GHSA-WCCJ-RQRC-G885
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-27 15:31 – Updated: 2025-01-14 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
binder: fix node UAF in binder_add_freeze_work()
In binder_add_freeze_work() we iterate over the proc->nodes with the proc->inner_lock held. However, this lock is temporarily dropped in order to acquire the node->lock first (lock nesting order). This can race with binder_node_release() and trigger a use-after-free:
================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock+0xe4/0x19c Write of size 4 at addr ffff53c04c29dd04 by task freeze/640
CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 640 Comm: freeze Not tainted 6.11.0-07343-ga727812a8d45 #17 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: _raw_spin_lock+0xe4/0x19c binder_add_freeze_work+0x148/0x478 binder_ioctl+0x1e70/0x25ac __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x124/0x190
Allocated by task 637: __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x12c/0x27c binder_new_node+0x50/0x700 binder_transaction+0x35ac/0x6f74 binder_thread_write+0xfb8/0x42a0 binder_ioctl+0x18f0/0x25ac __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x124/0x190
Freed by task 637: kfree+0xf0/0x330 binder_thread_read+0x1e88/0x3a68 binder_ioctl+0x16d8/0x25ac __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x124/0x190 ==================================================================
Fix the race by taking a temporary reference on the node before releasing the proc->inner lock. This ensures the node remains alive while in use.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-56556"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-362",
"CWE-416"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-27T15:15:14Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbinder: fix node UAF in binder_add_freeze_work()\n\nIn binder_add_freeze_work() we iterate over the proc-\u003enodes with the\nproc-\u003einner_lock held. However, this lock is temporarily dropped in\norder to acquire the node-\u003elock first (lock nesting order). This can\nrace with binder_node_release() and trigger a use-after-free:\n\n ==================================================================\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock+0xe4/0x19c\n Write of size 4 at addr ffff53c04c29dd04 by task freeze/640\n\n CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 640 Comm: freeze Not tainted 6.11.0-07343-ga727812a8d45 #17\n Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)\n Call trace:\n _raw_spin_lock+0xe4/0x19c\n binder_add_freeze_work+0x148/0x478\n binder_ioctl+0x1e70/0x25ac\n __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x124/0x190\n\n Allocated by task 637:\n __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x12c/0x27c\n binder_new_node+0x50/0x700\n binder_transaction+0x35ac/0x6f74\n binder_thread_write+0xfb8/0x42a0\n binder_ioctl+0x18f0/0x25ac\n __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x124/0x190\n\n Freed by task 637:\n kfree+0xf0/0x330\n binder_thread_read+0x1e88/0x3a68\n binder_ioctl+0x16d8/0x25ac\n __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x124/0x190\n ==================================================================\n\nFix the race by taking a temporary reference on the node before\nreleasing the proc-\u003einner lock. This ensures the node remains alive\nwhile in use.",
"id": "GHSA-wccj-rqrc-g885",
"modified": "2025-01-14T18:31:54Z",
"published": "2024-12-27T15:31:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-56556"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/38fbefeb2c140b581ed7de8117a5c90d6dd89c22"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dc8aea47b928cc153b591b3558829ce42f685074"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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