GHSA-WH8Q-CHG5-H7J4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-20 06:32 – Updated: 2026-11-20 06:32
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ocfs2/cluster: unlink socket containers before releasing resources

A socket container's node and socket must remain alive while the container is on sock_containers. The debugfs formatter reads sc_node and sc_sock under o2net_debug_lock without taking their references, but sc_kref_release() releases both before taking that lock to unlink the container.

With CONFIG_DEBUG_FS enabled, a synchronous sender can retain its last socket-container reference after o2net_disconnect_node() has detached the connection and flushed o2net_wq. The caller runs outside that workqueue. After the sender removes its configfs dependency, node removal can proceed without waiting for the sender's final sc_put():

Sender (final sc_put) Configfs rmdir Debugfs reader -------------------- -------------- -------------- o2nm_undepend_item() Drop node item refs o2nm_node_put() [node can be freed] sc_seq_show() Lock debug lock Read sc_node->nd_name Unlock debug lock sc_node = NULL o2net_debug_del_sc()

The earlier socket release has a similar window. The container is still selectable while its socket has been released and sc_sock has not yet been cleared:

Sender (final sc_put) Debugfs reader -------------------- -------------- sock_release(sc->sc_sock) [socket can be freed] sc_seq_show() Lock debug lock Read sc_sock->sk fields Unlock debug lock sc_sock = NULL ... o2net_debug_del_sc()

Move o2net_debug_del_sc() before releasing either resource. Unlinking under the existing debug lock waits for an active formatter to finish and prevents later readers from selecting the container. This covers both socket fields and node fields, including nd_num in the stats formatter.

KASAN report as below:

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in string+0x42b/0x470
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88810f56fc90 by task python3/506

CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 506 Comm: python3 Not tainted 7.3.0-rc4-next-20260921-pmb-ocfs2-functional-v1+ #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x93/0xd0
 print_report+0xce/0x630
 kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
 string+0x42b/0x470
 vsnprintf+0x330/0x1110
 seq_printf+0x1a8/0x260
 sc_seq_show+0x604/0x9f0
 seq_read_iter+0x480/0x1110
 seq_read+0x362/0x5a0
 full_proxy_read+0x11f/0x180
 vfs_read+0x1a0/0xc20
 ksys_read+0x111/0x200
 do_syscall_64+0x114/0x620
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

(User register dump omitted.)

 </TASK>

Allocated by task 497:
 kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
 __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
 __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x28d/0x610
 o2nm_node_group_make_item+0xea/0x1a0
 configfs_mkdir+0x762/0xca0
 vfs_mkdir+0x399/0x7e0
 filename_mkdirat+0x129/0x450
 __x64_sys_mkdir+0x70/0xa0
 do_syscall_64+0x114/0x620
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Freed by task 505:
 kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
 __kasan_slab_free+0x5f/0x80
 kfree+0x308/0x580
 config_item_cleanup+0x14b/0x230
 config_item_put+0x79/0x90
 sc_put+0x454/0x6e0
 o2net_send_message_vec+0x63d/0x1560
 o2net_send_message+0xa6/0xe0
 validation_send_write+0x17f/0x1d0
 full_proxy_write+0x11f/0x180
 vfs_write+0x25a/0x1010
 ksys_write+

