GHSA-VH2P-4GFM-V9V7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-27 03:34 – Updated: 2026-04-22 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
kernel: be more careful about dup_mmap() failures and uprobe registering
If a memory allocation fails during dup_mmap(), the maple tree can be left in an unsafe state for other iterators besides the exit path. All the locks are dropped before the exit_mmap() call (in mm/mmap.c), but the incomplete mm_struct can be reached through (at least) the rmap finding the vmas which have a pointer back to the mm_struct.
Up to this point, there have been no issues with being able to find an mm_struct that was only partially initialised. Syzbot was able to make the incomplete mm_struct fail with recent forking changes, so it has been proven unsafe to use the mm_struct that hasn't been initialised, as referenced in the link below.
Although 8ac662f5da19f ("fork: avoid inappropriate uprobe access to invalid mm") fixed the uprobe access, it does not completely remove the race.
This patch sets the MMF_OOM_SKIP to avoid the iteration of the vmas on the oom side (even though this is extremely unlikely to be selected as an oom victim in the race window), and sets MMF_UNSTABLE to avoid other potential users from using a partially initialised mm_struct.
When registering vmas for uprobe, skip the vmas in an mm that is marked unstable. Modifying a vma in an unstable mm may cause issues if the mm isn't fully initialised.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-21709"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-27T02:15:14Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nkernel: be more careful about dup_mmap() failures and uprobe registering\n\nIf a memory allocation fails during dup_mmap(), the maple tree can be left\nin an unsafe state for other iterators besides the exit path. All the\nlocks are dropped before the exit_mmap() call (in mm/mmap.c), but the\nincomplete mm_struct can be reached through (at least) the rmap finding\nthe vmas which have a pointer back to the mm_struct.\n\nUp to this point, there have been no issues with being able to find an\nmm_struct that was only partially initialised. Syzbot was able to make\nthe incomplete mm_struct fail with recent forking changes, so it has been\nproven unsafe to use the mm_struct that hasn\u0027t been initialised, as\nreferenced in the link below.\n\nAlthough 8ac662f5da19f (\"fork: avoid inappropriate uprobe access to\ninvalid mm\") fixed the uprobe access, it does not completely remove the\nrace.\n\nThis patch sets the MMF_OOM_SKIP to avoid the iteration of the vmas on the\noom side (even though this is extremely unlikely to be selected as an oom\nvictim in the race window), and sets MMF_UNSTABLE to avoid other potential\nusers from using a partially initialised mm_struct.\n\nWhen registering vmas for uprobe, skip the vmas in an mm that is marked\nunstable. Modifying a vma in an unstable mm may cause issues if the mm\nisn\u0027t fully initialised.",
"id": "GHSA-vh2p-4gfm-v9v7",
"modified": "2026-04-22T15:31:31Z",
"published": "2025-02-27T03:34:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21709"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/64c37e134b120fb462fb4a80694bfb8e7be77b14"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/74c2471eb891a7dcb3874b21c106cda75f52be30"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/da139948aeda677ac09cc0e7d837f8a314de7d55"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.