Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-VG6P-V9VM-6FGJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-25 14:43 – Updated: 2026-08-25 14:43

Summary

praisonaiagents vulnerable to SSRF in web_crawl tool via redirect-following and DNS rebinding (validate-then-fetch gap)

Details

The web_crawl tool performs its SSRF check only on the initial URL: it resolves the hostname once with socket.gethostbyname and rejects private/loopback/link-local results. It then passes the URL to a fetcher that uses httpx.Client(follow_redirects=True) - or urllib.request.urlopen when httpx is absent, which also follows redirects - and re-resolves the hostname at connect time, with no further validation. This validate-here/fetch-there gap is bypassable two independent ways: HTTP redirects and DNS rebinding.

Affected code: src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/web_crawl_tools.py - Single-shot validation (lines 229-238): if os.environ.get("ALLOW_LOCAL_CRAWL") != "true": ip_str = socket.gethostbyname(hostname) # resolved ONCE, at validation time ip = ipaddress.ip_address(ip_str) if ip.is_loopback or ip.is_private or ip.is_link_local or ip.is_multicast or ip.is_unspecified: continue # rejected url_list.append(u) - Vulnerable fetch (_crawl_with_httpx, lines 142 / 149): follows redirects, re-resolves DNS, no re-check: with httpx.Client(follow_redirects=True, timeout=30.0) as client: response = client.get(url) # fallback: urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=30) (also follows redirects by default) - web_crawl / crawl_web are registered tools (tools/init.py:156-157); httpx is the default fallback provider (dispatch at web_crawl_tools.py:269).

The two bypasses: 1) Redirect: validation approves an attacker domain resolving to a public IP; attacker server replies 302 Location: http://169.254.169.254/... (or any internal host); the fetcher follows it unchecked. 2) DNS rebinding (TOCTOU): validator's gethostbyname and fetcher's connect-time resolution are independent; a low-TTL attacker domain answers public to the validator and private/loopback to fetch.

Impact: An agent with web_crawl - driven by direct input or indirect prompt injection - can be made to read internal-only HTTP services and cloud instance-metadata endpoints (e.g. IAM credentials), with the response body returned in the tool output. Scope is Changed because the request pivots into the internal network.

Proof of concept: A PoC drives the real web_crawl() (httpx absent -> genuine urllib fallback). It runs a loopback "internal metadata" service and a loopback attacker redirector, substituting DNS only to stand in for "attacker owns a public domain" / offline routing - the redirect-following and connect-time re-resolution are the repo's own behavior. Observed: CONTROL: web_crawl("http://127.0.0.1:.../meta-data/") -> blocked (validator works) PoC 1A (redirect): attacker.example approved (public); 302 -> loopback metadata -> result.content leaks {"AccessKeyId":"ASIA_FAKE_STOLEN_CREDENTIAL_..."} PoC 1B (rebinding): gethostbyname(rebind.example)->public (allowed); connect->127.0.0.1 -> same secret leaked The control proves the validator blocks a direct loopback request, so the bypasses are genuine.

Remediation: Resolve the hostname once, validate that IP, and connect to that exact validated IP (pin it) rather than re-resolving. Disable redirect following (follow_redirects=False; for urllib use a redirect handler that re-validates), or re-validate every redirect hop's resolved IP. Apply the deny check to both the validator and the actual socket target. file_tools.py:364 already uses follow_redirects=False and is the correct pattern to propagate.

Distinct from prior advisories: The accepted SSRF advisories concern host-string parsing in different code — alternate loopback encodings in spider_tools (GHSA-5c6w-wwfq-7qqm) and the CLI @url feature (GHSA-5cxw-77wg-jrf3). This is in the web_crawl tool, which neither advisory names, and the mechanisms (redirect-following and DNS rebinding) differ categorically from host-string encoding; the spider_tools _host_is_blocked hardening does not apply to this tool.

