Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-W794-RJ3P-XV45

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-07 20:36 – Updated: 2026-10-07 20:36

Summary

Langflow: OS command injection (RCE) via arbitrary command in MCP stdio server configuration

Details

Summary

Before Langflow 1.10.3, the MCP stdio transport launched whatever command / args a user put in an MCP server configuration, with no allowlist and (before 1.10.3) wrapped in bash -c "exec {command} ...". Any user able to reach the MCP server settings ("Settings → MCP Servers → Add MCP Server", POST/PATCH /api/v2/mcp/servers/{server_name}) or to build a flow with the MCP Tools component could add a "server" whose command is an arbitrary OS command (touch, rm -rf, a reverse shell, ...). The command runs on the Langflow host as the Langflow process user as soon as Langflow tries to connect to the server (listing servers, loading tools, running the flow) — even when the UI then reports that the stdio server failed to start.

With the default LANGFLOW_AUTO_LOGIN=true, GET /api/v1/auto_login hands out a token without credentials, so on an exposed instance running the default configuration this is reachable without an account. AUTO_LOGIN is documented as a development-only setting; with it disabled, any authenticated (non-admin) user can exploit it.

The issue was fixed in two steps and is fully fixed in Langflow 1.10.3 (and 1.11.0+):

1.9.0 — #12290 added a command allowlist and argument/env validation to the REST model (MCPServerConfig), blocking the "Add MCP Server" vector reported here.
1.10.3 — #14036 applied the same policy at the execution sink (lfx.base.mcp.util), including configs embedded in flows / tweaks and the final pre-spawn boundary, and removed the bash -c wrapper (the process is now exec'd directly, without a shell).

Affected versions

Package (PyPI)	Vulnerable	Patched
`langflow`	`>= 1.1.2, < 1.10.3`	`1.10.3`
`langflow-base`	`>= 0.1.2, < 0.10.3`	`0.10.3`
`lfx`	`< 1.10.3`	`1.10.3`

Release	State
`1.1.2` – `1.4.x`	MCP Stdio component (added in #5148) runs `StdioServerParameters(command=..., args=...)` from the component's `command` field with no validation.
`1.5.0` – `1.8.x`	"Add MCP Server" settings page and `/api/v2/mcp/servers` API added (#8388). Stored stdio configs are launched via `bash -c "exec {command_str} ..."` with no validation. The PoC below works as-is.
`1.9.0` – `1.10.2`	#12290: `POST`/`PATCH /api/v2/mcp/servers` reject commands outside the allowlist. The execution sink still has no validation and still uses `bash -c`, so configs that do not go through `MCPServerConfig` (for example an MCP Tools component value embedded in a flow or passed as a tweak) can still execute arbitrary commands.
`1.10.3`+	#14036: one shared policy (`lfx.base.mcp.security.validate_mcp_stdio_config`) is enforced at the API, at flow execution and right before the process is spawned; no shell is used. Fixed.

Details

Vulnerable sink (src/lfx/src/lfx/base/mcp/util.py, MCPStdioClient._connect_to_server, before 1.10.3):

server_params = StdioServerParameters(
    command="bash",
    args=["-c", f"exec {command_str} || echo 'Command failed with exit code $?' >&2"],
    env=env_data,
)

command_str is built from the user's command + args. The only "validation" before 1.9.0 was _validate_node_installation, which only checks that Node.js is installed when the command contains npx. The MCP SDK then starts the process with anyio.open_process, so the command runs before any MCP handshake — which is why it executes even if the UI shows "failed to start".

PoC (as reported, Langflow 1.5.0 – 1.8.x)

In "Add MCP Server" → STDIO, add:

Name      - Test
Command   - touch
Arguments - /tmp/pwn

Or through the API, using a token from auto_login (default configuration):

TOKEN=$(curl -s http://127.0.0.1:7860/api/v1/auto_login | python3 -c 'import sys,json;print(json.load(sys.stdin)["access_token"])')

curl -s -X POST 'http://127.0.0.1:7860/api/v2/mcp/servers/testing' \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  --data-raw '{"command":"touch","args":["/tmp/pwned_langflow"]}'

/tmp/pwned_langflow gets created on the server. On 1.10.3+ the request is rejected with Command 'touch' is not allowed for security reasons. Allowed commands: bash, cmd, docker, node, npx, python, python3, uvx, and the same payload fails at the sink (MCPStdioClient.connect_to_server("touch /tmp/pwned_langflow") raises MCPStdioSecurityError, and no file is created). Wrappers such as bash -c "touch ...", sh -c ..., python3 -c ... and node -e ... are also rejected.

