GHSA-WGCQ-M83R-F344

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-16 15:30 – Updated: 2024-07-24 18:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

watch_queue: Fix filter limit check

In watch_queue_set_filter(), there are a couple of places where we check that the filter type value does not exceed what the type_filter bitmap can hold. One place calculates the number of bits by:

if (tf[i].type >= sizeof(wfilter->type_filter) * 8)

which is fine, but the second does:

if (tf[i].type >= sizeof(wfilter->type_filter) * BITS_PER_LONG)

which is not. This can lead to a couple of out-of-bounds writes due to a too-large type:

(1) __set_bit() on wfilter->type_filter (2) Writing more elements in wfilter->filters[] than we allocated.

Fix this by just using the proper WATCH_TYPE__NR instead, which is the number of types we actually know about.

The bug may cause an oops looking something like:

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in watch_queue_set_filter+0x659/0x740 Write of size 4 at addr ffff88800d2c66bc by task watch_queue_oob/611 ... Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x59 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x150 ... kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b ... watch_queue_set_filter+0x659/0x740 ... __x64_sys_ioctl+0x127/0x190 do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Allocated by task 611: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 __kasan_kmalloc+0x81/0xa0 watch_queue_set_filter+0x23a/0x740 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x127/0x190 do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800d2c66a0 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-32 of size 32 The buggy address is located 28 bytes inside of 32-byte region [ffff88800d2c66a0, ffff88800d2c66c0)

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-48847"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-787"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-07-16T13:15:11Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwatch_queue: Fix filter limit check\n\nIn watch_queue_set_filter(), there are a couple of places where we check\nthat the filter type value does not exceed what the type_filter bitmap\ncan hold.  One place calculates the number of bits by:\n\n   if (tf[i].type \u003e= sizeof(wfilter-\u003etype_filter) * 8)\n\nwhich is fine, but the second does:\n\n   if (tf[i].type \u003e= sizeof(wfilter-\u003etype_filter) * BITS_PER_LONG)\n\nwhich is not.  This can lead to a couple of out-of-bounds writes due to\na too-large type:\n\n (1) __set_bit() on wfilter-\u003etype_filter\n (2) Writing more elements in wfilter-\u003efilters[] than we allocated.\n\nFix this by just using the proper WATCH_TYPE__NR instead, which is the\nnumber of types we actually know about.\n\nThe bug may cause an oops looking something like:\n\n  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in watch_queue_set_filter+0x659/0x740\n  Write of size 4 at addr ffff88800d2c66bc by task watch_queue_oob/611\n  ...\n  Call Trace:\n   \u003cTASK\u003e\n   dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x59\n   print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x150\n   ...\n   kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b\n   ...\n   watch_queue_set_filter+0x659/0x740\n   ...\n   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x127/0x190\n   do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90\n   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae\n\n  Allocated by task 611:\n   kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40\n   __kasan_kmalloc+0x81/0xa0\n   watch_queue_set_filter+0x23a/0x740\n   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x127/0x190\n   do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90\n   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae\n\n  The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800d2c66a0\n   which belongs to the cache kmalloc-32 of size 32\n  The buggy address is located 28 bytes inside of\n   32-byte region [ffff88800d2c66a0, ffff88800d2c66c0)",
  "id": "GHSA-wgcq-m83r-f344",
  "modified": "2024-07-24T18:31:16Z",
  "published": "2024-07-16T15:30:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-48847"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1b09f28f70a5046acd64138075ae3f095238b045"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/648895da69ced90ca770fd941c3d9479a9d72c16"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b36588ebbcef74583824c08352e75838d6fb4ff2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c993ee0f9f81caf5767a50d1faeba39a0dc82af2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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