GHSA-WQMR-77RQ-877R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-22 18:30 – Updated: 2026-08-25 06:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/packet: reset the MAC header on the packet-socket transmit path
packet_parse_headers() resets the MAC header only for a SOCK_RAW frame whose socket did not bind a protocol. A protocol-bound SOCK_RAW socket, any SOCK_DGRAM frame, and the legacy SOCK_PACKET path therefore leave skb->mac_header unset here.
For frames sent via __dev_queue_xmit() this is harmless: it resets the MAC header unconditionally. But the packet-socket PACKET_QDISC_BYPASS path uses dev_direct_xmit(), which does not, so the frame reaches ndo_start_xmit() with the MAC header unset. A driver that reads eth_hdr(skb) on transmit then dereferences skb->head + (u16)~0, an out-of-bounds access ~64 KiB past the head -- the same class fixed for one consumer in commit f5089008f90c ("macsec: do not read an unset MAC header in macsec_encrypt()").
packet_parse_headers() runs only on the transmit path, where skb->data points at the start of the L2 header for every packet-socket type regardless of its length: SOCK_RAW and SOCK_PACKET carry a user-supplied header and SOCK_DGRAM has one built by dev_hard_header(). Reset the MAC header unconditionally, mirroring __dev_queue_xmit(), so the frame is anchored on the bypass path too.
Found by 0sec (https://0sec.ai) using automated source analysis; verified against source and matched to the macsec KASAN report in f5089008f90c. Compile-tested.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-74667"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-22T16:16:40Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/packet: reset the MAC header on the packet-socket transmit path\n\npacket_parse_headers() resets the MAC header only for a SOCK_RAW frame\nwhose socket did not bind a protocol. A protocol-bound SOCK_RAW socket,\nany SOCK_DGRAM frame, and the legacy SOCK_PACKET path therefore leave\nskb-\u003emac_header unset here.\n\nFor frames sent via __dev_queue_xmit() this is harmless: it resets the\nMAC header unconditionally. But the packet-socket PACKET_QDISC_BYPASS\npath uses dev_direct_xmit(), which does not, so the frame reaches\nndo_start_xmit() with the MAC header unset. A driver that reads\neth_hdr(skb) on transmit then dereferences skb-\u003ehead + (u16)~0, an\nout-of-bounds access ~64 KiB past the head -- the same class fixed for\none consumer in commit f5089008f90c (\"macsec: do not read an unset MAC\nheader in macsec_encrypt()\").\n\npacket_parse_headers() runs only on the transmit path, where skb-\u003edata\npoints at the start of the L2 header for every packet-socket type\nregardless of its length: SOCK_RAW and SOCK_PACKET carry a user-supplied\nheader and SOCK_DGRAM has one built by dev_hard_header(). Reset the MAC\nheader unconditionally, mirroring __dev_queue_xmit(), so the frame is\nanchored on the bypass path too.\n\nFound by 0sec (https://0sec.ai) using automated source analysis;\nverified against source and matched to the macsec KASAN report in\nf5089008f90c. Compile-tested.",
"id": "GHSA-wqmr-77rq-877r",
"modified": "2026-08-25T06:31:26Z",
"published": "2026-08-22T18:30:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74667"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1e43a1d66615f411d427f9df1f46dd049d9e3681"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2610ed4e86a4590234a9d70518c469751c5af231"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/284f3e7a3f1a743fdf89e304fd1f19d5ffcff46d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4057853a91fb796c4f47c7d1baf1aa085394148e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/971aa7d99242bbf09513e27b7a243f0b29ff23ae"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b47ba8fe6e1d2df8c92048de5afafd059447dc30"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c2707480cfbf19c7619acc9c089d17f20869821f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fdd4d7d52358a58e351dd9d82530c04eba8ccd7a"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
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