GHSA-WV45-QHGQ-9H5F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-24 18:31 – Updated: 2026-10-03 12:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rtrs-srv: Fix integer underflow in process_read and process_write
usr_len is read from a network-supplied message field (le16_to_cpu) and used to compute data_len = off - usr_len without validating that usr_len <= off. A malicious RDMA client can send usr_len > off causing an integer underflow, resulting in data_len wrapping to a huge size_t value which is then passed to the rdma_ev callback as a memory length, leading to out-of-bounds memory access.
Fix by reading and validating usr_len <= off before rtrs_srv_get_ops_ids() in both process_read() and process_write(), ensuring the early return path acquires no reference and has no resource leak.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-97413"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-24T17:17:18Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nRDMA/rtrs-srv: Fix integer underflow in process_read and process_write\n\nusr_len is read from a network-supplied message field (le16_to_cpu)\nand used to compute data_len = off - usr_len without validating that\nusr_len \u003c= off. A malicious RDMA client can send usr_len \u003e off causing\nan integer underflow, resulting in data_len wrapping to a huge size_t\nvalue which is then passed to the rdma_ev callback as a memory length,\nleading to out-of-bounds memory access.\n\nFix by reading and validating usr_len \u003c= off before rtrs_srv_get_ops_ids()\nin both process_read() and process_write(), ensuring the early return\npath acquires no reference and has no resource leak.",
"id": "GHSA-wv45-qhgq-9h5f",
"modified": "2026-10-03T12:31:11Z",
"published": "2026-09-24T18:31:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97413"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/24ad03bfeda05fca04c56677e57fd3d6bc3e9978"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2c52b2afded988233cd4ccc185cf5147bbc77a76"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/54bf38b27afc08a0eb6b732f9c14eb8a4bcb66b5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6b1e26e70d7ca9f0906af2283558a530eeb1f066"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b042b4947752df0b3d16e683ac09fb4f7f0e33e0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c76e9123ab91a903396d26e6ab1b5caae5c6b149"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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