GHSA-VVPG-RRWW-WPMH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-28 21:15 – Updated: 2026-10-28 21:15Summary
The OpenAI-compatible server registers Starlette CORSMiddleware with
allowed_origins defaulting to ["*"], and performs no authentication unless
--api-key (or VLLM_API_KEY) is configured. A web page on any origin can send
requests to a vLLM server that the victim's browser can reach (for example
localhost or an internal/VPN address) and read the responses. The default
allow_credentials=False blocks cookie-bearing cross-origin requests; because
vLLM authenticates with a bearer header rather than cookies, the wildcard still
permits untokenized access to an unauthenticated server and read access when the
caller already holds a token.
Details
Affected components
vllm/entrypoints/launchers/cli_args.py-allowed_originsdefault value.vllm/entrypoints/serve/middleware/register.py-CORSMiddlewareregistration.vllm/entrypoints/serve/middleware/authenticate.py- auth middleware and its guarded path prefixes.
Root cause
vllm/entrypoints/launchers/cli_args.py:
allow_credentials: bool = False
"""Allow credentials."""
allowed_origins: list[str] = field(default_factory=lambda: ["*"])
"""Allowed origins."""
vllm/entrypoints/serve/middleware/register.py:
app.add_middleware(
CORSMiddleware,
allow_origins=args.allowed_origins,
allow_credentials=args.allow_credentials,
allow_methods=args.allowed_methods,
allow_headers=args.allowed_headers,
)
The auth middleware is added only when a token is configured and guards only the
/v1, /v2, /inference, and /cohere prefixes. /v1/load_lora_adapter and
/v1/unload_lora_adapter are inside /v1 and therefore do require a key when
one is set; they are open only when no key is configured and dynamic LoRA
updating is enabled.
Impact
- A malicious page can enumerate models (
GET /v1/models), issuePOST /v1/chat/completions, consume GPU time, and read model output through the victim's browser. - When the server is reachable only from the victim's network, the browser acts as a proxy a remote website could not otherwise use.
- With
allow_credentials=False, cookie-based CSRF does not apply; the exposure is cross-origin request execution and response disclosure.
This advisory was fixed in MR61009.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "vllm"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.32.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-115917"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-942"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-28T21:15:49Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-26T18:17:39Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe OpenAI-compatible server registers Starlette `CORSMiddleware` with\n`allowed_origins` defaulting to `[\"*\"]`, and performs no authentication unless\n`--api-key` (or `VLLM_API_KEY`) is configured. A web page on any origin can send\nrequests to a vLLM server that the victim\u0027s browser can reach (for example\n`localhost` or an internal/VPN address) and read the responses. The default\n`allow_credentials=False` blocks cookie-bearing cross-origin requests; because\nvLLM authenticates with a bearer header rather than cookies, the wildcard still\npermits untokenized access to an unauthenticated server and read access when the\ncaller already holds a token.\n\n### Details\n\nAffected components\n\n- `vllm/entrypoints/launchers/cli_args.py` - `allowed_origins` default value.\n- `vllm/entrypoints/serve/middleware/register.py` - `CORSMiddleware`\n registration.\n- `vllm/entrypoints/serve/middleware/authenticate.py` - auth middleware and its\n guarded path prefixes.\n\n Root cause\n\n`vllm/entrypoints/launchers/cli_args.py`:\n\n```python\nallow_credentials: bool = False\n\"\"\"Allow credentials.\"\"\"\nallowed_origins: list[str] = field(default_factory=lambda: [\"*\"])\n\"\"\"Allowed origins.\"\"\"\n```\n\n`vllm/entrypoints/serve/middleware/register.py`:\n\n```python\napp.add_middleware(\n CORSMiddleware,\n allow_origins=args.allowed_origins,\n allow_credentials=args.allow_credentials,\n allow_methods=args.allowed_methods,\n allow_headers=args.allowed_headers,\n)\n```\n\nThe auth middleware is added only when a token is configured and guards only the\n`/v1`, `/v2`, `/inference`, and `/cohere` prefixes. `/v1/load_lora_adapter` and\n`/v1/unload_lora_adapter` are inside `/v1` and therefore do require a key when\none is set; they are open only when no key is configured and dynamic LoRA\nupdating is enabled.\n\n### Impact\n\n\n- A malicious page can enumerate models (`GET /v1/models`), issue\n `POST /v1/chat/completions`, consume GPU time, and read model output through\n the victim\u0027s browser.\n- When the server is reachable only from the victim\u0027s network, the browser acts\n as a proxy a remote website could not otherwise use.\n- With `allow_credentials=False`, cookie-based CSRF does not apply; the exposure\n is cross-origin request execution and response disclosure.\n\nThis advisory was fixed in [MR61009](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/61009).",
"id": "GHSA-vvpg-rrww-wpmh",
"modified": "2026-10-28T21:15:50Z",
"published": "2026-10-28T21:15:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-vvpg-rrww-wpmh"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-115917"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/61009"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/fcae5c98870ff2c20659731dce7ba3a3ff0d48aa"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/releases/tag/v0.32.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "vLLM: Permissive default CORS origins allow cross-origin requests to the vLLM HTTP server"
}
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