GHSA-W293-VG96-WGC3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-29 18:17 – Updated: 2026-09-29 18:17
VLAI
Summary
undici vulnerable to TLS certificate validation bypass via dropped connect options in BalancedPool
Details

Impact

undici's BalancedPool passes its constructor options through a JSON-based deep clone (JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(...))) before forwarding them to each per-upstream Pool. JSON cannot represent functions, so a caller-supplied connect or tls option containing a checkServerIdentity callback (or a custom connector function) is silently dropped before it reaches the TLS layer. As a result, a TLS peer whose certificate a custom checkServerIdentity was written to reject, but which passes Node's default hostname and chain checks, is silently accepted when the request is made through BalancedPool. Client, Pool, Agent, and RoundRobinPool destructure connect/tls before the clone and are not affected. Only applications that use BalancedPool with a function-valued connect/tls option (such as a custom checkServerIdentity or connector) are affected.

Patches

Upgrade to 7.29.1 or 8.10.2. BalancedPool now preserves the connect and tls options outside the JSON clone, so custom TLS verification callbacks are forwarded to each upstream unchanged.

Workarounds

Use Client, Pool, or Agent instead of BalancedPool for connections that rely on a custom checkServerIdentity or connector, until upgraded.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "undici"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "7.24.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.29.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "undici"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "8.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.10.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-84961"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-295"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-29T18:17:15Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-04T17:17:02Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nundici\u0027s `BalancedPool` passes its constructor options through a JSON-based deep clone (`JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(...))`) before forwarding them to each per-upstream `Pool`. JSON cannot represent functions, so a caller-supplied `connect` or `tls` option containing a `checkServerIdentity` callback (or a custom connector function) is silently dropped before it reaches the TLS layer. As a result, a TLS peer whose certificate a custom `checkServerIdentity` was written to reject, but which passes Node\u0027s default hostname and chain checks, is silently accepted when the request is made through `BalancedPool`. `Client`, `Pool`, `Agent`, and `RoundRobinPool` destructure `connect`/`tls` before the clone and are not affected. Only applications that use `BalancedPool` with a function-valued `connect`/`tls` option (such as a custom `checkServerIdentity` or connector) are affected.\n\n### Patches\n\nUpgrade to `7.29.1` or `8.10.2`. `BalancedPool` now preserves the `connect` and `tls` options outside the JSON clone, so custom TLS verification callbacks are forwarded to each upstream unchanged.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nUse `Client`, `Pool`, or `Agent` instead of `BalancedPool` for connections that rely on a custom `checkServerIdentity` or connector, until upgraded.",
  "id": "GHSA-w293-vg96-wgc3",
  "modified": "2026-09-29T18:17:15Z",
  "published": "2026-09-29T18:17:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/security/advisories/GHSA-w293-vg96-wgc3"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84961"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/commit/8f5868fbdbc8f1146dfc1bcd1f2d117790141390"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/commit/f690157d728508652fef14673630c71515123e96"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cna.openjsf.org/security-advisories.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/releases/tag/v7.29.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/releases/tag/v8.10.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "undici vulnerable to TLS certificate validation bypass via dropped connect options in BalancedPool"
}



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