GHSA-WW26-C733-J3R5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-19 12:32 – Updated: 2026-10-19 12:32Exposure of Data Element to Wrong Session vulnerability in Apache Camel Thrift component.
This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1.
The Thrift data format unmarshalled incoming data into the shared defaultInstance of the target type rather than into a fresh copy, and returned that shared object as the exchange body. Because the instance is shared process-wide, state written while unmarshalling one message stayed on the object and was visible to every later message that used the same type. Fields absent from a later payload retained the previous message's values, so content belonging to one sender could be read while processing another sender's message, and concurrent exchanges could observe each other's partially written state. In a deployment that serves more than one tenant or user through the same route, that is disclosure of one party's data to another.
Upgrade to Apache Camel 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. Users on the 4.18.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.18.5. Users on the 4.22.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.22.1. Unmarshalling now deserializes into a copy, so each exchange gets its own instance and no state carries between messages. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, copy the unmarshalled body into a new instance immediately after the data format runs, and do not retain references to the returned object.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-85245"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-488"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-19T11:17:22Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Exposure of Data Element to Wrong Session vulnerability in Apache Camel Thrift component.\n\n\n\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1.\n\nThe Thrift data format unmarshalled incoming data into the shared defaultInstance of the target type rather than into a fresh copy, and returned that shared object as the exchange body. Because the instance is shared process-wide, state written while unmarshalling one message stayed on the object and was visible to every later message that used the same type. Fields absent from a later payload retained the previous message\u0027s values, so content belonging to one sender could be read while processing another sender\u0027s message, and concurrent exchanges could observe each other\u0027s partially written state. In a deployment that serves more than one tenant or user through the same route, that is disclosure of one party\u0027s data to another.\n\nUpgrade to Apache Camel 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. Users on the 4.18.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.18.5. Users on the 4.22.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.22.1. Unmarshalling now deserializes into a copy, so each exchange gets its own instance and no state carries between messages. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, copy the unmarshalled body into a new instance immediately after the data format runs, and do not retain references to the returned object.",
"id": "GHSA-ww26-c733-j3r5",
"modified": "2026-10-19T12:32:51Z",
"published": "2026-10-19T12:32:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-85245"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25823"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25940"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25942"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-85245.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-24442"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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