Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-WR7X-H83J-8FQG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-05 09:31 – Updated: 2026-08-08 15:30

Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

xfrm: iptfs: propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG in iptfs_skb_add_frags()

When iptfs_skb_add_frags() copies frag references from the source frag walk into a new SKB, it increments the page reference count via __skb_frag_ref() but does not propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG to the destination SKB's skb_shinfo->flags.

If the source SKB carries shared frags (e.g. from a page-pool backed receive path), the new inner SKB will appear to ESP as having privately owned frags. A subsequent esp_input() call for a nested transport-mode SA then takes the no-COW fast path and decrypts in place, writing over pages that are still referenced by the outer IPTFS SKB. This causes kernel-visible memory corruption and can trigger a panic.

All other frag-transfer helpers in the kernel (skb_try_coalesce, skb_gro_receive, __pskb_copy_fclone, skb_shift, skb_segment) correctly propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG; align iptfs_skb_add_frags() with this convention by setting the flag inside the loop immediately after __skb_frag_ref() and nr_frags++, so every exit path that attaches a frag unconditionally propagates SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG.

Severity

9.8 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-64566"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-05T08:16:36Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nxfrm: iptfs: propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG in iptfs_skb_add_frags()\n\nWhen iptfs_skb_add_frags() copies frag references from the source\nfrag walk into a new SKB, it increments the page reference count via\n__skb_frag_ref() but does not propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG to the\ndestination SKB\u0027s skb_shinfo-\u003eflags.\n\nIf the source SKB carries shared frags (e.g. from a page-pool backed\nreceive path), the new inner SKB will appear to ESP as having privately\nowned frags.  A subsequent esp_input() call for a nested transport-mode\nSA then takes the no-COW fast path and decrypts in place, writing over\npages that are still referenced by the outer IPTFS SKB.  This causes\nkernel-visible memory corruption and can trigger a panic.\n\nAll other frag-transfer helpers in the kernel (skb_try_coalesce,\nskb_gro_receive, __pskb_copy_fclone, skb_shift, skb_segment) correctly\npropagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG; align iptfs_skb_add_frags() with this\nconvention by setting the flag inside the loop immediately after\n__skb_frag_ref() and nr_frags++, so every exit path that attaches a frag\nunconditionally propagates SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG.",
  "id": "GHSA-wr7x-h83j-8fqg",
  "modified": "2026-08-08T15:30:24Z",
  "published": "2026-08-05T09:31:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64566"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/430ea57d6daf765e88f90046afbfd1e071cb7200"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d8aaf06b29f5a0b6186cf68d21c7d63678ee3891"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ffd64e0717efd83fbf3396ab4e5ac6d795dac4d0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

CVE-2026-64566 (GCVE-0-2026-64566)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-05 08:06 – Updated: 2026-08-17 04:57

Title

xfrm: iptfs: propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG in iptfs_skb_add_frags()

Summary

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: iptfs: propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG in iptfs_skb_add_frags() When iptfs_skb_add_frags() copies frag references from the source frag walk into a new SKB, it increments the page reference count via __skb_frag_ref() but does not propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG to the destination SKB's skb_shinfo->flags. If the source SKB carries shared frags (e.g. from a page-pool backed receive path), the new inner SKB will appear to ESP as having privately owned frags. A subsequent esp_input() call for a nested transport-mode SA then takes the no-COW fast path and decrypts in place, writing over pages that are still referenced by the outer IPTFS SKB. This causes kernel-visible memory corruption and can trigger a panic. All other frag-transfer helpers in the kernel (skb_try_coalesce, skb_gro_receive, __pskb_copy_fclone, skb_shift, skb_segment) correctly propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG; align iptfs_skb_add_frags() with this convention by setting the flag inside the loop immediately after __skb_frag_ref() and nr_frags++, so every exit path that attaches a frag unconditionally propagates SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG.

