GHSA-VRW4-W73R-6MM8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-08-30 16:12 – Updated: 2021-09-13 20:30Impact
A vulnerability in TimelockController allowed an actor with the executor role to take immediate control of the timelock, by resetting the delay to 0 and escalating privileges, thus gaining unrestricted access to assets held in the contract. Instances with the executor role set to "open" allow anyone to use the executor role, thus leaving the timelock at risk of being taken over by an attacker.
Patches
A fix is included in the following releases of @openzeppelin/contracts and @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable:
- 4.3.1
- 3.4.2
- 3.4.2-solc-0.7
Deployed instances of TimelockController should be replaced with a fixed version by migrating all assets, ownership, and roles.
Workarounds
Revoke the executor role from accounts not strictly under the team's control. We recommend revoking all executors that are not also proposers. When applying this mitigation, ensure there is at least one proposer and executor remaining.
References
Credits
The issue was identified by an anonymous white hat hacker through Immunefi.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, or need assistance executing the mitigation, email us at security@openzeppelin.com.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.3.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.4.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-39168"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-269"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-08-27T12:57:31Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-08-27T00:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nA vulnerability in `TimelockController` allowed an actor with the executor role to take immediate control of the timelock, by resetting the delay to 0 and escalating privileges, thus gaining unrestricted access to assets held in the contract. Instances with the executor role set to \"open\" allow anyone to use the executor role, thus leaving the timelock at risk of being taken over by an attacker.\n\n### Patches\n\nA fix is included in the following releases of `@openzeppelin/contracts` and `@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable`:\n- 4.3.1\n- 3.4.2\n- 3.4.2-solc-0.7\n\nDeployed instances of `TimelockController` should be replaced with a fixed version by migrating all assets, ownership, and roles.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nRevoke the executor role from accounts not strictly under the team\u0027s control. We recommend revoking all executors that are not also proposers. When applying this mitigation, ensure there is at least one proposer and executor remaining.\n\n### References\n\n[Post-mortem](https://forum.openzeppelin.com/t/timelockcontroller-vulnerability-postmortem/14958).\n\n### Credits\n\nThe issue was identified by an anonymous white hat hacker through [Immunefi](https://immunefi.com/).\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, or need assistance executing the mitigation, email us at security@openzeppelin.com.\n",
"id": "GHSA-vrw4-w73r-6mm8",
"modified": "2021-09-13T20:30:25Z",
"published": "2021-08-30T16:12:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts-upgradeable/security/advisories/GHSA-vrw4-w73r-6mm8"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-39168"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/commit/cec4f2ef57495d8b1742d62846da212515d99dd5"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts-upgradeabl"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/blob/master/CHANGELOG.md#431"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "TimelockController vulnerability in OpenZeppelin Contracts"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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