin exists to isolate.

Patches

Fixed in 0.9.0a12 (PR #728): identity.tenant_id is passed from issue_tombstone into create_tombstone (no more "default" fallback); AND tenant_id = ? was added to _get_tombstone_filter and get_tombstone_status; the suppression cache is re-keyed to include tenant; and all four read call sites thread the caller's tenant. A tenant-B tombstone now suppresses only tenant-B facts and is invisible to tenant-A reads.

Workarounds

None other than upgrading to 0.9.0a12. Single-tenant deployments are unaffected.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "stigmem-node"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.9.0a12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T21:42:57Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nOn a multi-tenant stigmem node, RTBF (right-to-be-forgotten) tombstones were mis-scoped two ways. (1) `issue_tombstone` defaulted the tenant to `\"default\"` instead of the caller\u0027s tenant, so tombstones could be written to the wrong tenant. (2) The read-suppression path \u2014 `_get_tombstone_filter` (`routes/facts/common.py`) and the `_tombstone_scope_cache` (`lifecycle/tombstones.py`) \u2014 had no `tenant_id` predicate, so tombstone suppression was applied tenant-blind across fact queries and provenance. Reached via `/v1/tombstones` and the fact query/provenance read paths.\n\n### Impact\nCross-tenant integrity of the RTBF mechanism: a tenant\u0027s deletion request could be recorded against the wrong tenant, and tombstone suppression could hide \u2014 or fail to hide \u2014 facts across tenant boundaries, undermining both data-view correctness and RTBF guarantees.\n\n### Affected configurations\nThis is a cross-**tenant** break. It is exploitable **only** on deployments running the opt-in `stigmem-plugin-multi-tenant` (multiple tenants on one node). A default single-tenant node has only `tenant=\"default\"` \u2014 there is no second tenant to cross \u2014 so it is **not exploitable** on default deployments. The rating is HIGH for the multi-tenant deployments the plugin exists to isolate.\n\n### Patches\nFixed in `0.9.0a12` (PR #728): `identity.tenant_id` is passed from `issue_tombstone` into `create_tombstone` (no more `\"default\"` fallback); `AND tenant_id = ?` was added to `_get_tombstone_filter` and `get_tombstone_status`; the suppression cache is re-keyed to include tenant; and all four read call sites thread the caller\u0027s tenant. A tenant-B tombstone now suppresses only tenant-B facts and is invisible to tenant-A reads.\n\n### Workarounds\nNone other than upgrading to `0.9.0a12`. Single-tenant deployments are unaffected.",
  "id": "GHSA-x26h-xmv8-gxf7",
  "modified": "2026-06-19T21:42:57Z",
  "published": "2026-06-19T21:42:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/eidetic-labs/stigmem/security/advisories/GHSA-x26h-xmv8-gxf7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/eidetic-labs/stigmem/pull/728"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/eidetic-labs/stigmem"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "stigmem-node: RTBF tombstones are mis-attributed and suppress reads tenant-blind (cross-tenant BOLA)"
}



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