GHSA-WQ26-3J2M-4HVV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-18 21:16 – Updated: 2026-11-18 21:16Summary
The auth/aws package of the chainguard.dev/sdk Go library provides Chainguard's AWS-backed identity federation (an AWS workload proves its identity to Chainguard by signing an AWS STS GetCallerIdentity request). Its verifier, VerifyToken, reads the Chainguard-Audience and Chainguard-Identity binding headers from a presented token but does not require them to be covered by the SigV4 signature. AWS STS validates only the headers listed in SignedHeaders and ignores all others, so an attacker can take a GetCallerIdentity request that a victim signed for a different relying party, inject or rewrite those two headers after signing (without invalidating the signature), and replay it to any service that authenticates callers with VerifyToken. The binding those headers were meant to provide is therefore forgeable — a verifier-side (relying-party) authentication bypass / cross-service token replay.
Background
The package uses the standard "signed GetCallerIdentity" pattern — the same approach HashiCorp Vault's AWS auth method and Kubernetes aws-iam-authenticator use: the caller signs an AWS STS GetCallerIdentity request with its AWS credentials to prove who it is, and presents that signed request as a bearer token. It has two halves:
GenerateToken(client): builds theGetCallerIdentityrequest, adds theChainguard-AudienceandChainguard-Identityheaders that bind the proof to a specific Chainguard audience (issuer) and assumable identity, SigV4-signs it, and serializes it into a token.VerifyToken(relying party): decodes the token, checks those two binding headers, forwards the request to AWS STS to confirm the caller's real AWS identity (ARN), and returns it so a Chainguard token can be issued for that identity.
The binding headers exist so a proof minted for one audience/identity cannot be reused for another — a defense against cross-service replay — and their security depends entirely on being covered by the SigV4 signature.
Impact
A relying party calling auth/aws.VerifyToken can be induced to accept a GetCallerIdentity proof that a victim produced for an unrelated purpose — for example a request minted for HashiCorp Vault's AWS auth method, Kubernetes aws-iam-authenticator, a different audience, or one captured from logs or a proxy — and to treat it as proof of the victim's AWS identity for an attacker-chosen audience and identity. The signed request is valid within its ~15-minute window. No access to the victim's AWS credentials is required; the attacker only needs a fresh signed GetCallerIdentity request from the victim principal.
Code that uses only auth/aws.GenerateToken (token generation) is not affected — the generator correctly includes the binding headers in the signature. Only verifiers using auth/aws.VerifyToken are affected.
Affected versions
All released versions of chainguard.dev/sdk that include auth/aws.VerifyToken, up to and including v0.1.106.
Patches
Fixed in chainguard.dev/sdk v0.1.107. The fix requires both the Chainguard-Audience and Chainguard-Identity headers to be present in the request's SigV4 SignedHeaders before their values are trusted (mirroring the mitigation HashiCorp Vault applies by requiring X-Vault-AWS-IAM-Server-ID to be signed). It additionally adds defense-in-depth checks on the request method, the STS host, and the request timestamp. Upgrade to v0.1.107 or later.
Workarounds
There is no client-side workaround; the fix is in the verifier. Operators of services that verify AWS-backed identities with VerifyToken should upgrade as soon as the patched release is available.
References
- AWS Signature Version 4 — signed headers: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_sigv.html
- Comparable mitigation: HashiCorp Vault requires the
X-Vault-AWS-IAM-Server-IDheader to appear inSignedHeadersbefore trusting it.
Credits
Reported by Kris Kennaway (Datadog).
