GHSA-WX6R-3M2Q-4MM6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-10-15 03:36In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: igmp: remove multicast group from hash table on device destruction
When a device is destroyed under RTNL, ip_mc_destroy_dev() iterates through the multicast list and calls ip_ma_put() on each membership, scheduling them for RCU reclamation. However, they are not unlinked from the device's multicast hash table (mc_hash).
Since the device remains published in dev->ip_ptr until after ip_mc_destroy_dev() completes, concurrent RCU readers traversing mc_hash can still locate and access the multicast group after its refcount is decremented. If the RCU callback runs and frees the group while a reader is accessing it, a use-after-free occurs.
Fix this by unlinking the multicast group from mc_hash using ip_mc_hash_remove() before scheduling it for reclamation.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ip_check_mc_rcu+0x149/0x3f0 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888009bf1408 by task mausezahn/2276
Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x67/0x90 print_report+0x175/0x7c0 kasan_report+0x147/0x180 ip_check_mc_rcu+0x149/0x3f0 udp_v4_early_demux+0x36d/0x12d0 ip_rcv_finish_core+0xb8b/0x1390 ip_rcv_finish+0x54/0x120 NF_HOOK+0x213/0x2b0 __netif_receive_skb+0x126/0x340 process_backlog+0x4f2/0xf00 __napi_poll+0x92/0x2c0 net_rx_action+0x583/0xc60 handle_softirqs+0x236/0x7f0 do_softirq+0x57/0x80
Allocated by task 2239: kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 __kasan_kmalloc+0x72/0x90 ____ip_mc_inc_group+0x31a/0xa40 __ip_mc_join_group+0x334/0x3f0 do_ip_setsockopt+0x16fa/0x2010 ip_setsockopt+0x3f/0x90 do_sock_setsockopt+0x1ad/0x300
Freed by task 0: kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 __kasan_slab_free+0x3a/0x60 __rcu_free_sheaf_prepare+0xd4/0x220 rcu_free_sheaf+0x36/0x190 rcu_core+0x8d9/0x12f0 handle_softirqs+0x236/0x7f0
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-64423"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-416"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-25T10:17:26Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipv4: igmp: remove multicast group from hash table on device destruction\n\nWhen a device is destroyed under RTNL, ip_mc_destroy_dev() iterates through\nthe multicast list and calls ip_ma_put() on each membership, scheduling\nthem for RCU reclamation. However, they are not unlinked from the device\u0027s\nmulticast hash table (mc_hash).\n\nSince the device remains published in dev-\u003eip_ptr until after\nip_mc_destroy_dev() completes, concurrent RCU readers traversing mc_hash\ncan still locate and access the multicast group after its refcount is\ndecremented. If the RCU callback runs and frees the group while a reader is\naccessing it, a use-after-free occurs.\n\nFix this by unlinking the multicast group from mc_hash using\nip_mc_hash_remove() before scheduling it for reclamation.\n\nBUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ip_check_mc_rcu+0x149/0x3f0\nRead of size 4 at addr ffff888009bf1408 by task mausezahn/2276\n\nCall Trace:\n \u003cIRQ\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl+0x67/0x90\n print_report+0x175/0x7c0\n kasan_report+0x147/0x180\n ip_check_mc_rcu+0x149/0x3f0\n udp_v4_early_demux+0x36d/0x12d0\n ip_rcv_finish_core+0xb8b/0x1390\n ip_rcv_finish+0x54/0x120\n NF_HOOK+0x213/0x2b0\n __netif_receive_skb+0x126/0x340\n process_backlog+0x4f2/0xf00\n __napi_poll+0x92/0x2c0\n net_rx_action+0x583/0xc60\n handle_softirqs+0x236/0x7f0\n do_softirq+0x57/0x80\n \u003c/IRQ\u003e\n\nAllocated by task 2239:\n kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80\n __kasan_kmalloc+0x72/0x90\n ____ip_mc_inc_group+0x31a/0xa40\n __ip_mc_join_group+0x334/0x3f0\n do_ip_setsockopt+0x16fa/0x2010\n ip_setsockopt+0x3f/0x90\n do_sock_setsockopt+0x1ad/0x300\n\nFreed by task 0:\n kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80\n kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50\n __kasan_slab_free+0x3a/0x60\n __rcu_free_sheaf_prepare+0xd4/0x220\n rcu_free_sheaf+0x36/0x190\n rcu_core+0x8d9/0x12f0\n handle_softirqs+0x236/0x7f0",
"id": "GHSA-wx6r-3m2q-4mm6",
"modified": "2026-10-15T03:36:21Z",
"published": "2026-07-25T12:31:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64423"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-019113.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-457936.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2ca18df1c2611f70eb3eb487e02ae85eb703b284"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/412ba7def06ffe974ba9a1d862b022362c54ffa5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5f42729d74bd6c61306d864423290d92962de4e1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/76d030ac95e17f91d69a595f17ebc5979700cf9a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7993211bde166471dffac074dc965489f86531f8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8820b530cb2388503d7418228d03ba074bf7a03e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c6cb5f8ebe1c1a78710c19f102db9fe48b9e6ba9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f91883031e5a62877a29ce139442973cbea769f1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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