GHSA-VPX6-8PJR-4G3V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-03 16:14 – Updated: 2026-08-03 16:14A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in @angular/platform-server's DOM emulation dependency (domino) when serializing the content of fallback raw-content elements (<iframe>, <noembed>, <noframes>, and <noscript>).
When rendering dynamic text content inside fallback raw-content elements via template bindings, the template engine expects the browser to render the content safely. Under Server-Side Rendering (SSR), domino is configured with scripting enabled, meaning these elements are treated as raw-text elements.
However, domino's serializer previously did not escape text nodes within fallback raw-content elements (<iframe>, <noembed>, <noframes>, <noscript>) during DOM serialization. As a result, any occurrence of closing tags in the bound dynamic text was not escaped.
The unescaped closing tag could be serialized directly into the output HTML. When parsed by a browser or re-parsed during SSR post-processing without preserving raw-content parser state, an injected closing tag closes the element early, allowing an injected script block to execute in the user's browser context, causing same-origin Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).
Impact
This vulnerability allows an attacker to perform same-origin Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks against any user visiting an SSR-rendered page that binds user-controlled data inside fallback raw-content elements (<iframe>, <noembed>, <noframes>, <noscript>). This can lead to session hijacking, credentials theft, unauthorized actions on behalf of users, and defacement.
Patched Versions
- 22.0.7
- 21.2.19
- 20.3.27
Workarounds
If you cannot immediately update your dependencies, you can mitigate this issue using any of the following approaches:
- Disable critical CSS inlining: Critical CSS inlining in Angular SSR post-processes the rendered HTML using domino. Disabling this step prevents domino from re-parsing and re-serializing the HTML during server-side rendering.
- In angular.json, set inlineCritical to false under style optimization options:
json
{
"projects": {
"my-app": {
"architect": {
"build": {
"builder": "@angular/build:application",
"options": {
"optimization": {
"styles": {
"inlineCritical": false
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
- When rendering programmatically with CommonEngine, set inlineCriticalCss: false in your render options.
- Avoid binding user-controlled values inside fallback raw-content elements (<iframe>, <noembed>, <noframes>, <noscript>).
- Sanitize user input placed inside these elements to explicitly strip or escape closing tags before passing it to the template.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@angular/platform-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "22.0.0-next.0"
},
{
"fixed": "22.0.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@angular/platform-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "21.0.0-next.0"
},
{
"fixed": "21.2.19"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@angular/platform-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "20.0.0-next.0"
},
{
"fixed": "20.3.27"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@angular/platform-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "19.2.25"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-69149"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-03T16:14:43Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in `@angular/platform-server`\u0027s DOM emulation dependency (`domino`) when serializing the content of fallback raw-content elements (`\u003ciframe\u003e`, `\u003cnoembed\u003e`, `\u003cnoframes\u003e`, and `\u003cnoscript\u003e`).\n\nWhen rendering dynamic text content inside fallback raw-content elements via template bindings, the template engine expects the browser to render the content safely. Under Server-Side Rendering (SSR), `domino` is configured with scripting enabled, meaning these elements are treated as raw-text elements.\n\nHowever, `domino`\u0027s serializer previously did not escape text nodes within fallback raw-content elements (`\u003ciframe\u003e`, `\u003cnoembed\u003e`, `\u003cnoframes\u003e`, `\u003cnoscript\u003e`) during DOM serialization. As a result, any occurrence of closing tags in the bound dynamic text was not escaped.\n\nThe unescaped closing tag could be serialized directly into the output HTML. When parsed by a browser or re-parsed during SSR post-processing without preserving raw-content parser state, an injected closing tag closes the element early, allowing an injected script block to execute in the user\u0027s browser context, causing same-origin Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).\n\n### Impact\n\nThis vulnerability allows an attacker to perform same-origin Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks against any user visiting an SSR-rendered page that binds user-controlled data inside fallback raw-content elements (`\u003ciframe\u003e`, `\u003cnoembed\u003e`, `\u003cnoframes\u003e`, `\u003cnoscript\u003e`). This can lead to session hijacking, credentials theft, unauthorized actions on behalf of users, and defacement.\n\n### Patched Versions\n\n- 22.0.7\n- 21.2.19\n- 20.3.27\n\n### Workarounds\nIf you cannot immediately update your dependencies, you can mitigate this issue using any of the following approaches:\n- **Disable critical CSS inlining**: Critical CSS inlining in Angular SSR post-processes the rendered HTML using `domino`. Disabling this step prevents `domino` from re-parsing and re-serializing the HTML during server-side rendering.\n - In `angular.json`, set `inlineCritical` to `false` under style optimization options:\n ```json\n {\n \"projects\": {\n \"my-app\": {\n \"architect\": {\n \"build\": {\n \"builder\": \"@angular/build:application\",\n \"options\": {\n \"optimization\": {\n \"styles\": {\n \"inlineCritical\": false\n }\n }\n }\n }\n }\n }\n }\n }\n ```\n - When rendering programmatically with `CommonEngine`, set `inlineCriticalCss: false` in your render options.\n- **Avoid binding user-controlled values** inside fallback raw-content elements (`\u003ciframe\u003e`, `\u003cnoembed\u003e`, `\u003cnoframes\u003e`, `\u003cnoscript\u003e`).\n- **Sanitize user input** placed inside these elements to explicitly strip or escape closing tags before passing it to the template.",
"id": "GHSA-vpx6-8pjr-4g3v",
"modified": "2026-08-03T16:14:43Z",
"published": "2026-08-03T16:14:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/angular/angular/security/advisories/GHSA-vpx6-8pjr-4g3v"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/angular/angular/pull/69675"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/angular/angular/pull/69714"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/angular/angular/pull/69929"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/angular/angular/pull/69930"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/angular/domino/pull/32"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/angular/domino/commit/f88e5aa49cf2804d7c2df22ef1640eb4ec43dd56"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/angular/angular"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Angular SSR: Missing Fallback Raw-Content Serialization Escaping leads to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)"
}
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