GHSA-VGP4-2FC4-QFF2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-12 14:40 – Updated: 2026-08-12 14:40Impact
Authenticated Backend Users with the backend.manage_editor ("Manage editor settings") permission can provide custom styles through Settings → Editor Settings → Markup Styles that are compiled through the LESS CSS parser and rendered on every backend page. Previously, the compiled output was not sanitized, which could have allowed a stored XSS attack.
Although this is a valid security issue, it's important to note that its severity is relatively low. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker would already need to have trusted access to the Winter CMS backend with a specific administrative permission. The Winter CMS maintainers recommend that the backend.manage_editor permission only be granted to trusted administrators and developers.
A related issue exists in the custom CSS field at Settings → Customize Backend → Styles (backend.manage_branding permission), which uses the same rendering mechanism and is addressed separately.
All users are advised to update to the latest version to ensure their systems remain secure.
Patches
This issue has been patched in v1.2.13. The renderCss() method now applies strip_tags() to compiled CSS output before returning it.
Workarounds
Apply https://github.com/wintercms/winter/commit/d28f0b9474af79cfaa80eeb9d691f7a7c4469720 manually if unable to upgrade to v1.2.13.
Resources
- CVE-2025-61674 (identical vulnerability in October CMS, patched in v3.7.13 and v4.0.12)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "winter/wn-backend-module"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.2.10"
},
{
"fixed": "1.2.13"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-32258"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-12T14:40:38Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact \n \nAuthenticated Backend Users with the `backend.manage_editor` (\"Manage editor settings\") permission can provide custom styles through **Settings \u2192 Editor Settings \u2192 Markup Styles** that are compiled through the LESS CSS parser and rendered on every backend page. Previously, the compiled output was not sanitized, which could have allowed a stored XSS attack.\n\nAlthough this is a valid security issue, it\u0027s important to note that its severity is relatively low. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker would already need to have trusted access to the Winter CMS backend with a specific administrative permission. The Winter CMS maintainers recommend that the `backend.manage_editor` permission only be granted to trusted administrators and developers.\n\nA related issue exists in the custom CSS field at **Settings \u2192 Customize Backend \u2192 Styles** (`backend.manage_branding` permission), which uses the same rendering mechanism and is addressed separately.\n\nAll users are advised to update to the latest version to ensure their systems remain secure.\n\n### Patches\n\nThis issue has been patched in v1.2.13. The `renderCss()` method now applies `strip_tags()` to compiled CSS output before returning it.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nApply [https://github.com/wintercms/winter/commit/d28f0b9474af79cfaa80eeb9d691f7a7c4469720](https://github.com/wintercms/winter/commit/d28f0b9474af79cfaa80eeb9d691f7a7c4469720) manually if unable to upgrade to v1.2.13.\n\n### Resources\n\n- CVE-2025-61674 (identical vulnerability in October CMS, patched in v3.7.13 and v4.0.12)",
"id": "GHSA-vgp4-2fc4-qff2",
"modified": "2026-08-12T14:40:38Z",
"published": "2026-08-12T14:40:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/wintercms/winter/security/advisories/GHSA-vgp4-2fc4-qff2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/wintercms/winter/commit/d28f0b9474af79cfaa80eeb9d691f7a7c4469720"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/wintercms/winter"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Winter: Stored XSS through Editor Settings custom styles"
}
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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