GHSA-WG36-23G4-V8G6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-18 12:30 – Updated: 2025-11-19 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/fb-helper: Fix out-of-bounds access
Clip memory range to screen-buffer size to avoid out-of-bounds access in fbdev deferred I/O's damage handling.
Fbdev's deferred I/O can only track pages. From the range of pages, the damage handler computes the clipping rectangle for the display update. If the fbdev screen buffer ends near the beginning of a page, that page could contain more scanlines. The damage handler would then track these non-existing scanlines as dirty and provoke an out-of-bounds access during the screen update. Hence, clip the maximum memory range to the size of the screen buffer.
While at it, rename the variables min/max to min_off/max_off in drm_fb_helper_deferred_io(). This avoids confusion with the macros of the same name.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-50221"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-125"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-06-18T11:15:53Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/fb-helper: Fix out-of-bounds access\n\nClip memory range to screen-buffer size to avoid out-of-bounds access\nin fbdev deferred I/O\u0027s damage handling.\n\nFbdev\u0027s deferred I/O can only track pages. From the range of pages, the\ndamage handler computes the clipping rectangle for the display update.\nIf the fbdev screen buffer ends near the beginning of a page, that page\ncould contain more scanlines. The damage handler would then track these\nnon-existing scanlines as dirty and provoke an out-of-bounds access\nduring the screen update. Hence, clip the maximum memory range to the\nsize of the screen buffer.\n\nWhile at it, rename the variables min/max to min_off/max_off in\ndrm_fb_helper_deferred_io(). This avoids confusion with the macros of\nthe same name.",
"id": "GHSA-wg36-23g4-v8g6",
"modified": "2025-11-19T15:31:31Z",
"published": "2025-06-18T12:30:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-50221"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9c49ac792c639dbec0728b513329a32461f72253"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ae25885bdf59fde40726863c57fd20e4a0642183"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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