GHSA-W5H4-C4XX-3R8P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-21 15:31 – Updated: 2024-12-26 21:30
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Fix tail_call_reachable rejection for interpreter when jit failed

During testing of f263a81451c1 ("bpf: Track subprog poke descriptors correctly and fix use-after-free") under various failure conditions, for example, when jit_subprogs() fails and tries to clean up the program to be run under the interpreter, we ran into the following freeze:

[...] #127/8 tailcall_bpf2bpf_3:FAIL [...] [ 92.041251] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ___bpf_prog_run+0x1b9d/0x2e20 [ 92.042408] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800da67f68 by task test_progs/682 [ 92.043707] [ 92.044030] CPU: 1 PID: 682 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G O 5.13.0-53301-ge6c08cb33a30-dirty #87 [ 92.045542] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 92.046785] Call Trace: [ 92.047171] ? __bpf_prog_run_args64+0xc0/0xc0 [ 92.047773] ? __bpf_prog_run_args32+0x8b/0xb0 [ 92.048389] ? __bpf_prog_run_args64+0xc0/0xc0 [ 92.049019] ? ktime_get+0x117/0x130 [...] // few hundred [similar] lines more [ 92.659025] ? ktime_get+0x117/0x130 [ 92.659845] ? __bpf_prog_run_args64+0xc0/0xc0 [ 92.660738] ? __bpf_prog_run_args32+0x8b/0xb0 [ 92.661528] ? __bpf_prog_run_args64+0xc0/0xc0 [ 92.662378] ? print_usage_bug+0x50/0x50 [ 92.663221] ? print_usage_bug+0x50/0x50 [ 92.664077] ? bpf_ksym_find+0x9c/0xe0 [ 92.664887] ? ktime_get+0x117/0x130 [ 92.665624] ? kernel_text_address+0xf5/0x100 [ 92.666529] ? __kernel_text_address+0xe/0x30 [ 92.667725] ? unwind_get_return_address+0x2f/0x50 [ 92.668854] ? ___bpf_prog_run+0x15d4/0x2e20 [ 92.670185] ? ktime_get+0x117/0x130 [ 92.671130] ? __bpf_prog_run_args64+0xc0/0xc0 [ 92.672020] ? __bpf_prog_run_args32+0x8b/0xb0 [ 92.672860] ? __bpf_prog_run_args64+0xc0/0xc0 [ 92.675159] ? ktime_get+0x117/0x130 [ 92.677074] ? lock_is_held_type+0xd5/0x130 [ 92.678662] ? ___bpf_prog_run+0x15d4/0x2e20 [ 92.680046] ? ktime_get+0x117/0x130 [ 92.681285] ? __bpf_prog_run32+0x6b/0x90 [ 92.682601] ? __bpf_prog_run64+0x90/0x90 [ 92.683636] ? lock_downgrade+0x370/0x370 [ 92.684647] ? mark_held_locks+0x44/0x90 [ 92.685652] ? ktime_get+0x117/0x130 [ 92.686752] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x79/0x100 [ 92.688004] ? ktime_get+0x117/0x130 [ 92.688573] ? __cant_migrate+0x2b/0x80 [ 92.689192] ? bpf_test_run+0x2f4/0x510 [ 92.689869] ? bpf_test_timer_continue+0x1c0/0x1c0 [ 92.690856] ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0x90/0x90 [ 92.691506] ? __kasan_slab_alloc+0x61/0x80 [ 92.692128] ? eth_type_trans+0x128/0x240 [ 92.692737] ? __build_skb+0x46/0x50 [ 92.693252] ? bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x65e/0xc50 [ 92.693954] ? bpf_prog_test_run_raw_tp+0x2d0/0x2d0 [ 92.694639] ? __fget_light+0xa1/0x100 [ 92.695162] ? bpf_prog_inc+0x23/0x30 [ 92.695685] ? __sys_bpf+0xb40/0x2c80 [ 92.696324] ? bpf_link_get_from_fd+0x90/0x90 [ 92.697150] ? mark_held_locks+0x24/0x90 [ 92.698007] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x124/0x220 [ 92.699045] ? finish_task_switch+0xe6/0x370 [ 92.700072] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x79/0x100 [ 92.701233] ? finish_task_switch+0x11d/0x370 [ 92.702264] ? __switch_to+0x2c0/0x740 [ 92.703148] ? mark_held_locks+0x24/0x90 [ 92.704155] ? __x64_sys_bpf+0x45/0x50 [ 92.705146] ? do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 [ 92.706953] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [...]

Turns out that the program rejection from e411901c0b77 ("bpf: allow for tailcalls in BPF subprograms for x64 JIT") is buggy since env->prog->aux->tail_call_reachable is never true. Commit ebf7d1f508a7 ("bpf, x64: rework pro/epilogue and tailcall handling in JIT") added a tracker into check_max_stack_depth() which propagates the tail_call_reachable condition throughout the subprograms. This info is then assigned to the subprogram's ---truncated---

