GHSA-WXW6-8QPF-7GRC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-20 06:32 – Updated: 2026-11-20 06:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: atl1c: drop oversized RX frames instead of panicking
atl1c sizes its receive buffers from the netdev MTU plus a fixed set of L2 overheads, which comes to 1522 bytes at the default MTU. A link partner that sends a longer frame - in practice a MikroTik CCR2004-1G-2XS-PCIe, whose RouterOS side defaults to l2mtu 1600 while the host stays at MTU 1500 - makes the length reported by the RX return descriptor exceed what the hardware wrote, and skb_put() then either includes bytes that were never received or trips skb_over_panic and takes the host down.
Compare the descriptor length against buffer_info->length, the length the hardware was given, rather than against skb_tailroom(): the skb carries 64 bytes of slack for the DMA erratum, so tailroom is larger than the DMA buffer and a frame in between would pass the check and still be delivered with a tail the device never wrote. The same test rejects frames shorter than ETH_HLEN + ETH_FCS_LEN; before this change a reported length below ETH_FCS_LEN underflowed in skb_put().
The frame is dropped with kfree_skb_reason(SKB_DROP_REASON_PKT_TOO_BIG) so drop_monitor and the kfree_skb tracepoint see it, and counted through dev_core_stats_rx_dropped_inc(), which survives atl1c_get_stats() overwriting the hardware counters on every read. It also counts as work: atl1c_clean_rfd() has already recycled the RFD, and the refill at the end of the poll only runs when work_done is non-zero, so sustained oversized traffic would otherwise drain the ring and stop RX.
Tested on a MikroTik CCR2004-1G-2XS-PCIe (4x AR8151) in a Proxmox VE host, with atl1c built from a DKMS tree carrying this change: the l2mtu-1600 traffic that panics the stock driver is dropped and counted with the patch applied, and received normally once the host MTU is raised to match.
This complements commit 36c2009d90f2 ("net: atl1c: fix soft lockup on out-of-range tpd_cons read"), which fixed the TX side of the same "host dies while the card resets" problem.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99744"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-20T06:18:12Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: atl1c: drop oversized RX frames instead of panicking\n\natl1c sizes its receive buffers from the netdev MTU plus a fixed set of L2\noverheads, which comes to 1522 bytes at the default MTU. A link partner\nthat sends a longer frame - in practice a MikroTik CCR2004-1G-2XS-PCIe,\nwhose RouterOS side defaults to l2mtu 1600 while the host stays at MTU 1500\n- makes the length reported by the RX return descriptor exceed what the\nhardware wrote, and skb_put() then either includes bytes that were never\nreceived or trips skb_over_panic and takes the host down.\n\nCompare the descriptor length against buffer_info-\u003elength, the length the\nhardware was given, rather than against skb_tailroom(): the skb carries 64\nbytes of slack for the DMA erratum, so tailroom is larger than the DMA\nbuffer and a frame in between would pass the check and still be delivered\nwith a tail the device never wrote. The same test rejects frames shorter\nthan ETH_HLEN + ETH_FCS_LEN; before this change a reported length below\nETH_FCS_LEN underflowed in skb_put().\n\nThe frame is dropped with kfree_skb_reason(SKB_DROP_REASON_PKT_TOO_BIG) so\ndrop_monitor and the kfree_skb tracepoint see it, and counted through\ndev_core_stats_rx_dropped_inc(), which survives atl1c_get_stats()\noverwriting the hardware counters on every read. It also counts as work:\natl1c_clean_rfd() has already recycled the RFD, and the refill at the end\nof the poll only runs when work_done is non-zero, so sustained oversized\ntraffic would otherwise drain the ring and stop RX.\n\nTested on a MikroTik CCR2004-1G-2XS-PCIe (4x AR8151) in a Proxmox VE host,\nwith atl1c built from a DKMS tree carrying this change: the l2mtu-1600\ntraffic that panics the stock driver is dropped and counted with the patch\napplied, and received normally once the host MTU is raised to match.\n\nThis complements commit 36c2009d90f2 (\"net: atl1c: fix soft lockup on\nout-of-range tpd_cons read\"), which fixed the TX side of the same\n\"host dies while the card resets\" problem.",
"id": "GHSA-wxw6-8qpf-7grc",
"modified": "2026-11-20T06:32:10Z",
"published": "2026-11-20T06:32:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99744"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/11c873d6e6a497b5ee3699c63b57b49a882aa580"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/18ca06b36c4da8b46859dcd1c9aec557d05bc23a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/655463ba1de62e7f4893cabfc89fe70d0e33f55d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c4ba1716853de5178a9df785844ebb5e397a80e6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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