GHSA-W532-M3J8-F99H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-19 18:31 – Updated: 2026-07-19 18:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: L2CAP: ecred_reconfigure: send packed pdu, not stack pointer

Commit 1c08108f3014 ("Bluetooth: L2CAP: Avoid -Wflex-array-member-not-at-end warnings") converted the on-stack request PDU in l2cap_ecred_reconfigure() from an explicit packed struct to DEFINE_RAW_FLEX(), but did not adjust the size and source-pointer arguments to l2cap_send_cmd():

  • struct {
  • struct l2cap_ecred_reconf_req req;
  • __le16 scid;
  • } pdu;
  • DEFINE_RAW_FLEX(struct l2cap_ecred_reconf_req, pdu, scid, 1); ... l2cap_send_cmd(conn, chan->ident, L2CAP_ECRED_RECONF_REQ, sizeof(pdu), &pdu);

After the conversion, DEFINE_RAW_FLEX() expands to declare an anonymous union pdu_u plus a local pointer "pdu" pointing at it. Therefore:

  • sizeof(pdu) is now sizeof(struct l2cap_ecred_reconf_req *) = 8 on 64-bit (4 on 32-bit), not the 6 bytes of (mtu, mps, scid[1]).
  • &pdu is the address of the local pointer's stack storage, not the address of the request payload.

l2cap_send_cmd() forwards (data, count) to l2cap_build_cmd(), which calls skb_put_data(skb, data, count). The L2CAP_ECRED_RECONFIGURE_REQ packet body therefore contains 8 bytes copied from the kernel stack starting at &pdu -- the 8 bytes overlap the pdu pointer's value, leaking a kernel stack address to the paired Bluetooth peer. The intended (mtu, mps, scid) fields are not transmitted at all, so the peer rejects the request as malformed and the L2CAP_ECRED_RECONFIGURE feature itself has been broken for the local-side initiator since the introducing commit landed.

The sibling site l2cap_ecred_conn_req() in the same commit was converted correctly (sizeof(*pdu) + len, pdu); only this site was missed.

Restore the original semantics: pass the full flex-struct size via struct_size(pdu, scid, 1) and the pdu pointer (the struct address) as the source.

Validated on a stock 7.0-based host kernel via the real call path: setsockopt(SOL_BLUETOOTH, BT_RCVMTU, ...) on a BT_CONNECTED L2CAP_MODE_EXT_FLOWCTL socket emits an L2CAP_ECRED_RECONFIGURE_REQ whose body is 8 bytes (the on-stack pdu local's value) rather than the expected 6. Three captures from fresh socket / fresh hciemu peer on the same host -- low bytes vary per call, high 0xffff confirms a kernel virtual address (KASLR-randomised stack slot, not a fixed string):

RECONF_REQ body (ident=0x02 len=8): 42 fb 54 af 0e ca ff ff RECONF_REQ body (ident=0x02 len=8): 52 3d 2e af 0e ca ff ff RECONF_REQ body (ident=0x02 len=8): b2 fc 5b af 0e ca ff ff

After this patch the body is 6 bytes carrying the expected little-endian (mtu, mps, scid).

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-64127"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-19T16:17:54Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: L2CAP: ecred_reconfigure: send packed pdu, not stack pointer\n\nCommit 1c08108f3014 (\"Bluetooth: L2CAP: Avoid -Wflex-array-member-not-at-end\nwarnings\") converted the on-stack request PDU in l2cap_ecred_reconfigure()\nfrom an explicit packed struct to DEFINE_RAW_FLEX(), but did not adjust the\nsize and source-pointer arguments to l2cap_send_cmd():\n\n  -    struct {\n  -            struct l2cap_ecred_reconf_req req;\n  -            __le16 scid;\n  -    } pdu;\n  +    DEFINE_RAW_FLEX(struct l2cap_ecred_reconf_req, pdu, scid, 1);\n       ...\n       l2cap_send_cmd(conn, chan-\u003eident, L2CAP_ECRED_RECONF_REQ,\n                      sizeof(pdu), \u0026pdu);\n\nAfter the conversion, DEFINE_RAW_FLEX() expands to declare an anonymous\nunion pdu_u plus a local pointer \"pdu\" pointing at it. Therefore:\n\n  - sizeof(pdu) is now sizeof(struct l2cap_ecred_reconf_req *) = 8 on\n    64-bit (4 on 32-bit), not the 6 bytes of (mtu, mps, scid[1]).\n  - \u0026pdu is the address of the local pointer\u0027s stack storage, not the\n    address of the request payload.\n\nl2cap_send_cmd() forwards (data, count) to l2cap_build_cmd(), which calls\nskb_put_data(skb, data, count). The L2CAP_ECRED_RECONFIGURE_REQ packet\nbody therefore contains 8 bytes copied from the kernel stack starting at\n\u0026pdu -- the 8 bytes overlap the pdu pointer\u0027s value, leaking a kernel\nstack address to the paired Bluetooth peer. The intended (mtu, mps, scid)\nfields are not transmitted at all, so the peer rejects the request as\nmalformed and the L2CAP_ECRED_RECONFIGURE feature itself has been broken\nfor the local-side initiator since the introducing commit landed.\n\nThe sibling site l2cap_ecred_conn_req() in the same commit was converted\ncorrectly (sizeof(*pdu) + len, pdu); only this site was missed.\n\nRestore the original semantics: pass the full flex-struct size via\nstruct_size(pdu, scid, 1) and the pdu pointer (the struct address) as\nthe source.\n\nValidated on a stock 7.0-based host kernel via the real call path:\nsetsockopt(SOL_BLUETOOTH, BT_RCVMTU, ...) on a BT_CONNECTED\nL2CAP_MODE_EXT_FLOWCTL socket emits an L2CAP_ECRED_RECONFIGURE_REQ\nwhose body is 8 bytes (the on-stack pdu local\u0027s value) rather than\nthe expected 6. Three captures from fresh socket / fresh hciemu peer\non the same host -- low bytes vary per call, high 0xffff confirms a\nkernel virtual address (KASLR-randomised stack slot, not a fixed\nstring):\n\n  RECONF_REQ body (ident=0x02 len=8): 42 fb 54 af 0e ca ff ff\n  RECONF_REQ body (ident=0x02 len=8): 52 3d 2e af 0e ca ff ff\n  RECONF_REQ body (ident=0x02 len=8): b2 fc 5b af 0e ca ff ff\n\nAfter this patch the body is 6 bytes carrying the expected\nlittle-endian (mtu, mps, scid).",
  "id": "GHSA-w532-m3j8-f99h",
  "modified": "2026-07-19T18:31:53Z",
  "published": "2026-07-19T18:31:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64127"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/051922ab709c0a6917eae765c22481dfc68379e5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3374ef8cf99368a40f7efd51a2a375a4c5dc6f0d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/356c9d1a1cbacd2a1640fff3c050e1c3472e924f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ed5fcd2a26f0c16fc289c8cd6b03328a0582a687"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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