GHSA-W43H-R5M5-P832

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-05 16:19 – Updated: 2026-07-20 21:18
VLAI
Summary
NocoDB: Server-Side Request Forgery via Database Connection Host
Details

Summary

The connection-test endpoint opened a raw TCP socket to the user-supplied database host without resolving and range-checking the destination, so private and link-local addresses (including IPv4-mapped IPv6 forms and localhost) reached the driver.

Details

A new validateDbConnectionHost helper resolves hostnames through DNS, parses each address with ipaddr.js, normalises IPv4-mapped IPv6, and rejects addresses in the private, loopback, link-local, unique-local, reserved, unspecified, broadcast, and carrier-grade-NAT ranges. 0.0.0.0, ::, and the literal localhost are special-cased. The check runs before the existing SSL block in the connection-test controller and gates the driver invocation.

Impact

Authenticated users with connection-test permission could probe internal services (Redis, the cloud metadata endpoint, internal databases) reachable from the NocoDB process. A DNS rebinding attacker could still race the resolve-vs-connect window.

Credit

This issue was reported by @helwor-01.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.05.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "nocodb"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.05.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47382"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-05T16:19:01Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-23T21:17:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThe connection-test endpoint opened a raw TCP socket to the user-supplied database\nhost without resolving and range-checking the destination, so private and link-local\naddresses (including IPv4-mapped IPv6 forms and `localhost`) reached the driver.\n\n### Details\nA new `validateDbConnectionHost` helper resolves hostnames through DNS, parses each\naddress with `ipaddr.js`, normalises IPv4-mapped IPv6, and rejects addresses in the\nprivate, loopback, link-local, unique-local, reserved, unspecified, broadcast, and\ncarrier-grade-NAT ranges. `0.0.0.0`, `::`, and the literal `localhost` are special-cased.\nThe check runs before the existing SSL block in the connection-test controller and\ngates the driver invocation.\n\n### Impact\nAuthenticated users with connection-test permission could probe internal services\n(Redis, the cloud metadata endpoint, internal databases) reachable from the NocoDB\nprocess. A DNS rebinding attacker could still race the resolve-vs-connect window.\n\n### Credit\nThis issue was reported by [@helwor-01](https://github.com/helwor-01).",
  "id": "GHSA-w43h-r5m5-p832",
  "modified": "2026-07-20T21:18:21Z",
  "published": "2026-06-05T16:19:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nocodb/nocodb/security/advisories/GHSA-w43h-r5m5-p832"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47382"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nocodb/nocodb"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nocodb/nocodb/releases/tag/2026.05.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "NocoDB: Server-Side Request Forgery via Database Connection Host"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON

Loading timeline…




    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.