GHSA-W5G9-6V5H-28CV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-04 12:30 – Updated: 2025-11-19 21:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
binder: fix yet another UAF in binder_devices
Commit e77aff5528a18 ("binderfs: fix use-after-free in binder_devices") addressed a use-after-free where devices could be released without first being removed from the binder_devices list. However, there is a similar path in binder_free_proc() that was missed:
================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in binder_remove_device+0xd4/0x100 Write of size 8 at addr ffff0000c773b900 by task umount/467 CPU: 12 UID: 0 PID: 467 Comm: umount Not tainted 6.15.0-rc7-00138-g57483a362741 #9 PREEMPT Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: binder_remove_device+0xd4/0x100 binderfs_evict_inode+0x230/0x2f0 evict+0x25c/0x5dc iput+0x304/0x480 dentry_unlink_inode+0x208/0x46c __dentry_kill+0x154/0x530 [...]
Allocated by task 463: __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x13c/0x324 binderfs_binder_device_create.isra.0+0x138/0xa60 binder_ctl_ioctl+0x1ac/0x230 [...]
Freed by task 215: kfree+0x184/0x31c binder_proc_dec_tmpref+0x33c/0x4ac binder_deferred_func+0xc10/0x1108 process_one_work+0x520/0xba4 [...] ==================================================================
Call binder_remove_device() within binder_free_proc() to ensure the device is removed from the binder_devices list before being kfreed.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-38175"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-416"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-04T11:15:51Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbinder: fix yet another UAF in binder_devices\n\nCommit e77aff5528a18 (\"binderfs: fix use-after-free in binder_devices\")\naddressed a use-after-free where devices could be released without first\nbeing removed from the binder_devices list. However, there is a similar\npath in binder_free_proc() that was missed:\n\n ==================================================================\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in binder_remove_device+0xd4/0x100\n Write of size 8 at addr ffff0000c773b900 by task umount/467\n CPU: 12 UID: 0 PID: 467 Comm: umount Not tainted 6.15.0-rc7-00138-g57483a362741 #9 PREEMPT\n Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)\n Call trace:\n binder_remove_device+0xd4/0x100\n binderfs_evict_inode+0x230/0x2f0\n evict+0x25c/0x5dc\n iput+0x304/0x480\n dentry_unlink_inode+0x208/0x46c\n __dentry_kill+0x154/0x530\n [...]\n\n Allocated by task 463:\n __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x13c/0x324\n binderfs_binder_device_create.isra.0+0x138/0xa60\n binder_ctl_ioctl+0x1ac/0x230\n [...]\n\n Freed by task 215:\n kfree+0x184/0x31c\n binder_proc_dec_tmpref+0x33c/0x4ac\n binder_deferred_func+0xc10/0x1108\n process_one_work+0x520/0xba4\n [...]\n ==================================================================\n\nCall binder_remove_device() within binder_free_proc() to ensure the\ndevice is removed from the binder_devices list before being kfreed.",
"id": "GHSA-w5g9-6v5h-28cv",
"modified": "2025-11-19T21:31:14Z",
"published": "2025-07-04T12:30:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38175"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4a7694f499cae5b83412c5281bf2c961f34f2ed6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/72a726fb5f25fbb31d6060acfb671c1955831245"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9857af0fcff385c75433f2162c30c62eb912ef6d"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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