GHSA-VQ6G-G6C7-5F2J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-24 19:54 – Updated: 2026-09-24 19:54Impact
The SAML backend accepted SAML responses on the Assertion Consumer Service endpoint without verifying that they matched a previously issued AuthnRequest.
Applications using SAML account association could allow an attacker with a valid account on a trusted IdP to link the attacker's SAML identity to a logged-in victim's local account. The attacker could then authenticate through SAML and gain access to the victim's account.
The issue affects applications using the SAML backend together with authenticated account association.
Patches
The issue has been fixed by validating SAML responses against stored AuthnRequest IDs.
Users should upgrade to a patched version.
Fix:
- https://github.com/python-social-auth/social-core/pull/1794
Workarounds
Applications that cannot upgrade immediately should disable SAML account association for already authenticated users.
If SAML login is not required, the SAML backend can also be disabled by removing it from SOCIAL_AUTH_AUTHENTICATION_BACKENDS.
There is no complete workaround while continuing to allow vulnerable SAML account association.
Credits
Reported through GitHub private vulnerability reporting by Liyi Zhou, Ziyue Wang, Strick, Maurice, and Chenchen Yu from the University of Sydney security research team.
Reporter references:
- https://lzhou1110.github.io/
- https://zyy0530.github.io/
- https://str1ckl4nd.github.io/
- https://maurice.busystar.org/
- https://7thparkk.github.io/
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "social-auth-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-57175"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-24T19:54:48Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-24T18:17:14Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nThe SAML backend accepted SAML responses on the Assertion Consumer Service endpoint without verifying that they matched a previously issued `AuthnRequest`.\n\nApplications using SAML account association could allow an attacker with a valid account on a trusted IdP to link the attacker\u0027s SAML identity to a logged-in victim\u0027s local account. The attacker could then authenticate through SAML and gain access to the victim\u0027s account.\n\nThe issue affects applications using the SAML backend together with authenticated account association.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe issue has been fixed by validating SAML responses against stored `AuthnRequest` IDs.\n\nUsers should upgrade to a patched version.\n\nFix:\n\n* https://github.com/python-social-auth/social-core/pull/1794\n\n### Workarounds\n\nApplications that cannot upgrade immediately should disable SAML account association for already authenticated users.\n\nIf SAML login is not required, the SAML backend can also be disabled by removing it from `SOCIAL_AUTH_AUTHENTICATION_BACKENDS`.\n\nThere is no complete workaround while continuing to allow vulnerable SAML account association.\n\n### Credits\n\nReported through GitHub private vulnerability reporting by Liyi Zhou, Ziyue Wang, Strick, Maurice, and Chenchen Yu from the University of Sydney security research team.\n\nReporter references:\n\n* https://lzhou1110.github.io/\n* https://zyy0530.github.io/\n* https://str1ckl4nd.github.io/\n* https://maurice.busystar.org/\n* https://7thparkk.github.io/",
"id": "GHSA-vq6g-g6c7-5f2j",
"modified": "2026-09-24T19:54:48Z",
"published": "2026-09-24T19:54:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/python-social-auth/social-core/security/advisories/GHSA-vq6g-g6c7-5f2j"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-57175"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/python-social-auth/social-core/pull/1794"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/python-social-auth/social-core/commit/5c72f71125bc60e4411f09e2a9f998de5da7fcb6"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/python-social-auth/social-core"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/python-social-auth/social-core/releases/tag/5.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "social-auth-core has an Improper Authentication issue"
}
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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