Severity

7.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonaiagents"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.6.58"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55524"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-367",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-25T14:43:19Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-05T20:17:10Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The web_crawl tool performs its SSRF check only on the initial URL: it resolves the hostname once\nwith socket.gethostbyname and rejects private/loopback/link-local results. It then passes the URL to\na fetcher that uses httpx.Client(follow_redirects=True) - or urllib.request.urlopen when httpx is\nabsent, which also follows redirects - and re-resolves the hostname at connect time, with no further\nvalidation. This validate-here/fetch-there gap is bypassable two independent ways: HTTP redirects and\nDNS rebinding.\n\nAffected code: src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/web_crawl_tools.py\n- Single-shot validation (lines 229-238):\n    if os.environ.get(\"ALLOW_LOCAL_CRAWL\") != \"true\":\n        ip_str = socket.gethostbyname(hostname)            # resolved ONCE, at validation time\n        ip = ipaddress.ip_address(ip_str)\n        if ip.is_loopback or ip.is_private or ip.is_link_local or ip.is_multicast or ip.is_unspecified:\n            continue                                       # rejected\n    url_list.append(u)\n- Vulnerable fetch (_crawl_with_httpx, lines 142 / 149): follows redirects, re-resolves DNS, no re-check:\n    with httpx.Client(follow_redirects=True, timeout=30.0) as client: response = client.get(url)\n    # fallback: urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=30)  (also follows redirects by default)\n- web_crawl / crawl_web are registered tools (tools/__init__.py:156-157); httpx is the default fallback\n  provider (dispatch at web_crawl_tools.py:269).\n\nThe two bypasses:\n1) Redirect: validation approves an attacker domain resolving to a public IP; attacker server replies\n   302 Location: http://169.254.169.254/... (or any internal host); the fetcher follows it unchecked.\n2) DNS rebinding (TOCTOU): validator\u0027s gethostbyname and fetcher\u0027s connect-time resolution are\n   independent; a low-TTL attacker domain answers public to the validator and private/loopback to fetch.\n\nImpact:\nAn agent with web_crawl - driven by direct input or indirect prompt injection - can be made to read\ninternal-only HTTP services and cloud instance-metadata endpoints (e.g. IAM credentials), with the\nresponse body returned in the tool output. Scope is Changed because the request pivots into the\ninternal network.\n\nProof of concept:\nA PoC drives the real web_crawl() (httpx absent -\u003e genuine urllib fallback). It runs a loopback\n\"internal metadata\" service and a loopback attacker redirector, substituting DNS only to stand in\nfor \"attacker owns a public domain\" / offline routing - the redirect-following and connect-time\nre-resolution are the repo\u0027s own behavior. Observed:\n  CONTROL: web_crawl(\"http://127.0.0.1:.../meta-data/\")  -\u003e blocked (validator works)\n  PoC 1A (redirect):  attacker.example approved (public); 302 -\u003e loopback metadata\n                      -\u003e result.content leaks {\"AccessKeyId\":\"ASIA_FAKE_STOLEN_CREDENTIAL_...\"}\n  PoC 1B (rebinding): gethostbyname(rebind.example)-\u003epublic (allowed); connect-\u003e127.0.0.1\n                      -\u003e same secret leaked\nThe control proves the validator blocks a direct loopback request, so the bypasses are genuine.\n\nRemediation:\nResolve the hostname once, validate that IP, and connect to that exact validated IP (pin it) rather\nthan re-resolving. Disable redirect following (follow_redirects=False; for urllib use a redirect\nhandler that re-validates), or re-validate every redirect hop\u0027s resolved IP. Apply the deny check to\nboth the validator and the actual socket target. file_tools.py:364 already uses follow_redirects=False\nand is the correct pattern to propagate.\n\nDistinct from prior advisories:\nThe accepted SSRF advisories concern host-string parsing in different code \u2014 alternate loopback\nencodings in spider_tools (GHSA-5c6w-wwfq-7qqm) and the CLI @url feature (GHSA-5cxw-77wg-jrf3). This\nis in the web_crawl tool, which neither advisory names, and the mechanisms (redirect-following and DNS\nrebinding) differ categorically from host-string encoding; the spider_tools _host_is_blocked hardening\ndoes not apply to this tool.",
  "id": "GHSA-vg6p-v9vm-6fgj",
  "modified": "2026-08-25T14:43:19Z",
  "published": "2026-08-25T14:43:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-vg6p-v9vm-6fgj"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55524"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/releases/tag/v4.6.58"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "praisonaiagents vulnerable to SSRF in web_crawl tool via redirect-following and DNS rebinding (validate-then-fetch gap)"
}

