GHSA-VCXF-C337-W2H7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-20 06:32 – Updated: 2026-11-20 06:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: memory: fix truncation removing mapped folios
Ayush reported an issue that shmem/tmpfs folios are still mapped when truncating them on production: " BUG: Bad page cache in process ... pfn:... page dumped because: still mapped when deleted "
I reproduced the issue with Ayush's reproducer [1] with the latest mm-unstable branch, and I got the following crash info. From the dump message, we can see that truncate_inode_folio() is really trying to remove mapped folios, which is incorrect.
" [ 189.171977] page: refcount:3 mapcount:1 mapping:00000000fe168ee1 index:0x3880 pfn:0x191647 [ 189.171995] memcg:ffff0000cc073d40 [ 189.171997] aops:shmem_aops ino:3c01 dentry name(?):"memfd:runsc-memory" [ 189.172006] flags: 0x17fffef0002022d(locked|referenced|uptodate|lru| workingset|swapbacked|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x3ffff) ....... [ 189.172017] page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO(folio_mapped(folio)) [ 189.172026] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 189.172027] kernel BUG at mm/filemap.c:155! [ 189.172057] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP ....... [ 189.177721] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 5521 Comm: repro Kdump: loaded Tainted: 7.3.0-rc4+ #277 PREEMPT(lazy) ....... [ 189.183986] Call trace: [ 189.184124] filemap_unaccount_folio+0xf0/0x1e8 (P) [ 189.184391] __filemap_remove_folio+0x34/0x160 [ 189.184633] filemap_remove_folio+0x4c/0xb0 [ 189.184859] truncate_inode_folio+0x34/0x58 [ 189.185087] shmem_undo_range+0x220/0x658 [ 189.185308] shmem_fallocate+0x2f0/0x470 [ 189.185527] vfs_fallocate+0x128/0x328 ...... [ 189.187078] el0t_64_sync+0x184/0x188 "
After analysis, I believe the race exists between truncation and MADV_DONTNEED, and shmem's ->map_pages() merely makes the issue easier to reproduce. Since MADV_DONTNEED synchronously releases the pagetable page before calling tlb_flush_rmaps(), this could cause another thread's truncation to skip zap_pte_range() (due to pmd is none) but still observe the folio's mapcount as non-zero. A possible race scenario is as follows:
CPU 0 CPU 1 shmem_fallocate madvise_dontneed_single_vma unmap_mapping_range ....... ...... (filemap_map_pages() remap folios) zap_pte_range truncate_inode_folio zap_empty_pte_table(pmd clear) unmap_mapping_folio ...... zap_pmd_range (saw pmd none, skip)
filemap_remove_folio BUG_ON(folio_mapped) tlb_flush_rmaps(remove rmaps)
To fix this issue, we should move the pmd clear operation (via zap_empty_pte_table()) to after tlb_flush_rmaps() and use sync_with_folio_pmd_zap() to sync with concurrent zapping, so that when we find a pmd_none() while unmapping a folio without holding the PTL, the folio's mappings are guaranteed to have been removed via tlb_flush_rmaps().
Meanwhile move the second pmd_none() check to where it belongs: if splitting zapped the PMD.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99705"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-20T06:18:06Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm: memory: fix truncation removing mapped folios\n\nAyush reported an issue that shmem/tmpfs folios are still mapped when\ntruncating them on production:\n\"\nBUG: Bad page cache in process ... pfn:...\npage dumped because: still mapped when deleted\n\"\n\nI reproduced the issue with Ayush\u0027s reproducer [1] with the latest\nmm-unstable branch, and I got the following crash info. From the dump\nmessage, we can see that truncate_inode_folio() is really trying to remove\nmapped folios, which is incorrect.\n\n\"\n[ 189.171977] page: refcount:3 mapcount:1 mapping:00000000fe168ee1\nindex:0x3880 pfn:0x191647\n[ 189.171995] memcg:ffff0000cc073d40\n[ 189.171997] aops:shmem_aops ino:3c01 dentry name(?):\"memfd:runsc-memory\"\n[ 189.172006] flags: 0x17fffef0002022d(locked|referenced|uptodate|lru|\nworkingset|swapbacked|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x3ffff)\n.......\n[ 189.172017] page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO(folio_mapped(folio))\n[ 189.172026] ------------[ cut here ]------------\n[ 189.172027] kernel BUG at mm/filemap.c:155!\n[ 189.172057] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP\n.......\n[ 189.177721] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 5521 Comm: repro Kdump: loaded Tainted:\n7.3.0-rc4+ #277 PREEMPT(lazy)\n.......\n[ 189.183986] Call trace:\n[ 189.184124] filemap_unaccount_folio+0xf0/0x1e8 (P)\n[ 189.184391] __filemap_remove_folio+0x34/0x160\n[ 189.184633] filemap_remove_folio+0x4c/0xb0\n[ 189.184859] truncate_inode_folio+0x34/0x58\n[ 189.185087] shmem_undo_range+0x220/0x658\n[ 189.185308] shmem_fallocate+0x2f0/0x470\n[ 189.185527] vfs_fallocate+0x128/0x328\n......\n[ 189.187078] el0t_64_sync+0x184/0x188\n\"\n\nAfter analysis, I believe the race exists between truncation and\nMADV_DONTNEED, and shmem\u0027s -\u003emap_pages() merely makes the issue easier to\nreproduce. Since MADV_DONTNEED synchronously releases the pagetable page\nbefore calling tlb_flush_rmaps(), this could cause another thread\u0027s\ntruncation to skip zap_pte_range() (due to pmd is none) but still observe\nthe folio\u0027s mapcount as non-zero. A possible race scenario is as follows:\n\nCPU 0 CPU 1\nshmem_fallocate madvise_dontneed_single_vma\n unmap_mapping_range .......\n ......\n (filemap_map_pages() remap folios)\n\t\t\t\t zap_pte_range\n truncate_inode_folio\t\t zap_empty_pte_table(pmd clear)\n unmap_mapping_folio\n ......\n zap_pmd_range (saw pmd none, skip)\n\n filemap_remove_folio\n BUG_ON(folio_mapped)\n tlb_flush_rmaps(remove rmaps)\n\nTo fix this issue, we should move the pmd clear operation (via\nzap_empty_pte_table()) to after tlb_flush_rmaps() and use\nsync_with_folio_pmd_zap() to sync with concurrent zapping, so that when we\nfind a pmd_none() while unmapping a folio without holding the PTL, the\nfolio\u0027s mappings are guaranteed to have been removed via\ntlb_flush_rmaps().\n\nMeanwhile move the second pmd_none() check to where it belongs: if\nsplitting zapped the PMD.",
"id": "GHSA-vcxf-c337-w2h7",
"modified": "2026-11-20T06:32:08Z",
"published": "2026-11-20T06:32:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99705"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/243cf1f67b365668389832463fc31cbb9fec47af"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8011e987026b65f59ea6b6082c777807a008b227"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b57cfd4da476a4636bf1ed69dee176cc266e5a06"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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