GHSA-VHPC-FMR8-VGCC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-16 12:30 – Updated: 2026-09-16 12:30
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

scsi: qla2xxx: Bound i2c->length in I2C bsg handlers

struct qla_i2c_access carries a 16-bit length field alongside a fixed 64-byte buffer:

struct qla_i2c_access {
    uint16_t device, offset, option, length;
    uint8_t  buffer[0x40];
} __packed;

qla2x00_write_i2c() and qla2x00_read_i2c() use the user-supplied i2c->length without any bounds check. i2c is overlaid on a 256-byte on-stack buffer and sfp is a 256-byte DMA-pool buffer, so a length up to 65535 overruns both:

  • write: memcpy(sfp, i2c->buffer, i2c->length) over-reads the stack and over-writes the sfp heap buffer, and qla2x00_write_sfp() then DMAs i2c->length bytes out of the 256-byte buffer.
  • read: qla2x00_read_sfp() DMAs i2c->length bytes into the 256-byte sfp, then memcpy(i2c->buffer, sfp, i2c->length) overflows the 64-byte buffer inside the on-stack array.

A caller holding CAP_SYS_RAWIO can use this to corrupt the heap and the kernel stack. Reject requests whose length exceeds the buffer before any copy or DMA transfer in both handlers.

Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-89864"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-16T11:16:54Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: qla2xxx: Bound i2c-\u003elength in I2C bsg handlers\n\nstruct qla_i2c_access carries a 16-bit length field alongside a fixed\n64-byte buffer:\n\n\tstruct qla_i2c_access {\n\t\tuint16_t device, offset, option, length;\n\t\tuint8_t  buffer[0x40];\n\t} __packed;\n\nqla2x00_write_i2c() and qla2x00_read_i2c() use the user-supplied\ni2c-\u003elength without any bounds check. i2c is overlaid on a 256-byte\non-stack buffer and sfp is a 256-byte DMA-pool buffer, so a length up to\n65535 overruns both:\n\n  - write: memcpy(sfp, i2c-\u003ebuffer, i2c-\u003elength) over-reads the stack and\n    over-writes the sfp heap buffer, and qla2x00_write_sfp() then DMAs\n    i2c-\u003elength bytes out of the 256-byte buffer.\n  - read: qla2x00_read_sfp() DMAs i2c-\u003elength bytes into the 256-byte sfp,\n    then memcpy(i2c-\u003ebuffer, sfp, i2c-\u003elength) overflows the 64-byte\n    buffer inside the on-stack array.\n\nA caller holding CAP_SYS_RAWIO can use this to corrupt the heap and the\nkernel stack. Reject requests whose length exceeds the buffer before any\ncopy or DMA transfer in both handlers.",
  "id": "GHSA-vhpc-fmr8-vgcc",
  "modified": "2026-09-16T12:30:39Z",
  "published": "2026-09-16T12:30:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89864"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0918ee2c0eeb4d7f45b82b3dc11e65c2d9b7ad59"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2be39946abcde5a6416fb074ef728429e246a996"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/32d6df14fdab71fe1ba304fd9a0db0411ea2e043"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/47049fdadc0eaa115e813735b827e1379c0d2cf8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/522d6dcdc645d8f97d6b4cdfd6d8eea307f3ff0e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8f01f886cc5e7bbc16cbf1a9928fdebbc911e973"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/97ca58b0fb026799b99e3d552d5f69cf9a3113ad"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9a756f277eb89f769dbf380f38245c270d31fdb5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.





Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.



Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.