GHSA-WV26-J37Q-2G7P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-02 16:18 – Updated: 2026-07-02 16:18Summary
Slack plugin approvals used the exec approver gate for plugin actions. In affected versions, a Slack user authorized only for exec approvals could resolve a plugin approval through the exec approver gate.
This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed.
Impact
When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could approve a plugin action outside the operator's intended approval split. Practical impact depends on the operator's configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path.
Patched Versions
The first stable patched version is 2026.5.12.
Mitigations
keep approval allowlists aligned and review Slack approval actions manually until patched. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.5.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-02T16:18:24Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nSlack plugin approvals used the exec approver gate for plugin actions. In affected versions, a Slack user authorized only for exec approvals could resolve a plugin approval through the exec approver gate.\n\nThis advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw\u0027s trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed.\n\n### Impact\n\nWhen the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could approve a plugin action outside the operator\u0027s intended approval split. Practical impact depends on the operator\u0027s configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path.\n\n### Patched Versions\n\nThe first stable patched version is `2026.5.12`.\n\n### Mitigations\n\nkeep approval allowlists aligned and review Slack approval actions manually until patched. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.",
"id": "GHSA-wv26-j37q-2g7p",
"modified": "2026-07-02T16:18:24Z",
"published": "2026-07-02T16:18:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-wv26-j37q-2g7p"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [],
"summary": "OpenClaw\u0027s Slack plugin approvals used the exec approver gate for plugin actions"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.