Fix

#12290 (1.9.0) — MCPServerConfig validators: command allowlist (node, python, python3, npx, uvx, docker, and cmd/sh/bash only to wrap one of those), shell-metacharacter and dangerous-keyword checks on arguments, env var blocklist (LD_PRELOAD, NODE_OPTIONS, PYTHONPATH, BASH_ENV, ...), and Docker isolation checks.
#14036 (1.10.3) — moves the policy into lfx.base.mcp.security.validate_mcp_stdio_config and enforces it at every entry point (API, embedded flow / tweak configs, the deprecated MCP Stdio component and just before spawn); it also launches the process without a shell:

command_parts = shlex.split(command_str)
command, args = command_parts[0], command_parts[1:]
validate_mcp_stdio_config(command, args, env)   # final pre-spawn enforcement
server_params = StdioServerParameters(command=command, args=final_args, env=env_data)

Later hardening (1.11.0, #13530) adds optional stricter modes for multi-tenant deployments.

Workarounds (if you cannot upgrade)

Set LANGFLOW_AUTO_LOGIN=false and do not expose Langflow directly to untrusted networks.
Only give Langflow accounts to trusted users.

Hardening recommendations for 1.10.3+

The allowlist still lets npx / uvx run any package by default, which is how MCP servers are normally distributed. On multi-tenant deployments, operators should also set:

LANGFLOW_MCP_SERVER_ALLOWED_PACKAGES — the exact packages npx / uvx may run.
LANGFLOW_MCP_SERVER_INTERPRETER_HARDENING=true and LANGFLOW_MCP_SERVER_DOCKER_HARDENING=true.
On 1.11.1+ (#14150), restricting custom code (LANGFLOW_ALLOW_CUSTOM_COMPONENTS=false, LANGFLOW_CUSTOM_COMPONENT_ADMIN_ONLY=true or LANGFLOW_BLOCK_CODE_INTERPRETER_COMPONENTS=true) also limits MCP stdio servers to superusers.

Impact

Remote code execution on the Langflow host as the Langflow process user (CWE-78). Any exposed instance on a vulnerable version is affected, whether the attacker has an account or uses the default AUTO_LOGIN. The reporter found several internet-facing Langflow servers that were vulnerable.

Severity

9.9 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Show details on source website

