GHSA-WP5H-RFFW-RH8W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:32 – Updated: 2026-10-21 15:41In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: validate inline xattrs during inode block validation
Patch series "ocfs2: validate xattr entry bounds", v7.
This series validates OCFS2 xattr entry name/value bounds when xattr metadata is read and validated, before getxattr() or listxattr() can walk out-of-range entry arrays or offsets from corrupted metadata.
This patch (of 2):
ocfs2_validate_inode_block() verifies a dinode before OCFS2 users walk metadata from it, but inline xattr metadata is still checked only in operation-specific consumers. The existing ibody lookup helper validates inline header placement and entry count, but inode block validation does not reject entry name/value bounds.
Add a flat xattr entry validator and call it from inode block validation for inline xattrs. Keep the operation paths on their existing header/count lookup checks; the full entry bounds check now runs when the inode block is validated at read time.
Reject corrupted inline xattr metadata before ocfs2_xattr_ibody_get() or listxattr() can walk past the inline storage.
Validation reproduced this kernel report: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ocfs2_xattr_find_entry+0x5a/0x170 Read of size 2 at addr ffff8881242a2000 by task python3/529 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 print_report+0xce/0x630 kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 ocfs2_xattr_find_entry+0x5a/0x170 ocfs2_xattr_get_nolock+0x20a/0x820 ocfs2_xattr_get+0x10c/0x1e0 __vfs_getxattr+0xe2/0x130 vfs_getxattr+0x185/0x1b0
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-90321"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:17:30Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nocfs2: validate inline xattrs during inode block validation\n\nPatch series \"ocfs2: validate xattr entry bounds\", v7.\n\nThis series validates OCFS2 xattr entry name/value bounds when xattr\nmetadata is read and validated, before getxattr() or listxattr() can walk\nout-of-range entry arrays or offsets from corrupted metadata.\n\n\nThis patch (of 2):\n\nocfs2_validate_inode_block() verifies a dinode before OCFS2 users walk\nmetadata from it, but inline xattr metadata is still checked only in\noperation-specific consumers. The existing ibody lookup helper validates\ninline header placement and entry count, but inode block validation does\nnot reject entry name/value bounds.\n\nAdd a flat xattr entry validator and call it from inode block validation\nfor inline xattrs. Keep the operation paths on their existing\nheader/count lookup checks; the full entry bounds check now runs when the\ninode block is validated at read time.\n\nReject corrupted inline xattr metadata before ocfs2_xattr_ibody_get() or\nlistxattr() can walk past the inline storage.\n\nValidation reproduced this kernel report:\nBUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ocfs2_xattr_find_entry+0x5a/0x170\nRead of size 2 at addr ffff8881242a2000 by task python3/529\nCall Trace:\n dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0\n print_report+0xce/0x630\n kasan_report+0xe0/0x110\n ocfs2_xattr_find_entry+0x5a/0x170\n ocfs2_xattr_get_nolock+0x20a/0x820\n ocfs2_xattr_get+0x10c/0x1e0\n __vfs_getxattr+0xe2/0x130\n vfs_getxattr+0x185/0x1b0",
"id": "GHSA-wp5h-rffw-rh8w",
"modified": "2026-10-21T15:41:22Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T18:32:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90321"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3fd45b24879fa4885b66a582a6e47eda67f11310"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7dec19f6bafe4e1503007141c9f5eb7eb10e5578"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8138d06e7a1d9a0b0481dc015c67b34e8bb60a58"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8914a3330b72378136c2c02d6328a826f6abdad7"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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