GHSA-WRX6-QM3H-C589
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-09 12:32 – Updated: 2026-09-10 18:31Potential problem for users of the org.apache.parquet.crypto.keytools package in Apache Parquet, versions 1.12 to 1.18. This package enables users to encrypt Parquet files via an envelope encryption mechanism that wraps (encrypts) data keys via a Key Management Service (KMS). On the reader side, the KMS URL can be application-controlled or file-controlled. If the user does not leverage application control for this parameter, a file-controlled KMS URL is forwarded to a pluggable KmsClient implementation. If the pluggable implementation does not perform host validation, a KMS token can be sent to a malicious host set by an attacker in the file.
Before the problem is fixed, users are recommended to leverage application control for KMS URL parameter in readers (versions 1.12-1.18). After the problem is fixed (presumably in version 1.19), the upgrade will disable file-controlled KMS URL by default. Users of the KMS URL parameter will have two options then: leverage application control for KMS URL parameter in readers, or enable file-controlled KMS URL (via a new app parameter). The latter option will explicitly require (in the new parameter documentation) to validate the KMS URL and use authentication in the custom implementation of the KMS client plug in.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-73334"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-09T11:17:15Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Potential problem for users of the\u00a0org.apache.parquet.crypto.keytools package in Apache Parquet, versions 1.12 to 1.18. \nThis package enables users to encrypt Parquet files via an envelope encryption mechanism that wraps (encrypts) data keys via a Key Management Service (KMS).\u00a0\nOn the reader side, the KMS URL can be application-controlled or file-controlled.\nIf the user does not leverage application control for this parameter, a file-controlled KMS URL is forwarded to a pluggable KmsClient implementation. \nIf the pluggable implementation does not perform host validation, a KMS token can be sent to a malicious host set by an attacker in the file.\n\nBefore the problem is fixed, users are recommended to\u00a0leverage application control for KMS URL parameter in readers (versions 1.12-1.18).\nAfter the problem is fixed (presumably in version 1.19), the upgrade will disable file-controlled KMS URL by default. Users of the KMS URL parameter\u00a0\nwill have two options then:\u00a0leverage application control for KMS URL parameter in readers, or enable file-controlled\u00a0KMS URL (via a new app parameter).\nThe latter option will explicitly require (in the new parameter documentation) to validate the KMS URL and use authentication in the custom implementation of the KMS client plug in.",
"id": "GHSA-wrx6-qm3h-c589",
"modified": "2026-09-10T18:31:39Z",
"published": "2026-09-09T12:32:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73334"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/ro2vomk9xxhv34xhvopgys96c9j8ojm0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/08/11"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.