GHSA-WC8C-QW6V-H7F6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-04 20:05 – Updated: 2026-03-06 22:43
VLAI
Summary
@hono/node-server has authorization bypass for protected static paths via encoded slashes in Serve Static Middleware
Details

Summary

When using @hono/node-server's static file serving together with route-based middleware protections (e.g. protecting /admin/*), inconsistent URL decoding can allow protected static resources to be accessed without authorization.

In particular, paths containing encoded slashes (%2F) may be evaluated differently by routing/middleware matching versus static file path resolution, enabling a bypass where middleware does not run but the static file is still served.

Details

The routing layer and the node-server static handler normalize request paths differently. The router preserves %2F as a literal string when matching routes, while the static handler decodes %2F into / before resolving the filesystem path.

Example request:

  • /admin%2Fsecret.html

This may: - fail to match middleware intended for /admin/*, but - still be resolved by the static handler as /admin/secret.html under the configured static root.

This does not allow access outside the configured static root and is not a path traversal vulnerability.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker could bypass route-based authorization protections for protected static resources by supplying paths containing encoded slashes.

Applications relying solely on route-based middleware to protect static subpaths under the same static root may have exposed those resources.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@hono/node-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.19.10"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-29087"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-04T20:05:49Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-06T18:16:19Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nWhen using @hono/node-server\u0027s static file serving together with route-based middleware protections (e.g. protecting `/admin/*`), inconsistent URL decoding can allow protected static resources to be accessed without authorization.\n\nIn particular, paths containing encoded slashes (`%2F`) may be evaluated differently by routing/middleware matching versus static file path resolution, enabling a bypass where middleware does not run but the static file is still served.\n\n## Details\n\nThe routing layer and the node-server static handler normalize request paths differently. The router preserves `%2F` as a literal string when matching routes, while the static handler decodes `%2F` into `/` before resolving the filesystem path.\n\nExample request:\n\n- `/admin%2Fsecret.html`\n\nThis may:\n- fail to match middleware intended for `/admin/*`, but\n- still be resolved by the static handler as `/admin/secret.html` under the configured static root.\n\nThis does not allow access outside the configured static root and is not a path traversal vulnerability.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker could bypass route-based authorization protections for protected static resources by supplying paths containing encoded slashes.\n\nApplications relying solely on route-based middleware to protect static subpaths under the same static root may have exposed those resources.",
  "id": "GHSA-wc8c-qw6v-h7f6",
  "modified": "2026-03-06T22:43:58Z",
  "published": "2026-03-04T20:05:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/honojs/node-server/security/advisories/GHSA-wc8c-qw6v-h7f6"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-29087"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/honojs/node-server/commit/455015be1697dd89974a68b70350ea7b2d126d2e"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/honojs/node-server"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@hono/node-server has authorization bypass for protected static paths via encoded slashes in Serve Static Middleware"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.