GHSA-W9CG-V44M-4QV8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-03 22:09 – Updated: 2026-03-03 22:09Summary
BASH_ENV / ENV startup-file injection could lead to unintended pre-command shell execution when attacker-controlled environment values were admitted and then inherited by host command execution paths.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Affected:
<= 2026.2.19-2 - Fixed on
main:2cdbadee1f8fcaa93302d7debbfc529e19868ea4 - Planned patched release version:
2026.2.21
Details
The fix hardens environment handling across all relevant execution paths: - Blocks dangerous startup/runtime env keys and prefixes in shared host env sanitization. - Sanitizes inherited ambient environment even when no per-request overrides are provided. - Blocks dangerous config-driven env injection before values enter process environment. - Uses the same sanitizer in macOS host execution paths. - Aligns skill env override sanitization with the shared dangerous-env policy.
Impact
Medium. Exploitation requires local/privileged influence over configuration or environment inputs; there is no standalone remote unauthenticated trigger from this issue alone.
Fix Commit(s)
2cdbadee1f8fcaa93302d7debbfc529e19868ea4
Release Process Note
patched_versions is pre-set to the planned next release (2026.2.21). Once npm openclaw@2026.2.21 is published, the advisory can be published without further field edits.
OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.2.21"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-15",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-03T22:09:52Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n`BASH_ENV` / `ENV` startup-file injection could lead to unintended pre-command shell execution when attacker-controlled environment values were admitted and then inherited by host command execution paths.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected: `\u003c= 2026.2.19-2`\n- Fixed on `main`: `2cdbadee1f8fcaa93302d7debbfc529e19868ea4`\n- Planned patched release version: `2026.2.21`\n\n### Details\nThe fix hardens environment handling across all relevant execution paths:\n- Blocks dangerous startup/runtime env keys and prefixes in shared host env sanitization.\n- Sanitizes inherited ambient environment even when no per-request overrides are provided.\n- Blocks dangerous config-driven env injection before values enter process environment.\n- Uses the same sanitizer in macOS host execution paths.\n- Aligns skill env override sanitization with the shared dangerous-env policy.\n\n### Impact\nMedium. Exploitation requires local/privileged influence over configuration or environment inputs; there is no standalone remote unauthenticated trigger from this issue alone.\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `2cdbadee1f8fcaa93302d7debbfc529e19868ea4`\n\n### Release Process Note\n`patched_versions` is pre-set to the planned next release (`2026.2.21`). Once npm `openclaw@2026.2.21` is published, the advisory can be published without further field edits.\n\nOpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.",
"id": "GHSA-w9cg-v44m-4qv8",
"modified": "2026-03-03T22:09:52Z",
"published": "2026-03-03T22:09:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-w9cg-v44m-4qv8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/2cdbadee1f8fcaa93302d7debbfc529e19868ea4"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw affected by BASH_ENV / ENV startup-file injection into spawned shell commands"
}
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