GHSA-WWFP-W96M-C6X8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-07 18:14 – Updated: 2026-05-06 23:25
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw: Pairing pending-request caps were enforced per channel instead of per account
Details
Summary
Before OpenClaw 2026.3.31, pending pairing-request caps were enforced per channel file instead of per account. On multi-account channel setups, requests from other accounts could fill the shared pending window and block new pairing challenges on an unaffected account.
Impact
This issue could deny new pairing or onboarding on another account until an existing request was approved or expired. It was an availability-only bug; it did not allow cross-account approval, data access, or authorization bypass.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Affected versions:
>= 2026.2.26, < 2026.3.31 - Patched versions:
>= 2026.3.31 - Latest published npm version:
2026.4.1
Fix Commit(s)
9bc1f896c8cd325dd4761681e9bdb8c425f69785— scope pending request caps per account
Release Process Note
The fix shipped in OpenClaw 2026.3.31 on March 31, 2026. The current published npm release 2026.4.1 from April 1, 2026 also contains the fix.
Thanks @smaeljaish771 for reporting.
Severity
5.3 (Medium)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2026.2.26"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.3.31"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-41346"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-799"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-07T18:14:44Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nBefore OpenClaw 2026.3.31, pending pairing-request caps were enforced per channel file instead of per account. On multi-account channel setups, requests from other accounts could fill the shared pending window and block new pairing challenges on an unaffected account.\n\n## Impact\n\nThis issue could deny new pairing or onboarding on another account until an existing request was approved or expired. It was an availability-only bug; it did not allow cross-account approval, data access, or authorization bypass.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003e= 2026.2.26, \u003c 2026.3.31`\n- Patched versions: `\u003e= 2026.3.31`\n- Latest published npm version: `2026.4.1`\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- `9bc1f896c8cd325dd4761681e9bdb8c425f69785` \u2014 scope pending request caps per account\n\n## Release Process Note\n\nThe fix shipped in OpenClaw `2026.3.31` on March 31, 2026. The current published npm release `2026.4.1` from April 1, 2026 also contains the fix.\n\nThanks @smaeljaish771 for reporting.",
"id": "GHSA-wwfp-w96m-c6x8",
"modified": "2026-05-06T23:25:01Z",
"published": "2026-04-07T18:14:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-wwfp-w96m-c6x8"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41346"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/9bc1f896c8cd325dd4761681e9bdb8c425f69785"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-denial-of-service-via-improper-pending-pairing-request-cap-enforcement"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw: Pairing pending-request caps were enforced per channel instead of per account"
}
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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