JSON

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "langflow"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.1.2"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.10.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "langflow-base"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.1.2"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.10.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "lfx"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.10.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-105697"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-07T20:36:35Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-05T21:16:35Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nBefore **Langflow 1.10.3**, the MCP stdio transport launched whatever `command` / `args` a user put in an MCP server configuration, with no allowlist and (before 1.10.3) wrapped in `bash -c \"exec {command} ...\"`. Any user able to reach the MCP server settings (\"Settings \u2192 MCP Servers \u2192 Add MCP Server\", `POST/PATCH /api/v2/mcp/servers/{server_name}`) or to build a flow with the MCP Tools component could add a \"server\" whose command is an arbitrary OS command (`touch`, `rm -rf`, a reverse shell, ...). The command runs on the Langflow host as the Langflow process user as soon as Langflow tries to connect to the server (listing servers, loading tools, running the flow) \u2014 even when the UI then reports that the stdio server failed to start.\n\nWith the default `LANGFLOW_AUTO_LOGIN=true`, `GET /api/v1/auto_login` hands out a token without credentials, so on an exposed instance running the default configuration this is reachable without an account. `AUTO_LOGIN` is documented as a development-only setting; with it disabled, any authenticated (non-admin) user can exploit it.\n\nThe issue was fixed in two steps and is **fully fixed in Langflow 1.10.3** (and 1.11.0+):\n\n- **1.9.0** \u2014 #12290 added a command allowlist and argument/env validation to the REST model (`MCPServerConfig`), blocking the \"Add MCP Server\" vector reported here.\n- **1.10.3** \u2014 #14036 applied the same policy at the execution sink (`lfx.base.mcp.util`), including configs embedded in flows / tweaks and the final pre-spawn boundary, and removed the `bash -c` wrapper (the process is now exec\u0027d directly, without a shell).\n\n### Affected versions\n\n| Package (PyPI) | Vulnerable | Patched |\n|---|---|---|\n| `langflow` | `\u003e= 1.1.2, \u003c 1.10.3` | `1.10.3` |\n| `langflow-base` | `\u003e= 0.1.2, \u003c 0.10.3` | `0.10.3` |\n| `lfx` | `\u003c 1.10.3` | `1.10.3` |\n\n| Release | State |\n|---|---|\n| `1.1.2` \u2013 `1.4.x` | MCP Stdio component (added in #5148) runs `StdioServerParameters(command=..., args=...)` from the component\u0027s `command` field with no validation. |\n| `1.5.0` \u2013 `1.8.x` | \"Add MCP Server\" settings page and `/api/v2/mcp/servers` API added (#8388). Stored stdio configs are launched via `bash -c \"exec {command_str} ...\"` with no validation. The PoC below works as-is. |\n| `1.9.0` \u2013 `1.10.2` | #12290: `POST`/`PATCH /api/v2/mcp/servers` reject commands outside the allowlist. The execution sink still has no validation and still uses `bash -c`, so configs that do not go through `MCPServerConfig` (for example an MCP Tools component value embedded in a flow or passed as a tweak) can still execute arbitrary commands. |\n| `1.10.3`+ | #14036: one shared policy (`lfx.base.mcp.security.validate_mcp_stdio_config`) is enforced at the API, at flow execution and right before the process is spawned; no shell is used. **Fixed.** |\n\n### Details\n\nVulnerable sink (`src/lfx/src/lfx/base/mcp/util.py`, `MCPStdioClient._connect_to_server`, before 1.10.3):\n\n```python\nserver_params = StdioServerParameters(\n    command=\"bash\",\n    args=[\"-c\", f\"exec {command_str} || echo \u0027Command failed with exit code $?\u0027 \u003e\u00262\"],\n    env=env_data,\n)\n```\n\n`command_str` is built from the user\u0027s `command` + `args`. The only \"validation\" before 1.9.0 was `_validate_node_installation`, which only checks that Node.js is installed when the command contains `npx`. The MCP SDK then starts the process with `anyio.open_process`, so the command runs before any MCP handshake \u2014 which is why it executes even if the UI shows \"failed to start\".\n\n### PoC (as reported, Langflow 1.5.0 \u2013 1.8.x)\n\nIn \"Add MCP Server\" \u2192 STDIO, add:\n\n```\nName      - Test\nCommand   - touch\nArguments - /tmp/pwn\n```\n\nOr through the API, using a token from `auto_login` (default configuration):\n\n```bash\nTOKEN=$(curl -s http://127.0.0.1:7860/api/v1/auto_login | python3 -c \u0027import sys,json;print(json.load(sys.stdin)[\"access_token\"])\u0027)\n\ncurl -s -X POST \u0027http://127.0.0.1:7860/api/v2/mcp/servers/testing\u0027 \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  --data-raw \u0027{\"command\":\"touch\",\"args\":[\"/tmp/pwned_langflow\"]}\u0027\n```\n\n`/tmp/pwned_langflow` gets created on the server. On 1.10.3+ the request is rejected with `Command \u0027touch\u0027 is not allowed for security reasons. Allowed commands: bash, cmd, docker, node, npx, python, python3, uvx`, and the same payload fails at the sink (`MCPStdioClient.connect_to_server(\"touch /tmp/pwned_langflow\")` raises `MCPStdioSecurityError`, and no file is created). Wrappers such as `bash -c \"touch ...\"`, `sh -c ...`, `python3 -c ...` and `node -e ...` are also rejected.\n\n### Fix\n\n- **#12290** (1.9.0) \u2014 `MCPServerConfig` validators: command allowlist (`node`, `python`, `python3`, `npx`, `uvx`, `docker`, and `cmd`/`sh`/`bash` only to wrap one of those), shell-metacharacter and dangerous-keyword checks on arguments, env var blocklist (`LD_PRELOAD`, `NODE_OPTIONS`, `PYTHONPATH`, `BASH_ENV`, ...), and Docker isolation checks.\n- **#14036** (1.10.3) \u2014 moves the policy into `lfx.base.mcp.security.validate_mcp_stdio_config` and enforces it at every entry point (API, embedded flow / tweak configs, the deprecated MCP Stdio component and just before spawn); it also launches the process without a shell:\n\n```python\ncommand_parts = shlex.split(command_str)\ncommand, args = command_parts[0], command_parts[1:]\nvalidate_mcp_stdio_config(command, args, env)   # final pre-spawn enforcement\nserver_params = StdioServerParameters(command=command, args=final_args, env=env_data)\n```\n\nLater hardening (1.11.0, #13530) adds optional stricter modes for multi-tenant deployments.\n\n### Workarounds (if you cannot upgrade)\n\n- Set `LANGFLOW_AUTO_LOGIN=false` and do not expose Langflow directly to untrusted networks.\n- Only give Langflow accounts to trusted users.\n\n### Hardening recommendations for 1.10.3+\n\nThe allowlist still lets `npx` / `uvx` run any package by default, which is how MCP servers are normally distributed. On multi-tenant deployments, operators should also set:\n\n- `LANGFLOW_MCP_SERVER_ALLOWED_PACKAGES` \u2014 the exact packages `npx` / `uvx` may run.\n- `LANGFLOW_MCP_SERVER_INTERPRETER_HARDENING=true` and `LANGFLOW_MCP_SERVER_DOCKER_HARDENING=true`.\n- On 1.11.1+ (#14150), restricting custom code (`LANGFLOW_ALLOW_CUSTOM_COMPONENTS=false`, `LANGFLOW_CUSTOM_COMPONENT_ADMIN_ONLY=true` or `LANGFLOW_BLOCK_CODE_INTERPRETER_COMPONENTS=true`) also limits MCP stdio servers to superusers.\n\n### Impact\n\nRemote code execution on the Langflow host as the Langflow process user (CWE-78). Any exposed instance on a vulnerable version is affected, whether the attacker has an account or uses the default `AUTO_LOGIN`. The reporter found several internet-facing Langflow servers that were vulnerable.",
  "id": "GHSA-w794-rj3p-xv45",
  "modified": "2026-10-07T20:36:35Z",
  "published": "2026-10-07T20:36:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/security/advisories/GHSA-w794-rj3p-xv45"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-105697"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/pull/12290"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/pull/14036"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/commit/eba285edf1dd4a33bf23a9cb8113c991fcdf3d1d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/commit/efbc4a16e639409d938a4883463d27ef0bc637a0"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/releases/tag/v1.10.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Langflow: OS command injection (RCE) via arbitrary command in MCP stdio server configuration"
}