Severity

9.8 (Critical)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Assigner

Linux CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard D 53/100 over 6653 records in the last 180 days details

References

3 references

URL	Tags
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d8aaf06b29f5a0b61…
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ffd64e0717efd83fb…
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/430ea57d6daf765e8…

Impacted products

2 products

Vendor	Product	Version
Linux	Linux	Affected: 5f2b6a9095743a6bf1f34c43c4fe78fa8bdf5ad7 , < d8aaf06b29f5a0b6186cf68d21c7d63678ee3891 (git) Affected: 5f2b6a9095743a6bf1f34c43c4fe78fa8bdf5ad7 , < ffd64e0717efd83fbf3396ab4e5ac6d795dac4d0 (git) Affected: 5f2b6a9095743a6bf1f34c43c4fe78fa8bdf5ad7 , < 430ea57d6daf765e88f90046afbfd1e071cb7200 (git)
Linux	Linux	Affected: 6.14 Unaffected: 0 , < 6.14 (semver) Unaffected: 6.18.42 , ≤ 6.18.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.1.6 , ≤ 7.1.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.2 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix)

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{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "d8aaf06b29f5a0b6186cf68d21c7d63678ee3891",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5f2b6a9095743a6bf1f34c43c4fe78fa8bdf5ad7",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "ffd64e0717efd83fbf3396ab4e5ac6d795dac4d0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5f2b6a9095743a6bf1f34c43c4fe78fa8bdf5ad7",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "430ea57d6daf765e88f90046afbfd1e071cb7200",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5f2b6a9095743a6bf1f34c43c4fe78fa8bdf5ad7",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.14"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.14",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.42",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.1.6",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.18.42",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.14",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.1.6",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.14",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.2",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.14",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nxfrm: iptfs: propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG in iptfs_skb_add_frags()\n\nWhen iptfs_skb_add_frags() copies frag references from the source\nfrag walk into a new SKB, it increments the page reference count via\n__skb_frag_ref() but does not propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG to the\ndestination SKB\u0027s skb_shinfo-\u003eflags.\n\nIf the source SKB carries shared frags (e.g. from a page-pool backed\nreceive path), the new inner SKB will appear to ESP as having privately\nowned frags.  A subsequent esp_input() call for a nested transport-mode\nSA then takes the no-COW fast path and decrypts in place, writing over\npages that are still referenced by the outer IPTFS SKB.  This causes\nkernel-visible memory corruption and can trigger a panic.\n\nAll other frag-transfer helpers in the kernel (skb_try_coalesce,\nskb_gro_receive, __pskb_copy_fclone, skb_shift, skb_segment) correctly\npropagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG; align iptfs_skb_add_frags() with this\nconvention by setting the flag inside the loop immediately after\n__skb_frag_ref() and nr_frags++, so every exit path that attaches a frag\nunconditionally propagates SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "baseScore": 9.8,
            "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "AV:N - The flaw is on the IPsec IPTFS receive path: inbound ESP packets hit xfrm_input \u2192 iptfs_input \u2192 iptfs_skb_add_frags, then reinjected inner packets reach nested transport-mode esp_input(); a remote IPTFS/IPsec peer triggers it with network packets.\nAC:L - On a host with IPTFS plus a nested transport-mode SA, the peer fully controls packet sizes and ESP payloads that take the frag-share path and drive in-place decrypt; no race or attacker-uncontrollable memory layout is required.\nPR:N - Exploitation is by a remote IPsec peer sending packets to an already-configured IPTFS endpoint; no local account or capability on the target is required, and SA presence is a deployment precondition rather than an attacker privilege.\nUI:N - Packets are processed in softirq/NAPI receive context with no victim action such as mounting, opening a file, or otherwise interacting with the system.\nS:U - Corruption is of shared skb/NIC fragment pages within the same kernel security authority; this is not a VM escape, IOMMU bypass, or cross-sandbox boundary crossing.\nC:H - Missing SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG lets nested esp_input() overwrite pages still referenced by the outer IPTFS skb and sibling inners, yielding attacker-influenced memory corruption that can be leveraged for information disclosure.\nI:H - In-place ESP decryption writes attacker-controlled plaintext into pages still held by other skbs, providing a memory-corruption write primitive capable of integrity compromise and control-flow impact.\nA:H - The same shared-page overwrite causes kernel-visible memory corruption and can panic/oops the host, fully denying availability."
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-17T04:57:44.387Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d8aaf06b29f5a0b6186cf68d21c7d63678ee3891"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ffd64e0717efd83fbf3396ab4e5ac6d795dac4d0"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/430ea57d6daf765e88f90046afbfd1e071cb7200"
        }
      ],
      "title": "xfrm: iptfs: propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG in iptfs_skb_add_frags()",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-64566",
    "datePublished": "2026-08-05T08:06:18.645Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-07-19T15:36:31.797Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-08-17T04:57:44.387Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

Order JSON

How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Publication & reservation Sightings KEV catalogs Other timestamps

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

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