GHSA-VQJQ-CM24-XJP3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-04 18:31 – Updated: 2026-02-05 18:30
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nfsd: clean up potential nfsd_file refcount leaks in COPY codepath

There are two different flavors of the nfsd4_copy struct. One is embedded in the compound and is used directly in synchronous copies. The other is dynamically allocated, refcounted and tracked in the client struture. For the embedded one, the cleanup just involves releasing any nfsd_files held on its behalf. For the async one, the cleanup is a bit more involved, and we need to dequeue it from lists, unhash it, etc.

There is at least one potential refcount leak in this code now. If the kthread_create call fails, then both the src and dst nfsd_files in the original nfsd4_copy object are leaked.

The cleanup in this codepath is also sort of weird. In the async copy case, we'll have up to four nfsd_file references (src and dst for both flavors of copy structure). They are both put at the end of nfsd4_do_async_copy, even though the ones held on behalf of the embedded one outlive that structure.

Change it so that we always clean up the nfsd_file refs held by the embedded copy structure before nfsd4_copy returns. Rework cleanup_async_copy to handle both inter and intra copies. Eliminate nfsd4_cleanup_intra_ssc since it now becomes a no-op.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-53606"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-10-04T16:15:57Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnfsd: clean up potential nfsd_file refcount leaks in COPY codepath\n\nThere are two different flavors of the nfsd4_copy struct. One is\nembedded in the compound and is used directly in synchronous copies. The\nother is dynamically allocated, refcounted and tracked in the client\nstruture. For the embedded one, the cleanup just involves releasing any\nnfsd_files held on its behalf. For the async one, the cleanup is a bit\nmore involved, and we need to dequeue it from lists, unhash it, etc.\n\nThere is at least one potential refcount leak in this code now. If the\nkthread_create call fails, then both the src and dst nfsd_files in the\noriginal nfsd4_copy object are leaked.\n\nThe cleanup in this codepath is also sort of weird. In the async copy\ncase, we\u0027ll have up to four nfsd_file references (src and dst for both\nflavors of copy structure). They are both put at the end of\nnfsd4_do_async_copy, even though the ones held on behalf of the embedded\none outlive that structure.\n\nChange it so that we always clean up the nfsd_file refs held by the\nembedded copy structure before nfsd4_copy returns. Rework\ncleanup_async_copy to handle both inter and intra copies. Eliminate\nnfsd4_cleanup_intra_ssc since it now becomes a no-op.",
  "id": "GHSA-vqjq-cm24-xjp3",
  "modified": "2026-02-05T18:30:28Z",
  "published": "2025-10-04T18:31:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-53606"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6ba434cb1a8d403ea9aad1b667c3ea3ad8b3191f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/75b8c681c563ef7e85da6862354efc18d2a08b1b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8f565846fbe8182961498d4cbe618b15076a683b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b3169b6ffe036b549c296a9e71591d29a1fb3209"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fd63299db8090307eae66f2aef17c8f00aafa0a9"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.