GHSA-VGXX-7QQ2-4HRV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-11-12 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: fix out-of-bounds write in l2cap_ecred_connect
l2cap_chan_connect() tries to ensure there are no more than L2CAP_ECRED_CONN_SCID_MAX pending ECRED channels, so they fit in the same L2CAP_ECRED_CONN_REQ that l2cap_ecred_connect() constructs.
However, the check only counts deferred channels. If 6 L2CAP sockets are connected at the same time in order DDDDND (D=deferred, N=non-deferred), the last can bump the total to max+1. It results to one __le16 written out of bounds of the scid array, and an invalid ECRED_CONN_REQ being sent.
Fix by leaving room for the non-deferred pending ECRED channels in the counting in l2cap_chan_connect(), so the limit can't be exceeded.
Move counting under same critical section where the channel is added. Although race conditions involving this appear unreachable, it's easier to see.
Also add WARN_ON_ONCE check in l2cap_ecred_defer_connect() to make this less brittle.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98107"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-787"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-25T11:17:41Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: L2CAP: fix out-of-bounds write in l2cap_ecred_connect\n\nl2cap_chan_connect() tries to ensure there are no more than\nL2CAP_ECRED_CONN_SCID_MAX pending ECRED channels, so they fit in the\nsame L2CAP_ECRED_CONN_REQ that l2cap_ecred_connect() constructs.\n\nHowever, the check only counts deferred channels. If 6 L2CAP sockets\nare connected at the same time in order DDDDND (D=deferred,\nN=non-deferred), the last can bump the total to max+1. It results to\none __le16 written out of bounds of the scid array, and an invalid\nECRED_CONN_REQ being sent.\n\nFix by leaving room for the non-deferred pending ECRED channels in the\ncounting in l2cap_chan_connect(), so the limit can\u0027t be exceeded.\n\nMove counting under same critical section where the channel is added.\nAlthough race conditions involving this appear unreachable, it\u0027s easier\nto see.\n\nAlso add WARN_ON_ONCE check in l2cap_ecred_defer_connect() to make this\nless brittle.",
"id": "GHSA-vgxx-7qq2-4hrv",
"modified": "2026-11-12T18:31:13Z",
"published": "2026-09-25T12:31:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98107"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/56c2b5831d39dc84aad2573dc3e197af1a872a05"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6da5c0331fc3ef0c7b8df8269523fc3b2cce1e65"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ce0927eb3ee2939fab5ce3f9334bfd2fafb38481"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/df8c3af6132640da4788e96a02d653e642059803"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fabc5e04f123225daf980d03f2c5a05e7f0f0a7f"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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