---truncated---

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-99691"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-20T06:18:04Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nocfs2/cluster: unlink socket containers before releasing resources\n\nA socket container\u0027s node and socket must remain alive while the\ncontainer is on sock_containers. The debugfs formatter reads sc_node\nand sc_sock under o2net_debug_lock without taking their references, but\nsc_kref_release() releases both before taking that lock to unlink the\ncontainer.\n\nWith CONFIG_DEBUG_FS enabled, a synchronous sender can retain its last\nsocket-container reference after o2net_disconnect_node() has detached\nthe connection and flushed o2net_wq. The caller runs outside that\nworkqueue. After the sender removes its configfs dependency, node\nremoval can proceed without waiting for the sender\u0027s final sc_put():\n\n  Sender (final sc_put)    Configfs rmdir        Debugfs reader\n  --------------------    --------------        --------------\n  o2nm_undepend_item()\n                          Drop node item refs\n  o2nm_node_put()\n    [node can be freed]\n                                               sc_seq_show()\n                                                 Lock debug lock\n                                                 Read sc_node-\u003end_name\n                                                 Unlock debug lock\n  sc_node = NULL\n  o2net_debug_del_sc()\n\nThe earlier socket release has a similar window. The container is\nstill selectable while its socket has been released and sc_sock has\nnot yet been cleared:\n\n  Sender (final sc_put)                       Debugfs reader\n  --------------------                       --------------\n  sock_release(sc-\u003esc_sock)\n    [socket can be freed]\n                                             sc_seq_show()\n                                               Lock debug lock\n                                               Read sc_sock-\u003esk fields\n                                               Unlock debug lock\n  sc_sock = NULL\n  ...\n  o2net_debug_del_sc()\n\nMove o2net_debug_del_sc() before releasing either resource. Unlinking\nunder the existing debug lock waits for an active formatter to finish\nand prevents later readers from selecting the container. This covers\nboth socket fields and node fields, including nd_num in the stats\nformatter.\n\nKASAN report as below:\n\n    BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in string+0x42b/0x470\n    Read of size 1 at addr ffff88810f56fc90 by task python3/506\n\n    CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 506 Comm: python3 Not tainted 7.3.0-rc4-next-20260921-pmb-ocfs2-functional-v1+ #1 PREEMPT(lazy)\n    Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014\n    Call Trace:\n     \u003cTASK\u003e\n     dump_stack_lvl+0x93/0xd0\n     print_report+0xce/0x630\n     kasan_report+0xe0/0x110\n     string+0x42b/0x470\n     vsnprintf+0x330/0x1110\n     seq_printf+0x1a8/0x260\n     sc_seq_show+0x604/0x9f0\n     seq_read_iter+0x480/0x1110\n     seq_read+0x362/0x5a0\n     full_proxy_read+0x11f/0x180\n     vfs_read+0x1a0/0xc20\n     ksys_read+0x111/0x200\n     do_syscall_64+0x114/0x620\n     entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\n\n(User register dump omitted.)\n\n     \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\n    Allocated by task 497:\n     kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60\n     kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30\n     __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0\n     __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x28d/0x610\n     o2nm_node_group_make_item+0xea/0x1a0\n     configfs_mkdir+0x762/0xca0\n     vfs_mkdir+0x399/0x7e0\n     filename_mkdirat+0x129/0x450\n     __x64_sys_mkdir+0x70/0xa0\n     do_syscall_64+0x114/0x620\n     entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\n\n    Freed by task 505:\n     kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60\n     kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30\n     kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60\n     __kasan_slab_free+0x5f/0x80\n     kfree+0x308/0x580\n     config_item_cleanup+0x14b/0x230\n     config_item_put+0x79/0x90\n     sc_put+0x454/0x6e0\n     o2net_send_message_vec+0x63d/0x1560\n     o2net_send_message+0xa6/0xe0\n     validation_send_write+0x17f/0x1d0\n     full_proxy_write+0x11f/0x180\n     vfs_write+0x25a/0x1010\n     ksys_write+\n---truncated---",
  "id": "GHSA-wh8q-chg5-h7j4",
  "modified": "2026-11-20T06:32:07Z",
  "published": "2026-11-20T06:32:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99691"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0988f0c0c7c908f0ff77fd8b90ce9918a1f41479"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/829a331e1b52053c6f2d880daaa2f2c0ee85580f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/831f6f917f7e22068d850efc6443eca300a11f95"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8dc77ad4253904eb768f1aff45bb870d6d5a6eb5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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