CVE-2026-55524 (GCVE-0-2026-55524)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-05 19:58 – Updated: 2026-08-06 14:43

Title

PraisonAI: SSRF in web_crawl tool via redirect-following and DNS rebinding (validate-then-fetch gap)

Summary

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions prior to 1.6.58, the web_crawl tool performs its SSRF check only on the initially supplied URL, allowing the protection to be bypassed so the tool connects to attacker-chosen internal destinations. The check resolves the hostname once with socket.gethostbyname and rejects private/loopback/link-local results, but then passes the URL to a fetcher using httpx.Client(follow_redirects=True) (or urllib.request.urlopen when httpx is absent, which also follows redirects) that re-resolves the hostname at connect time with no further validation. This validate-here/fetch-there gap is exploitable through both HTTP redirects and DNS rebinding. If an attacker can influence URLs passed to web_crawl(), directly or through an agent/tool workflow, they can cause the PraisonAI host to fetch loopback, private-network, or cloud metadata endpoints reachable from that host, with the response body returned in the web_crawl() result. This issue has been fixed in version 1.6.58.

Severity

7.5 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-08-06 14:41 UTC

CWE

CWE-367 - Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition
CWE-918 - Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Assigner

GitHub_M mitre root

References

1 reference

URL	Tags
https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/securi…	x_refsource_CONFIRM

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
MervinPraison	PraisonAI	Affected: < 1.6.58

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JSON

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{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-55524",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-08-06T14:41:35.294289Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-08-06T14:43:50.259Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-vg6p-v9vm-6fgj"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "PraisonAI",
          "vendor": "MervinPraison",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 1.6.58"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions prior to 1.6.58, the web_crawl tool performs its SSRF check only on the initially supplied URL, allowing the protection to be bypassed so the tool connects to attacker-chosen internal destinations. The check resolves the hostname once with socket.gethostbyname and rejects private/loopback/link-local results, but then passes the URL to a fetcher using httpx.Client(follow_redirects=True) (or urllib.request.urlopen when httpx is absent, which also follows redirects) that re-resolves the hostname at connect time with no further validation. This validate-here/fetch-there gap is exploitable through both HTTP redirects and DNS rebinding. If an attacker can influence URLs passed to web_crawl(), directly or through an agent/tool workflow, they can cause the PraisonAI host to fetch loopback, private-network, or cloud metadata endpoints reachable from that host, with the response body returned in the web_crawl() result. This issue has been fixed in version 1.6.58."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "baseScore": 7.5,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "integrityImpact": "LOW",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "scope": "CHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-367",
              "description": "CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-918",
              "description": "CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T19:58:46.038Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-vg6p-v9vm-6fgj",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-vg6p-v9vm-6fgj"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-vg6p-v9vm-6fgj",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "PraisonAI: SSRF in web_crawl tool via redirect-following and DNS rebinding (validate-then-fetch gap)"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-55524",
    "datePublished": "2026-08-05T19:58:46.038Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-06-16T22:44:22.284Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-08-06T14:43:50.259Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.

Action not permitted

GHSA-VG6P-V9VM-6FGJ

CVE-2026-55524 (GCVE-0-2026-55524)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature