GHSA-VQ9M-4624-XG7R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-22 21:30 – Updated: 2025-09-22 21:30
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ALSA: oss: Fix PCM OSS buffer allocation overflow

We've got syzbot reports hitting INT_MAX overflow at vmalloc() allocation that is called from snd_pcm_plug_alloc(). Although we apply the restrictions to input parameters, it's based only on the hw_params of the underlying PCM device. Since the PCM OSS layer allocates a temporary buffer for the data conversion, the size may become unexpectedly large when more channels or higher rates is given; in the reported case, it went over INT_MAX, hence it hits WARN_ON().

This patch is an attempt to avoid such an overflow and an allocation for too large buffers. First off, it adds the limit of 1MB as the upper bound for period bytes. This must be large enough for all use cases, and we really don't want to handle a larger temporary buffer than this size. The size check is performed at two places, where the original period bytes is calculated and where the plugin buffer size is calculated.

In addition, the driver uses array_size() and array3_size() for multiplications to catch overflows for the converted period size and buffer bytes.

Severity
7.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-49292"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-787"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-02-26T07:01:06Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nALSA: oss: Fix PCM OSS buffer allocation overflow\n\nWe\u0027ve got syzbot reports hitting INT_MAX overflow at vmalloc()\nallocation that is called from snd_pcm_plug_alloc().  Although we\napply the restrictions to input parameters, it\u0027s based only on the\nhw_params of the underlying PCM device.  Since the PCM OSS layer\nallocates a temporary buffer for the data conversion, the size may\nbecome unexpectedly large when more channels or higher rates is given;\nin the reported case, it went over INT_MAX, hence it hits WARN_ON().\n\nThis patch is an attempt to avoid such an overflow and an allocation\nfor too large buffers.  First off, it adds the limit of 1MB as the\nupper bound for period bytes.  This must be large enough for all use\ncases, and we really don\u0027t want to handle a larger temporary buffer\nthan this size.  The size check is performed at two places, where the\noriginal period bytes is calculated and where the plugin buffer size\nis calculated.\n\nIn addition, the driver uses array_size() and array3_size() for\nmultiplications to catch overflows for the converted period size and\nbuffer bytes.",
  "id": "GHSA-vq9m-4624-xg7r",
  "modified": "2025-09-22T21:30:16Z",
  "published": "2025-09-22T21:30:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-49292"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0c4190b41a69990666b4000999e27f8f1b2a426b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5ce74ff7059341d8b2f4d01c3383491df63d1898"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7a40cbf3579a8e14849ba7ce46309c1992658d2b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a63af1baf0a5e11827db60e3127f87e437cab6e5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e74a069c6a7bb505f3ade141dddf85f4b0b5145a"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/efb6402c3c4a7c26d97c92d70186424097b6e366"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fb08bf99195a87c798bc8ae1357337a981faeade"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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