GHSA-WCV7-QXR2-WHRG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-01 15:31 – Updated: 2025-05-01 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/cpumf: Fix double free on error in cpumf_pmu_event_init()
In PMU event initialization functions - cpumsf_pmu_event_init() - cpumf_pmu_event_init() - cfdiag_event_init() the partially created event had to be removed when an error was detected. The event::event_init() member function had to release all resources it allocated in case of error. event::destroy() had to be called on freeing an event after it was successfully created and event::event_init() returned success.
With
commit c70ca298036c ("perf/core: Simplify the perf_event_alloc() error path")
this is not necessary anymore. The performance subsystem common code now always calls event::destroy() to clean up the allocated resources created during event initialization.
Remove the event::destroy() invocation in PMU event initialization or that function is called twice for each event that runs into an error condition in event creation.
This is the kernel log entry which shows up without the fix:
------------[ cut here ]------------ refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 43388 at lib/refcount.c:87 refcount_dec_not_one+0x74/0x90 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 43388 Comm: perf Not tainted 6.15.0-20250407.rc1.git0.300.fc41.s390x+git #1 NONE Hardware name: IBM 3931 A01 704 (LPAR) Krnl PSW : 0704c00180000000 00000209cb2c1b88 (refcount_dec_not_one+0x78/0x90) R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:0 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3 Krnl GPRS: 0000020900000027 0000020900000023 0000000000000026 0000018900000000 00000004a2200a00 0000000000000000 0000000000000057 ffffffffffffffea 00000002b386c600 00000002b3f5b3e0 00000209cc51f140 00000209cc7fc550 0000000001449d38 ffffffffffffffff 00000209cb2c1b84 00000189d67dfb80 Krnl Code: 00000209cb2c1b78: c02000506727 larl %r2,00000209cbcce9c6 00000209cb2c1b7e: c0e5ffbd4431 brasl %r14,00000209caa6a3e0 #00000209cb2c1b84: af000000 mc 0,0 >00000209cb2c1b88: a7480001 lhi %r4,1 00000209cb2c1b8c: ebeff0a00004 lmg %r14,%r15,160(%r15) 00000209cb2c1b92: ec243fbf0055 risbg %r2,%r4,63,191,0 00000209cb2c1b98: 07fe bcr 15,%r14 00000209cb2c1b9a: 47000700 bc 0,1792 Call Trace: [<00000209cb2c1b88>] refcount_dec_not_one+0x78/0x90 [<00000209cb2c1dc4>] refcount_dec_and_mutex_lock+0x24/0x90 [<00000209caa3c29e>] hw_perf_event_destroy+0x2e/0x80 [<00000209cacaf8b4>] __free_event+0x74/0x270 [<00000209cacb47c4>] perf_event_alloc.part.0+0x4a4/0x730 [<00000209cacbf3e8>] __do_sys_perf_event_open+0x248/0xc20 [<00000209cacc14a4>] __s390x_sys_perf_event_open+0x44/0x50 [<00000209cb8114de>] __do_syscall+0x12e/0x260 [<00000209cb81ce34>] system_call+0x74/0x98 Last Breaking-Event-Address: [<00000209caa6a4d2>] __warn_printk+0xf2/0x100 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-37753"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-05-01T13:15:54Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ns390/cpumf: Fix double free on error in cpumf_pmu_event_init()\n\nIn PMU event initialization functions\n - cpumsf_pmu_event_init()\n - cpumf_pmu_event_init()\n - cfdiag_event_init()\nthe partially created event had to be removed when an error was detected.\nThe event::event_init() member function had to release all resources\nit allocated in case of error. event::destroy() had to be called\non freeing an event after it was successfully created and\nevent::event_init() returned success.\n\nWith\n\ncommit c70ca298036c (\"perf/core: Simplify the perf_event_alloc() error path\")\n\nthis is not necessary anymore. The performance subsystem common\ncode now always calls event::destroy() to clean up the allocated\nresources created during event initialization.\n\nRemove the event::destroy() invocation in PMU event initialization\nor that function is called twice for each event that runs into an\nerror condition in event creation.\n\nThis is the kernel log entry which shows up without the fix:\n\n------------[ cut here ]------------\nrefcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.\nWARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 43388 at lib/refcount.c:87\trefcount_dec_not_one+0x74/0x90\nCPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 43388 Comm: perf Not tainted 6.15.0-20250407.rc1.git0.300.fc41.s390x+git #1 NONE\nHardware name: IBM 3931 A01 704 (LPAR)\nKrnl PSW : 0704c00180000000 00000209cb2c1b88 (refcount_dec_not_one+0x78/0x90)\n R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:0 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3\nKrnl GPRS: 0000020900000027 0000020900000023 0000000000000026 0000018900000000\n 00000004a2200a00 0000000000000000 0000000000000057 ffffffffffffffea\n 00000002b386c600 00000002b3f5b3e0 00000209cc51f140 00000209cc7fc550\n 0000000001449d38 ffffffffffffffff 00000209cb2c1b84 00000189d67dfb80\nKrnl Code: 00000209cb2c1b78: c02000506727\tlarl\t%r2,00000209cbcce9c6\n 00000209cb2c1b7e: c0e5ffbd4431\tbrasl\t%r14,00000209caa6a3e0\n #00000209cb2c1b84: af000000\t\tmc\t0,0\n \u003e00000209cb2c1b88: a7480001\t\tlhi\t%r4,1\n 00000209cb2c1b8c: ebeff0a00004\tlmg\t%r14,%r15,160(%r15)\n 00000209cb2c1b92: ec243fbf0055\trisbg\t%r2,%r4,63,191,0\n 00000209cb2c1b98: 07fe\t\tbcr\t15,%r14\n 00000209cb2c1b9a: 47000700\t\tbc\t0,1792\nCall Trace:\n [\u003c00000209cb2c1b88\u003e] refcount_dec_not_one+0x78/0x90\n [\u003c00000209cb2c1dc4\u003e] refcount_dec_and_mutex_lock+0x24/0x90\n [\u003c00000209caa3c29e\u003e] hw_perf_event_destroy+0x2e/0x80\n [\u003c00000209cacaf8b4\u003e] __free_event+0x74/0x270\n [\u003c00000209cacb47c4\u003e] perf_event_alloc.part.0+0x4a4/0x730\n [\u003c00000209cacbf3e8\u003e] __do_sys_perf_event_open+0x248/0xc20\n [\u003c00000209cacc14a4\u003e] __s390x_sys_perf_event_open+0x44/0x50\n [\u003c00000209cb8114de\u003e] __do_syscall+0x12e/0x260\n [\u003c00000209cb81ce34\u003e] system_call+0x74/0x98\nLast Breaking-Event-Address:\n [\u003c00000209caa6a4d2\u003e] __warn_printk+0xf2/0x100\n---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---",
"id": "GHSA-wcv7-qxr2-whrg",
"modified": "2025-05-01T15:31:42Z",
"published": "2025-05-01T15:31:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37753"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3a3faf873db5dcd5d2622d8e2accb90af0a86c2d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aa1ac98268cd1f380c713f07e39b1fa1d5c7650c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bdbecb2bf531fadbbc9347a79009f7a58ea7eb03"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ddf60c1491102dab04491481bc3376d3e9cd139d"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.