GHSA-VGPF-3M99-Q785
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-11 18:30 – Updated: 2026-03-11 18:30A vulnerability in the handling of an Egress Packet Network Interface (EPNI) Aligner interrupt in Cisco IOS XR Software for Cisco Network Convergence System (NCS) 5500 Series with NC57 line cards and Cisco NCS 5700 Routers and Cisco IOS XR Software for Third Party Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause the network processing unit (NPU) and ASIC to stop processing, preventing traffic from traversing the interface.
This vulnerability is due to the corruption of packets in specific cases when an EPNI Aligner interrupt is triggered while an affected device is experiencing heavy transit traffic. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a continuous flow of crafted packets to an interface of the affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause persistent, heavy packet loss, resulting in a denial of service (DoS) condition. Note: If active exploitation of this vulnerability is suspected, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider. Cisco has assigned this security advisory a Security Impact Rating (SIR) of High rather than Medium as the score indicates. This change was made because the affected device operates within a critical network segment where compromise could lead to significant disruption or exposure, thereby elevating the overall risk beyond the base technical severity.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-20118"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-460"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-11T17:16:56Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in the handling of an Egress Packet Network Interface (EPNI) Aligner interrupt in Cisco IOS XR Software for Cisco Network Convergence System (NCS) 5500 Series with NC57 line cards and Cisco NCS 5700 Routers and Cisco IOS XR Software for Third Party Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause the network processing unit (NPU) and ASIC to stop processing, preventing traffic from traversing the interface.\n\nThis vulnerability is due to the corruption of packets in specific cases when an EPNI Aligner interrupt is triggered while an affected device is experiencing heavy transit traffic. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a continuous flow of crafted packets to an interface of the affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause persistent, heavy packet loss, resulting in a denial of service (DoS) condition.\nNote: If active exploitation of this vulnerability is suspected, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider.\nCisco has assigned this security advisory a Security Impact Rating (SIR) of High rather than Medium as the score indicates. This change was made because the affected device operates within a critical network segment where compromise could lead to significant disruption or exposure, thereby elevating the overall risk beyond the base technical severity.",
"id": "GHSA-vgpf-3m99-q785",
"modified": "2026-03-11T18:30:33Z",
"published": "2026-03-11T18:30:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20118"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-xrncs-epni-int-dos-TWMffUsN"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.