GHSA-VJM7-M4XH-7WRC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-07 16:51 – Updated: 2026-07-07 16:51Summary
Manually modifying chat history allows setting the embeds property on a response message, the content of which is loaded into an iFrame with a sandbox that has allow-scripts and allow-same-origin set, ignoring the "iframe Sandbox Allow Same Origin" configuration. This enables stored XSS on the affected chat. This also triggers when the chat is in the shared format. The result is a shareable link containing the payload that can be distributed to any other users on the instance.
Details
The flaw stems from how iFrames are constructed here: https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/6f1486ffd0cb288d0e21f41845361924e0d742b3/src/lib/components/chat/Messages/ResponseMessage.svelte#L689-L703
messages.embeds is a user controlled property and so can be arbitrarily set by the user to a payload of their choosing. Since allowScripts and allowSameOrigin are harcoded as true here the sandboxing offers essentially no protection.
PoC
Create an arbitrary chat:
Edit the model response:
Before saving, configure the browser to use an HTTP proxy tool (Burp/Caido/ZAP) and intercept the save request. Find the object within the
history and then messages objects (not the messages array) that corresponds to the edited text.
On this object, add an
embeds key and list value as shown below, forward the request and refresh the page.
This results in XSS via the controlled content getting rendered in the iFrame. Note the bold text is just to aid demonstration.
console.log is used to prove JS execution because the lack of allow-modals on the iFrame sandbox prevents alerts.
The same payload triggers when the chat is shared.
Impact
Any user can create a weaponised chat that can be shared and subsequently used to target other users.
Low privilege users are at risk of having their session taken over by a payload that reads their token from local storage and exfiltrates it to an attacker controlled server.
Admins are at risk of exposing the server to RCE via same chain described in GHSA-w7xj-8fx7-wfch.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.6.43"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "open-webui"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.6.44"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-26193"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-07T16:51:22Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-19T20:25:42Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nManually modifying chat history allows setting the `embeds` property on a response message, the content of which is loaded into an iFrame with a sandbox that has `allow-scripts` and `allow-same-origin` set, ignoring the \"iframe Sandbox Allow Same Origin\" configuration. This enables stored XSS on the affected chat. This also triggers when the chat is in the shared format. The result is a shareable link containing the payload that can be distributed to any other users on the instance.\n\n### Details\nThe flaw stems from how iFrames are constructed here:\nhttps://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/6f1486ffd0cb288d0e21f41845361924e0d742b3/src/lib/components/chat/Messages/ResponseMessage.svelte#L689-L703\n\n`messages.embeds` is a user controlled property and so can be arbitrarily set by the user to a payload of their choosing. Since `allowScripts` and `allowSameOrigin` are harcoded as true here the sandboxing offers essentially no protection.\n\n### PoC\nCreate an arbitrary chat:\n\u003cimg width=\"2468\" height=\"1426\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/41e32f5c-3fa7-4208-a71f-85556eec6309\" /\u003e\nEdit the model response:\n\u003cimg width=\"632\" height=\"192\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b1e79303-360f-46e3-8d6d-3309c3ec30af\" /\u003e\n\u003cimg width=\"2150\" height=\"434\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/78f19d7f-10dc-4e91-83cc-2d4811e58496\" /\u003e\nBefore saving, configure the browser to use an HTTP proxy tool (Burp/Caido/ZAP) and intercept the save request. Find the object within the `history` and then `messages` objects (not the `messages` array) that corresponds to the edited text.\n\u003cimg width=\"2024\" height=\"1528\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/953e5368-8e93-428b-b223-c695eacfe7b9\" /\u003e\nOn this object, add an `embeds` key and list value as shown below, forward the request and refresh the page.\n\u003cimg width=\"1904\" height=\"1530\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0e56be6f-5513-490e-9961-972bdfbd5d8b\" /\u003e\nThis results in XSS via the controlled content getting rendered in the iFrame. Note the bold text is just to aid demonstration. `console.log` is used to prove JS execution because the lack of `allow-modals` on the iFrame sandbox prevents alerts. \n\u003cimg width=\"2752\" height=\"1686\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4858f7b3-4e2f-4fab-a5a5-196df26bcdce\" /\u003e\nThe same payload triggers when the chat is shared.\n\u003cimg width=\"2730\" height=\"1426\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ee88b538-9781-4276-b681-9953974b826d\" /\u003e\n\n### Impact\nAny user can create a weaponised chat that can be shared and subsequently used to target other users.\n\nLow privilege users are at risk of having their session taken over by a payload that reads their token from local storage and exfiltrates it to an attacker controlled server.\n\nAdmins are at risk of exposing the server to RCE via same chain described in GHSA-w7xj-8fx7-wfch.",
"id": "GHSA-vjm7-m4xh-7wrc",
"modified": "2026-07-07T16:51:22Z",
"published": "2026-07-07T16:51:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-vjm7-m4xh-7wrc"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26193"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/6f1486ffd0cb288d0e21f41845361924e0d742b3/src/lib/components/chat/Messages/ResponseMessage.svelte#L689-L703"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Open WebUI vulnerable to Stored XSS via iFrame embeds in response messages"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.