GHSA-VR2G-5Q36-7736
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-28 12:30 – Updated: 2026-05-28 12:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
eventfs: Hold eventfs_mutex and SRCU when remount walks events
Commit 340f0c7067a9 ("eventfs: Update all the eventfs_inodes from the events descriptor") had eventfs_set_attrs() recurse through ei->children on remount. The walk only holds the rcu_read_lock() taken by tracefs_apply_options() over tracefs_inodes, which is wrong:
- list_for_each_entry over ei->children races with the list_del_rcu() in eventfs_remove_rec() -- LIST_POISON1 deref, same shape as d2603279c7d6.
- eventfs_inodes are freed via call_srcu(&eventfs_srcu, ...). rcu_read_lock() does not extend an SRCU grace period, so ti->private can be reclaimed under the walk.
- The writes to ei->attr race with eventfs_set_attr(), which holds eventfs_mutex.
Reproducer:
while :; do mount -o remount,uid=$((RANDOM%1000)) /sys/kernel/tracing; done & while :; do echo "p:kp submit_bio" > /sys/kernel/tracing/kprobe_events echo > /sys/kernel/tracing/kprobe_events done
Wrap the events portion of tracefs_apply_options() in eventfs_remount_lock()/_unlock() that take eventfs_mutex and srcu_read_lock(&eventfs_srcu). eventfs_set_attrs() doesn't sleep so the nested rcu_read_lock() is fine; lockdep_assert_held() pins the contract.
Comment in tracefs_drop_inode() said "RCU cycle" -- it is SRCU.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-46106"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-28T10:16:25Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\neventfs: Hold eventfs_mutex and SRCU when remount walks events\n\nCommit 340f0c7067a9 (\"eventfs: Update all the eventfs_inodes from the\nevents descriptor\") had eventfs_set_attrs() recurse through ei-\u003echildren\non remount. The walk only holds the rcu_read_lock() taken by\ntracefs_apply_options() over tracefs_inodes, which is wrong:\n\n - list_for_each_entry over ei-\u003echildren races with the list_del_rcu()\n in eventfs_remove_rec() -- LIST_POISON1 deref, same shape as\n d2603279c7d6.\n - eventfs_inodes are freed via call_srcu(\u0026eventfs_srcu, ...).\n rcu_read_lock() does not extend an SRCU grace period, so ti-\u003eprivate\n can be reclaimed under the walk.\n - The writes to ei-\u003eattr race with eventfs_set_attr(), which holds\n eventfs_mutex.\n\nReproducer:\n\n while :; do mount -o remount,uid=$((RANDOM%1000)) /sys/kernel/tracing; done \u0026\n while :; do\n echo \"p:kp submit_bio\" \u003e /sys/kernel/tracing/kprobe_events\n echo \u003e /sys/kernel/tracing/kprobe_events\n done\n\nWrap the events portion of tracefs_apply_options() in\neventfs_remount_lock()/_unlock() that take eventfs_mutex and\nsrcu_read_lock(\u0026eventfs_srcu). eventfs_set_attrs() doesn\u0027t sleep so the\nnested rcu_read_lock() is fine; lockdep_assert_held() pins the contract.\n\nComment in tracefs_drop_inode() said \"RCU cycle\" -- it is SRCU.",
"id": "GHSA-vr2g-5q36-7736",
"modified": "2026-05-28T12:30:28Z",
"published": "2026-05-28T12:30:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46106"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/07004a8c4b572171934390148ee48c4175c77eed"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/44e64d8a432837308f4dda3ffe819f1ec092a0ba"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/52b109f1b875b912d4ab2c5fdd8c322d47119d9b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ae9cd0b46b1890040006a2fc5e905c5d6053fd02"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ed2ad73bcb0a7a6cc934097d4853b6d5124c317e"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.