GHSA-VMVF-F857-43V5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-12 15:31 – Updated: 2025-02-14 18:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: dell-uart-backlight: fix serdev race
The dell_uart_bl_serdev_probe() function calls devm_serdev_device_open() before setting the client ops via serdev_device_set_client_ops(). This ordering can trigger a NULL pointer dereference in the serdev controller's receive_buf handler, as it assumes serdev->ops is valid when SERPORT_ACTIVE is set.
This is similar to the issue fixed in commit 5e700b384ec1 ("platform/chrome: cros_ec_uart: properly fix race condition") where devm_serdev_device_open() was called before fully initializing the device.
Fix the race by ensuring client ops are set before enabling the port via devm_serdev_device_open().
Note, serdev_device_set_baudrate() and serdev_device_set_flow_control() calls should be after the devm_serdev_device_open() call.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-21695"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-476"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-12T14:15:32Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nplatform/x86: dell-uart-backlight: fix serdev race\n\nThe dell_uart_bl_serdev_probe() function calls devm_serdev_device_open()\nbefore setting the client ops via serdev_device_set_client_ops(). This\nordering can trigger a NULL pointer dereference in the serdev controller\u0027s\nreceive_buf handler, as it assumes serdev-\u003eops is valid when\nSERPORT_ACTIVE is set.\n\nThis is similar to the issue fixed in commit 5e700b384ec1\n(\"platform/chrome: cros_ec_uart: properly fix race condition\") where\ndevm_serdev_device_open() was called before fully initializing the\ndevice.\n\nFix the race by ensuring client ops are set before enabling the port via\ndevm_serdev_device_open().\n\nNote, serdev_device_set_baudrate() and serdev_device_set_flow_control()\ncalls should be after the devm_serdev_device_open() call.",
"id": "GHSA-vmvf-f857-43v5",
"modified": "2025-02-14T18:30:49Z",
"published": "2025-02-12T15:31:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21695"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1b2128aa2d45ab20b22548dcf4b48906298ca7fd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d3a24d923333f75aaece9acb051d676edc0afb75"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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