GHSA-WQG3-R97Q-73XM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 15:32 – Updated: 2026-10-01 15:41Duplicate Advisory
This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-qhwx-74w5-xhxq. This link is maintained to preserve external references.
Original Description
vm2 versions >= 3.9.6 and <= 3.11.6 are affected by a NodeVM builtin allowlist bypass that permits a sandbox escape on Node.js 24 and newer when the embedder explicitly allows the node:test builtin (e.g. require: { builtin: ['node:test'] }). On Node.js 24+, module.builtinModules exposes the scheme-only key node:test, which is not covered by vm2's family-based DANGEROUS_BUILTINS protection, so it is stored in the generic host-passthrough loader. Because requireImpl() in lib/setup-node-sandbox.js strips a single 'node:' prefix before the builtin lookup, sandbox code calling require('node:node:test') resolves to the stored node:test key and receives a readonly proxy to the host module. Calls to node:test.run() are forwarded to the host implementation, which spawns a separate Node process for process-isolated test execution and passes through attacker-controlled execArgv values; supplying --eval= therefore executes arbitrary JavaScript in an unrestricted host Node process outside the NodeVM sandbox. Fixed in vm2 3.11.7.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "vm2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.9.6"
},
{
"last_affected": "3.11.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-01T15:41:04Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T14:18:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Duplicate Advisory\n\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of\u00a0GHSA-qhwx-74w5-xhxq. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n## Original Description\nvm2 versions \u003e= 3.9.6 and \u003c= 3.11.6 are affected by a NodeVM builtin allowlist bypass that permits a sandbox escape on Node.js 24 and newer when the embedder explicitly allows the node:test builtin (e.g. require: { builtin: [\u0027node:test\u0027] }). On Node.js 24+, module.builtinModules exposes the scheme-only key node:test, which is not covered by vm2\u0027s family-based DANGEROUS_BUILTINS protection, so it is stored in the generic host-passthrough loader. Because requireImpl() in lib/setup-node-sandbox.js strips a single \u0027node:\u0027 prefix before the builtin lookup, sandbox code calling require(\u0027node:node:test\u0027) resolves to the stored node:test key and receives a readonly proxy to the host module. Calls to node:test.run() are forwarded to the host implementation, which spawns a separate Node process for process-isolated test execution and passes through attacker-controlled execArgv values; supplying --eval=\u003cJavaScript\u003e therefore executes arbitrary JavaScript in an unrestricted host Node process outside the NodeVM sandbox. Fixed in vm2 3.11.7.",
"id": "GHSA-wqg3-r97q-73xm",
"modified": "2026-10-01T15:41:04Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T15:32:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-qhwx-74w5-xhxq"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92948"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vm2-3.9.6-through-3.11.5-sandbox-escape-via-node-test"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Duplicate Advisory: NodeVM builtin allowlist bypass via node:test.run() execArgv allows sandbox escape",
"withdrawn": "2026-10-01T15:41:04Z"
}
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