GHSA-VHPC-FMR8-VGCC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-16 12:30 – Updated: 2026-09-16 12:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Bound i2c->length in I2C bsg handlers
struct qla_i2c_access carries a 16-bit length field alongside a fixed 64-byte buffer:
struct qla_i2c_access {
uint16_t device, offset, option, length;
uint8_t buffer[0x40];
} __packed;
qla2x00_write_i2c() and qla2x00_read_i2c() use the user-supplied i2c->length without any bounds check. i2c is overlaid on a 256-byte on-stack buffer and sfp is a 256-byte DMA-pool buffer, so a length up to 65535 overruns both:
- write: memcpy(sfp, i2c->buffer, i2c->length) over-reads the stack and over-writes the sfp heap buffer, and qla2x00_write_sfp() then DMAs i2c->length bytes out of the 256-byte buffer.
- read: qla2x00_read_sfp() DMAs i2c->length bytes into the 256-byte sfp, then memcpy(i2c->buffer, sfp, i2c->length) overflows the 64-byte buffer inside the on-stack array.
A caller holding CAP_SYS_RAWIO can use this to corrupt the heap and the kernel stack. Reject requests whose length exceeds the buffer before any copy or DMA transfer in both handlers.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89864"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-16T11:16:54Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: qla2xxx: Bound i2c-\u003elength in I2C bsg handlers\n\nstruct qla_i2c_access carries a 16-bit length field alongside a fixed\n64-byte buffer:\n\n\tstruct qla_i2c_access {\n\t\tuint16_t device, offset, option, length;\n\t\tuint8_t buffer[0x40];\n\t} __packed;\n\nqla2x00_write_i2c() and qla2x00_read_i2c() use the user-supplied\ni2c-\u003elength without any bounds check. i2c is overlaid on a 256-byte\non-stack buffer and sfp is a 256-byte DMA-pool buffer, so a length up to\n65535 overruns both:\n\n - write: memcpy(sfp, i2c-\u003ebuffer, i2c-\u003elength) over-reads the stack and\n over-writes the sfp heap buffer, and qla2x00_write_sfp() then DMAs\n i2c-\u003elength bytes out of the 256-byte buffer.\n - read: qla2x00_read_sfp() DMAs i2c-\u003elength bytes into the 256-byte sfp,\n then memcpy(i2c-\u003ebuffer, sfp, i2c-\u003elength) overflows the 64-byte\n buffer inside the on-stack array.\n\nA caller holding CAP_SYS_RAWIO can use this to corrupt the heap and the\nkernel stack. Reject requests whose length exceeds the buffer before any\ncopy or DMA transfer in both handlers.",
"id": "GHSA-vhpc-fmr8-vgcc",
"modified": "2026-09-16T12:30:39Z",
"published": "2026-09-16T12:30:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89864"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0918ee2c0eeb4d7f45b82b3dc11e65c2d9b7ad59"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2be39946abcde5a6416fb074ef728429e246a996"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/32d6df14fdab71fe1ba304fd9a0db0411ea2e043"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/47049fdadc0eaa115e813735b827e1379c0d2cf8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/522d6dcdc645d8f97d6b4cdfd6d8eea307f3ff0e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8f01f886cc5e7bbc16cbf1a9928fdebbc911e973"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/97ca58b0fb026799b99e3d552d5f69cf9a3113ad"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9a756f277eb89f769dbf380f38245c270d31fdb5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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