GHSA-VR35-F6M3-RH89
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-21 18:31 – Updated: 2025-01-06 21:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tls: fix NULL deref on tls_sw_splice_eof() with empty record
syzkaller discovered that if tls_sw_splice_eof() is executed as part of
sendfile() when the plaintext/ciphertext sk_msg are empty, the send path
gets confused because the empty ciphertext buffer does not have enough
space for the encryption overhead. This causes tls_push_record() to go on
the split = true path (which is only supposed to be used when interacting
with an attached BPF program), and then get further confused and hit the
tls_merge_open_record() path, which then assumes that there must be at
least one populated buffer element, leading to a NULL deref.
It is possible to have empty plaintext/ciphertext buffers if we previously bailed from tls_sw_sendmsg_locked() via the tls_trim_both_msgs() path. tls_sw_push_pending_record() already handles this case correctly; let's do the same check in tls_sw_splice_eof().
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-52767"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-476"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-21T16:15:15Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntls: fix NULL deref on tls_sw_splice_eof() with empty record\n\nsyzkaller discovered that if tls_sw_splice_eof() is executed as part of\nsendfile() when the plaintext/ciphertext sk_msg are empty, the send path\ngets confused because the empty ciphertext buffer does not have enough\nspace for the encryption overhead. This causes tls_push_record() to go on\nthe `split = true` path (which is only supposed to be used when interacting\nwith an attached BPF program), and then get further confused and hit the\ntls_merge_open_record() path, which then assumes that there must be at\nleast one populated buffer element, leading to a NULL deref.\n\nIt is possible to have empty plaintext/ciphertext buffers if we previously\nbailed from tls_sw_sendmsg_locked() via the tls_trim_both_msgs() path.\ntls_sw_push_pending_record() already handles this case correctly; let\u0027s do\nthe same check in tls_sw_splice_eof().",
"id": "GHSA-vr35-f6m3-rh89",
"modified": "2025-01-06T21:30:49Z",
"published": "2024-05-21T18:31:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52767"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2214e2bb5489145aba944874d0ee1652a0a63dc8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/53f2cb491b500897a619ff6abd72f565933760f0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/944900fe2736c07288efe2d9394db4d3ca23f2c9"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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