Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-W4VJ-GM7W-293H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-12 15:30 – Updated: 2026-08-12 15:30

Details

An attacker who obtains a valid activation or recovery token could therefore replay it multiple times during its validity period to set a new password and repeatedly take control of the affected account. In addition, tokens were not bound to a specific purpose, allowing the same token mechanism to be used across activation and recovery workflows. The patch introduces purpose-bound tokens and a random nonce whose SHA-256 digest is stored with the user account. The nonce is invalidated after a successful password change, making tokens single-use, while issuing a new token invalidates any previously issued token. The password-setting operation now explicitly consumes the token before committing the account change.

Successful exploitation requires the attacker to obtain a currently valid activation or recovery link, but does not require knowledge of the victim's existing password or an authenticated session.

Severity

8.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N

Show details on source website

JSON

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-73431"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-294"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-12T15:18:33Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Vulnerability-Lookup contains an \nauthentication weakness in its account activation and password-recovery \nmechanism. Activation and recovery links were generated using stateless \nsigned tokens containing only the user\u0027s login. Although the token \nsignature and age were validated, the application did not track whether a\n token had already been successfully used. As a result, a captured \nactivation or password-recovery link remained valid for the entire \nconfigured TOKEN_VALIDITY_PERIOD, even after the associated password had been changed. \n\n\nAn attacker who obtains a valid \nactivation or recovery token could therefore replay it multiple times \nduring its validity period to set a new password and repeatedly take \ncontrol of the affected account. In addition, tokens were not bound to a\n specific purpose, allowing the same token mechanism to be used across \nactivation and recovery workflows. The patch introduces purpose-bound \ntokens and a random nonce whose SHA-256 digest is stored with the user \naccount. The nonce is invalidated after a successful password change, \nmaking tokens single-use, while issuing a new token invalidates any \npreviously issued token.  The password-setting operation now explicitly consumes the token before committing the account change. \n\n\nSuccessful exploitation requires \nthe attacker to obtain a currently valid activation or recovery link, \nbut does not require knowledge of the victim\u0027s existing password or an \nauthenticated session.",
  "id": "GHSA-w4vj-gm7w-293h",
  "modified": "2026-08-12T15:30:50Z",
  "published": "2026-08-12T15:30:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73431"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vulnerability-lookup/vulnerability-lookup/commit/bef837242657acf680832be56b94428df130ed67"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

CVE-2026-73431 (GCVE-0-2026-73431)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-12 14:32 – Updated: 2026-08-12 17:07

Title

Reusable Account Activation and Recovery Tokens Allow Repeated Account Takeover in vulnerability-lookup

Summary

Vulnerability-Lookup contains an authentication weakness in its account activation and password-recovery mechanism. Activation and recovery links were generated using stateless signed tokens containing only the user's login. Although the token signature and age were validated, the application did not track whether a token had already been successfully used. As a result, a captured activation or password-recovery link remained valid for the entire configured TOKEN_VALIDITY_PERIOD, even after the associated password had been changed. An attacker who obtains a valid activation or recovery token could therefore replay it multiple times during its validity period to set a new password and repeatedly take control of the affected account. In addition, tokens were not bound to a specific purpose, allowing the same token mechanism to be used across activation and recovery workflows. The patch introduces purpose-bound tokens and a random nonce whose SHA-256 digest is stored with the user account. The nonce is invalidated after a successful password change, making tokens single-use, while issuing a new token invalidates any previously issued token. The password-setting operation now explicitly consumes the token before committing the account change. Successful exploitation requires the attacker to obtain a currently valid activation or recovery link, but does not require knowledge of the victim's existing password or an authenticated session.

Severity

8.8 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: total

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-08-12 17:04 UTC

CWE

CWE-294 - Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay

Assigner

CIRCL CNA under the ENISA root

CNA scorecard A 91/100 over 254 records in the last 180 days details

References

1 reference

URL	Tags
https://github.com/vulnerability-lookup/vulnerabi…	patch

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
vulnerability-lookup	vulnerability-lookup	Affected: 0 , ≤ 5.5.1 (semver)

Credits

openai/gpt-5.5-cyber-preview (reasoning level: high) EUVD @ ENISA Team Cedric Bonhomme Alexandre Dulaunoy

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

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                  },
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                  }
                ],
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                "timestamp": "2026-08-12T17:04:55.924147Z",
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        },
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          "type": "remediation reviewer",
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Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

Order JSON

How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Publication & reservation Sightings KEV catalogs Other timestamps

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

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