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.1.106"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "chainguard.dev/sdk"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.1.107"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-71861"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-290",
"CWE-294",
"CWE-347"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-18T21:16:44Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-18T16:18:16Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe `auth/aws` package of the `chainguard.dev/sdk` Go library provides Chainguard\u0027s AWS-backed identity federation (an AWS workload proves its identity to Chainguard by signing an AWS STS `GetCallerIdentity` request). Its verifier, `VerifyToken`, reads the `Chainguard-Audience` and `Chainguard-Identity` binding headers from a presented token but does not require them to be covered by the SigV4 signature. AWS STS validates only the headers listed in `SignedHeaders` and ignores all others, so an attacker can take a `GetCallerIdentity` request that a victim signed for a *different* relying party, inject or rewrite those two headers *after* signing (without invalidating the signature), and replay it to any service that authenticates callers with `VerifyToken`. The binding those headers were meant to provide is therefore forgeable \u2014 a verifier-side (relying-party) authentication bypass / cross-service token replay.\n\n### Background\n\nThe package uses the standard \"signed `GetCallerIdentity`\" pattern \u2014 the same approach HashiCorp Vault\u0027s AWS auth method and Kubernetes `aws-iam-authenticator` use: the caller signs an AWS STS `GetCallerIdentity` request with its AWS credentials to prove who it is, and presents that signed request as a bearer token. It has two halves:\n\n- `GenerateToken` (client): builds the `GetCallerIdentity` request, adds the `Chainguard-Audience` and `Chainguard-Identity` headers that bind the proof to a specific Chainguard audience (issuer) and assumable identity, SigV4-signs it, and serializes it into a token.\n- `VerifyToken` (relying party): decodes the token, checks those two binding headers, forwards the request to AWS STS to confirm the caller\u0027s real AWS identity (ARN), and returns it so a Chainguard token can be issued for that identity.\n\nThe binding headers exist so a proof minted for one audience/identity cannot be reused for another \u2014 a defense against cross-service replay \u2014 and their security depends entirely on being covered by the SigV4 signature.\n\n### Impact\n\nA relying party calling `auth/aws.VerifyToken` can be induced to accept a `GetCallerIdentity` proof that a victim produced for an unrelated purpose \u2014 for example a request minted for HashiCorp Vault\u0027s AWS auth method, Kubernetes `aws-iam-authenticator`, a different audience, or one captured from logs or a proxy \u2014 and to treat it as proof of the victim\u0027s AWS identity for an attacker-chosen audience and identity. The signed request is valid within its ~15-minute window. No access to the victim\u0027s AWS credentials is required; the attacker only needs a fresh signed `GetCallerIdentity` request from the victim principal.\n\nCode that uses only `auth/aws.GenerateToken` (token generation) is not affected \u2014 the generator correctly includes the binding headers in the signature. Only verifiers using `auth/aws.VerifyToken` are affected.\n\n### Affected versions\n\nAll released versions of `chainguard.dev/sdk` that include `auth/aws.VerifyToken`, up to and including `v0.1.106`.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in `chainguard.dev/sdk` [v0.1.107](https://github.com/chainguard-dev/sdk/releases/tag/v0.1.107). The fix requires both the `Chainguard-Audience` and `Chainguard-Identity` headers to be present in the request\u0027s SigV4 `SignedHeaders` before their values are trusted (mirroring the mitigation HashiCorp Vault applies by requiring `X-Vault-AWS-IAM-Server-ID` to be signed). It additionally adds defense-in-depth checks on the request method, the STS host, and the request timestamp. Upgrade to v0.1.107 or later.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThere is no client-side workaround; the fix is in the verifier. Operators of services that verify AWS-backed identities with `VerifyToken` should upgrade as soon as the patched release is available.\n\n### References\n\n- AWS Signature Version 4 \u2014 signed headers: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/reference_sigv.html\n- Comparable mitigation: HashiCorp Vault requires the `X-Vault-AWS-IAM-Server-ID` header to appear in `SignedHeaders` before trusting it.\n\n### Credits\n\nReported by Kris Kennaway (Datadog).",
"id": "GHSA-wq26-3j2m-4hvv",
"modified": "2026-11-18T21:16:44Z",
"published": "2026-11-18T21:16:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/chainguard-dev/sdk/security/advisories/GHSA-wq26-3j2m-4hvv"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-71861"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/chainguard-dev/sdk/commit/d27997d62aaffe85f905cce4cbe8cdebbd5e24eb"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/chainguard-dev/sdk"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/chainguard-dev/sdk/releases/tag/v0.1.107"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Chainguard SDK: AWS SigV4 token replay in auth/aws.VerifyToken \u2014 Chainguard-Audience/Chainguard-Identity binding headers not required in SignedHeaders"
}
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