GHSA-WWF9-7JRC-RV4Q

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 21:18 – Updated: 2026-06-19 21:18
VLAI
Summary
Outerbase Studio: Stored XSS in Text Widget Leads to Authentication Token Exposure
Details

Summary

A Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) issue previously existed in the Text Widget in Board of Outerbase Studio where unsanitized HTML could be rendered using dangerouslySetInnerHTML

Steps to Reproduce

  1. Create a new dashboard.
  2. Add a Text widget.
  3. Insert the following payload:
<img src=x onerror="alert('XSS Executed\nToken: ' + localStorage.getItem('ob-token'))">

Architectural Context

Outerbase Cloud and its backend services were discontinued in 2025.

The current version of Outerbase Studio operates purely as a client-side application, with dashboard data stored locally in the browser.

Impact

In the current architecture, the impact is limited to local self-XSS within a user's browser session. The previously described scenarios involving:

  • authentication token theft
  • account takeover
  • database access

are no longer applicable since there are no active backend services or authentication tokens.

Remediation

The unsafe HTML rendering in the Text Widget has been removed in commit https://github.com/outerbase/studio/commit/b06fb85e5967440278d5a815721b360920566ab9 by eliminating the use of dangerouslySetInnerHTML.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@outerbase/studio"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.10.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55650"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T21:18:44Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nA Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) issue previously existed in the Text Widget in Board of Outerbase Studio where unsanitized HTML could be rendered using `dangerouslySetInnerHTML`\n\n### Steps to Reproduce\n\n1. Create a new dashboard.\n2. Add a **Text widget**.\n3. Insert the following payload:\n\n```html\n\u003cimg src=x onerror=\"alert(\u0027XSS Executed\\nToken: \u0027 + localStorage.getItem(\u0027ob-token\u0027))\"\u003e\n```\n\n### Architectural Context\n\nOuterbase Cloud and its backend services were discontinued in 2025.\n\nThe current version of Outerbase Studio operates purely as a client-side application, with dashboard data stored locally in the browser.\n\n### Impact\n\nIn the current architecture, the impact is limited to local self-XSS within a user\u0027s browser session.\nThe previously described scenarios involving:\n\n- authentication token theft\n- account takeover\n- database access\n\nare no longer applicable since there are no active backend services or authentication tokens.\n\n### Remediation\n\nThe unsafe HTML rendering in the Text Widget has been removed in commit https://github.com/outerbase/studio/commit/b06fb85e5967440278d5a815721b360920566ab9 by eliminating the use of dangerouslySetInnerHTML.",
  "id": "GHSA-wwf9-7jrc-rv4q",
  "modified": "2026-06-19T21:18:44Z",
  "published": "2026-06-19T21:18:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/outerbase/studio/security/advisories/GHSA-wwf9-7jrc-rv4q"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/outerbase/studio/commit/b06fb85e5967440278d5a815721b360920566ab9"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/outerbase/studio"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Outerbase Studio: Stored XSS in Text Widget Leads to Authentication Token Exposure"
}



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