CVE-2026-105697 (GCVE-0-2026-105697)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-05 20:16 – Updated: 2026-10-06 14:49

Title

Langflow: OS command injection (RCE) via arbitrary command in MCP stdio server configuration

Summary

Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Before Langflow 1.10.3, the MCP stdio transport launched whatever command / args a user put in an MCP server configuration, with no allowlist and (before 1.10.3) wrapped in bash -c "exec {command} ...". Any user able to reach the MCP server settings ("Settings → MCP Servers → Add MCP Server", POST/PATCH /api/v2/mcp/servers/{server_name}) or to build a flow with the MCP Tools component could add a "server" whose command is an arbitrary OS command (touch, rm -rf, a reverse shell, ...). The command runs on the Langflow host as the Langflow process user as soon as Langflow tries to connect to the server (listing servers, loading tools, running the flow) — even when the UI then reports that the stdio server failed to start. With the default LANGFLOW_AUTO_LOGIN=true, GET /api/v1/auto_login hands out a token without credentials, so on an exposed instance running the default configuration this is reachable without an account. AUTO_LOGIN is documented as a development-only setting; with it disabled, any authenticated (non-admin) user can exploit it. This issue is fixed in Langflow 1.10.3, langflow-base 0.10.3, and lfx 1.10.3.

Severity

9.9 (Critical)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: total

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-10-06 14:36 UTC

CWE

CWE-78 - Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')

Assigner

GitHub_M mitre root Scorecard

References

6 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/security/…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/pull/12290	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/pull/14036	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/commit/eb…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/commit/ef…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/releases/…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

3 products

Vendor	Product	Version
langflow-ai	langflow	Affected: >= 1.1.2, < 1.10.3
langflow-ai	langflow-base	Affected: >= 0.1.2, < 0.10.3
langflow-ai	lfx	Affected: < 1.10.3

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JSON

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            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/commit/eba285edf1dd4a33bf23a9cb8113c991fcdf3d1d"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/commit/efbc4a16e639409d938a4883463d27ef0bc637a0",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/commit/efbc4a16e639409d938a4883463d27ef0bc637a0"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/releases/tag/v1.10.3",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/releases/tag/v1.10.3"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-w794-rj3p-xv45",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Langflow: OS command injection (RCE) via arbitrary command in MCP stdio server configuration"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-105697",
    "datePublished": "2026-10-05T20:16:58.291Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-10-05T17:48:58.627Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-10-06T14:49:22.922Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

GHSA-W794-RJ3P-XV45

Summary

Affected versions

Details

PoC (as reported, Langflow 1.5.0 – 1.8.x)

Fix

Workarounds (if you cannot upgrade)

Hardening recommendations for 1.10.3+

Impact

CVE-2026-105697 (GCVE-0-2026-105697)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Related by attack behaviour