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-47300"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-125"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-05-21T15:15:17Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Fix tail_call_reachable rejection for interpreter when jit failed\n\nDuring testing of f263a81451c1 (\"bpf: Track subprog poke descriptors correctly\nand fix use-after-free\") under various failure conditions, for example, when\njit_subprogs() fails and tries to clean up the program to be run under the\ninterpreter, we ran into the following freeze:\n\n  [...]\n  #127/8 tailcall_bpf2bpf_3:FAIL\n  [...]\n  [   92.041251] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ___bpf_prog_run+0x1b9d/0x2e20\n  [   92.042408] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800da67f68 by task test_progs/682\n  [   92.043707]\n  [   92.044030] CPU: 1 PID: 682 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G   O   5.13.0-53301-ge6c08cb33a30-dirty #87\n  [   92.045542] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014\n  [   92.046785] Call Trace:\n  [   92.047171]  ? __bpf_prog_run_args64+0xc0/0xc0\n  [   92.047773]  ? __bpf_prog_run_args32+0x8b/0xb0\n  [   92.048389]  ? __bpf_prog_run_args64+0xc0/0xc0\n  [   92.049019]  ? ktime_get+0x117/0x130\n  [...] // few hundred [similar] lines more\n  [   92.659025]  ? ktime_get+0x117/0x130\n  [   92.659845]  ? __bpf_prog_run_args64+0xc0/0xc0\n  [   92.660738]  ? __bpf_prog_run_args32+0x8b/0xb0\n  [   92.661528]  ? __bpf_prog_run_args64+0xc0/0xc0\n  [   92.662378]  ? print_usage_bug+0x50/0x50\n  [   92.663221]  ? print_usage_bug+0x50/0x50\n  [   92.664077]  ? bpf_ksym_find+0x9c/0xe0\n  [   92.664887]  ? ktime_get+0x117/0x130\n  [   92.665624]  ? kernel_text_address+0xf5/0x100\n  [   92.666529]  ? __kernel_text_address+0xe/0x30\n  [   92.667725]  ? unwind_get_return_address+0x2f/0x50\n  [   92.668854]  ? ___bpf_prog_run+0x15d4/0x2e20\n  [   92.670185]  ? ktime_get+0x117/0x130\n  [   92.671130]  ? __bpf_prog_run_args64+0xc0/0xc0\n  [   92.672020]  ? __bpf_prog_run_args32+0x8b/0xb0\n  [   92.672860]  ? __bpf_prog_run_args64+0xc0/0xc0\n  [   92.675159]  ? ktime_get+0x117/0x130\n  [   92.677074]  ? lock_is_held_type+0xd5/0x130\n  [   92.678662]  ? ___bpf_prog_run+0x15d4/0x2e20\n  [   92.680046]  ? ktime_get+0x117/0x130\n  [   92.681285]  ? __bpf_prog_run32+0x6b/0x90\n  [   92.682601]  ? __bpf_prog_run64+0x90/0x90\n  [   92.683636]  ? lock_downgrade+0x370/0x370\n  [   92.684647]  ? mark_held_locks+0x44/0x90\n  [   92.685652]  ? ktime_get+0x117/0x130\n  [   92.686752]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x79/0x100\n  [   92.688004]  ? ktime_get+0x117/0x130\n  [   92.688573]  ? __cant_migrate+0x2b/0x80\n  [   92.689192]  ? bpf_test_run+0x2f4/0x510\n  [   92.689869]  ? bpf_test_timer_continue+0x1c0/0x1c0\n  [   92.690856]  ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0x90/0x90\n  [   92.691506]  ? __kasan_slab_alloc+0x61/0x80\n  [   92.692128]  ? eth_type_trans+0x128/0x240\n  [   92.692737]  ? __build_skb+0x46/0x50\n  [   92.693252]  ? bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x65e/0xc50\n  [   92.693954]  ? bpf_prog_test_run_raw_tp+0x2d0/0x2d0\n  [   92.694639]  ? __fget_light+0xa1/0x100\n  [   92.695162]  ? bpf_prog_inc+0x23/0x30\n  [   92.695685]  ? __sys_bpf+0xb40/0x2c80\n  [   92.696324]  ? bpf_link_get_from_fd+0x90/0x90\n  [   92.697150]  ? mark_held_locks+0x24/0x90\n  [   92.698007]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x124/0x220\n  [   92.699045]  ? finish_task_switch+0xe6/0x370\n  [   92.700072]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x79/0x100\n  [   92.701233]  ? finish_task_switch+0x11d/0x370\n  [   92.702264]  ? __switch_to+0x2c0/0x740\n  [   92.703148]  ? mark_held_locks+0x24/0x90\n  [   92.704155]  ? __x64_sys_bpf+0x45/0x50\n  [   92.705146]  ? do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80\n  [   92.706953]  ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae\n  [...]\n\nTurns out that the program rejection from e411901c0b77 (\"bpf: allow for tailcalls\nin BPF subprograms for x64 JIT\") is buggy since env-\u003eprog-\u003eaux-\u003etail_call_reachable\nis never true. Commit ebf7d1f508a7 (\"bpf, x64: rework pro/epilogue and tailcall\nhandling in JIT\") added a tracker into check_max_stack_depth() which propagates\nthe tail_call_reachable condition throughout the subprograms. This info is then\nassigned to the subprogram\u0027s \n---truncated---",
  "id": "GHSA-w5h4-c4xx-3r8p",
  "modified": "2024-12-26T21:30:35Z",
  "published": "2024-05-21T15:31:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-47300"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/39f1735c8107ef43a53c4daf82f330d880488d8f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5dd0a6b8582ffbfa88351949d50eccd5b6694ade"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cbb086074dab631ac43f8645cbac1d7b148e05c4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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