Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-VJFX-9V82-G36P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 03:15 – Updated: 2024-03-21 03:33

Details

** DISPUTED ** Prior to 2018-04-27, the reprompt feature in Amazon Echo devices could be misused by a custom Alexa skill. The reprompt feature is designed so that if Alexa does not receive an input within 8 seconds, the device can speak a reprompt, then wait an additional 8 seconds for input; if the user still does not respond, the microphone is then turned off. The vulnerability involves empty output-speech reprompts, custom wildcard ("gibberish") input slots, and logging of detected speech. If a maliciously designed skill is installed, an attacker could obtain transcripts of speech not intended for Alexa to process, but simply spoken within the device's hearing range. NOTE: The vendor states "Customer trust is important to us and we take security and privacy seriously. We have put mitigations in place for detecting this type of skill behavior and reject or suppress those skills when we do. Customers do not need to take any action for these mitigations to work."

Severity

3.3 (Low)


                  
                    CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-11567"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-384"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2018-05-30T22:29:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "** DISPUTED ** Prior to 2018-04-27, the reprompt feature in Amazon Echo devices could be misused by a custom Alexa skill. The reprompt feature is designed so that if Alexa does not receive an input within 8 seconds, the device can speak a reprompt, then wait an additional 8 seconds for input; if the user still does not respond, the microphone is then turned off. The vulnerability involves empty output-speech reprompts, custom wildcard (\"gibberish\") input slots, and logging of detected speech. If a maliciously designed skill is installed, an attacker could obtain transcripts of speech not intended for Alexa to process, but simply spoken within the device\u0027s hearing range. NOTE: The vendor states \"Customer trust is important to us and we take security and privacy seriously. We have put mitigations in place for detecting this type of skill behavior and reject or suppress those skills when we do. Customers do not need to take any action for these mitigations to work.\"",
  "id": "GHSA-vjfx-9v82-g36p",
  "modified": "2024-03-21T03:33:25Z",
  "published": "2022-05-14T03:15:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11567"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://info.checkmarx.com/hubfs/Amazon_Echo_Research.pdf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.checkmarx.com/2018/04/25/eavesdropping-with-amazon-alexa"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wired.com/story/amazon-echo-alexa-skill-spying"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.yahoo.com/news/amazon-alexa-bug-let-hackers-104609600.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

CVE-2018-11567 (GCVE-0-2018-11567)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2018-05-30 22:00 – Updated: 2024-08-05 08:10 Disputed

Summary

Prior to 2018-04-27, the reprompt feature in Amazon Echo devices could be misused by a custom Alexa skill. The reprompt feature is designed so that if Alexa does not receive an input within 8 seconds, the device can speak a reprompt, then wait an additional 8 seconds for input; if the user still does not respond, the microphone is then turned off. The vulnerability involves empty output-speech reprompts, custom wildcard ("gibberish") input slots, and logging of detected speech. If a maliciously designed skill is installed, an attacker could obtain transcripts of speech not intended for Alexa to process, but simply spoken within the device's hearing range. NOTE: The vendor states "Customer trust is important to us and we take security and privacy seriously. We have put mitigations in place for detecting this type of skill behavior and reject or suppress those skills when we do. Customers do not need to take any action for these mitigations to work.

Severity

No CVSS data available.

CWE

Assigner

mitre CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard E 29/100 over 2157 records in the last 180 days details

References

4 references

URL	Tags
https://www.yahoo.com/news/amazon-alexa-bug-let-h…	x_refsource_MISC
https://www.wired.com/story/amazon-echo-alexa-ski…	x_refsource_MISC
https://info.checkmarx.com/hubfs/Amazon_Echo_Rese…	x_refsource_MISC
https://www.checkmarx.com/2018/04/25/eavesdroppin…	x_refsource_MISC

Date Public

2018-05-30 00:00

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

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Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

Order JSON

How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Publication & reservation Sightings KEV catalogs Other timestamps

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

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