GHSA-WJ9X-QHWH-XF9H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-10 15:33 – Updated: 2026-08-14 00:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

fs: preserve ACL_DONT_CACHE state in forget_cached_acl()

The ACL_DONT_CACHE state is meant to be a constant state for the inode for filesystems that want to opt out of posix acl caching.

Commit facd61053cff1 ("fuse: fixes after adapting to new posix acl api") used this facility to opt out of posix acl caching for fuse inodes with fuse server that does not negotiate FUSE_POSIX_ACL (fc->posix_acl).

The commit also takes care to gate the forget_all_cached_acls() call in fuse_set_acl() on fc->posix_acl because there is no need for it, but there are other placed in fuse code which call forget_all_cached_acls() unconditional to fc->posix_acl and those cause the loss of the ACL_DONT_CACHE state.

This is not only a functional bug. Properly timed, a get_acl() from this fuse filesystem can return a stale cached value, as was observed in tests, because set_acl() does not invalidate the unintentional acl cache.

We could fix this in fuse, but it actually makes no sense for the vfs helper forget_cached_acl() to invalidate the ACL_DONT_CACHE state, so let it not do that to fix fuse and future users of ACL_DONT_CACHE.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-68149"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-662"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-10T13:20:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfs: preserve ACL_DONT_CACHE state in forget_cached_acl()\n\nThe ACL_DONT_CACHE state is meant to be a constant state for the inode\nfor filesystems that want to opt out of posix acl caching.\n\nCommit facd61053cff1 (\"fuse: fixes after adapting to new posix acl api\")\nused this facility to opt out of posix acl caching for fuse inodes with\nfuse server that does not negotiate FUSE_POSIX_ACL (fc-\u003eposix_acl).\n\nThe commit also takes care to gate the forget_all_cached_acls() call in\nfuse_set_acl() on fc-\u003eposix_acl because there is no need for it, but\nthere are other placed in fuse code which call forget_all_cached_acls()\nunconditional to fc-\u003eposix_acl and those cause the loss of the\nACL_DONT_CACHE state.\n\nThis is not only a functional bug. Properly timed, a get_acl() from this\nfuse filesystem can return a stale cached value, as was observed in tests,\nbecause set_acl() does not invalidate the unintentional acl cache.\n\nWe could fix this in fuse, but it actually makes no sense for the vfs\nhelper forget_cached_acl() to invalidate the ACL_DONT_CACHE state, so\nlet it not do that to fix fuse and future users of ACL_DONT_CACHE.",
  "id": "GHSA-wj9x-qhwh-xf9h",
  "modified": "2026-08-14T00:31:52Z",
  "published": "2026-08-10T15:33:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68149"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4b9a5458d02e214ef2b384124ca626e3e381d778"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/834ddf899484a2f23129080e8773bc04f4691d07"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a019b074903b3ad0a9726087efd0e8291452023b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b98fad81f1202b0eb26aacf3ff4cc7a21ed3b5bf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ca03a7984a34f48085fd013e0d2cf4e6420b4acf"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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