GHSA-WGMW-XWR6-63WW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-15 06:32 – Updated: 2026-08-17 06:33In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/bpf-ops: reject re-registration of an already-bound ops
io_install_bpf() only rejects a second registration on the ctx side (ctx->bpf_ops) and sets the per-map back-pointer ops->priv unconditionally. The struct_ops link path never advances a map past BPF_STRUCT_OPS_STATE_READY, so the same io_uring_bpf_ops map can be registered more than once, and bpf_io_reg() re-resolves the target ring via fget(ops->ring_fd) on every call. A caller can therefore point the same ring_fd at a different io_ring_ctx between two BPF_LINK_CREATE calls.
The second registration passes the ctx->bpf_ops check (the new ctx has none) and overwrites ops->priv, orphaning the first ctx. Teardown (io_eject_bpf()/bpf_io_unreg()) only reaches a ctx through ops->priv, so the orphaned ctx is never torn down: its ctx->loop_step keeps pointing into the struct_ops trampoline, which is freed once the map is gone. A later io_uring_enter() on the orphaned ring then calls the dangling ctx->loop_step from io_run_loop() -- a use-after-free of freed executable memory, reachable by a task with CAP_BPF + CAP_PERFMON.
Reject registration when ops->priv is already set, as hid_bpf_reg() does for its struct_ops.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-72112"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-15T06:21:25Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nio_uring/bpf-ops: reject re-registration of an already-bound ops\n\nio_install_bpf() only rejects a second registration on the ctx side\n(ctx-\u003ebpf_ops) and sets the per-map back-pointer ops-\u003epriv\nunconditionally. The struct_ops link path never advances a map past\nBPF_STRUCT_OPS_STATE_READY, so the same io_uring_bpf_ops map can be\nregistered more than once, and bpf_io_reg() re-resolves the target ring\nvia fget(ops-\u003ering_fd) on every call. A caller can therefore point the\nsame ring_fd at a different io_ring_ctx between two BPF_LINK_CREATE\ncalls.\n\nThe second registration passes the ctx-\u003ebpf_ops check (the new ctx has\nnone) and overwrites ops-\u003epriv, orphaning the first ctx. Teardown\n(io_eject_bpf()/bpf_io_unreg()) only reaches a ctx through ops-\u003epriv, so\nthe orphaned ctx is never torn down: its ctx-\u003eloop_step keeps pointing\ninto the struct_ops trampoline, which is freed once the map is gone. A\nlater io_uring_enter() on the orphaned ring then calls the dangling\nctx-\u003eloop_step from io_run_loop() -- a use-after-free of freed\nexecutable memory, reachable by a task with CAP_BPF + CAP_PERFMON.\n\nReject registration when ops-\u003epriv is already set, as hid_bpf_reg()\ndoes for its struct_ops.",
"id": "GHSA-wgmw-xwr6-63ww",
"modified": "2026-08-17T06:33:10Z",
"published": "2026-08-15T06:32:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72112"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0639ea767fe04c288a8d6cb826100fe3d95d4936"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3afc64c61ce906a04f073ca350b46de10e8302f9"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.